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i 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this research I examine the intersubjective dimension of suffering which 
affects the relation of the sufferer to his/her lived body, time and space, as well as to 
his/her narrative identity and narrative memory. I argue that narrative voice 
constitutes the intersubjective relation in illness narratives that caregivers write about 
partners or spouses who suffered from brain cancer or Alzheimer’s disease. My 
discussion draws on ethics, phenomenology, theories of embodiment, life-narratives 
studies, medical anthropology and sociology, and narratological theory. The object of 
my study is the embodied, subjective experience of suffering in illness narratives and 
the main focus is cast on suffering as loss of memory and loss of the narrative self. I 
analyse Frank Davey’s diary How Linda Died, and John Bayley’s memoirs Iris: A 
Memoir of Iris Murdoch, and Iris and Her Friends: A Memoir of Memory and Desire. 
I explore how illness narratives as embodied stories constitute an ethical relation to 
the suffering Other who bears a lived impossibility of remembering. I situate the 
discussion of voice in the context of life-narratives and aim at filling in the theoretical 
gaps of sociological and anthropological approaches of voice in illness narratives. For 
this, I examine and question narratological studies of narrative voice and focalization. 
My own definition of narrative voice is based on Emmanuel Levinas’s and Paul 
Ricœur’s ethics, Saint Augustine’s interpretation of time, memory, and forgetfulness, 
and on Levinas’s discussion of time as intersubjective relation. I suggest that 
“spontanéité bienveillante” (Ricœur, Soi-même comme un autre 222) modulates 
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narrative voice as the attention towards the suffering Other whose voice is silenced.     
Reformulating the Augustinian definition of time that correlates the temporal modes 
with the reciting voice, I suggest that through the ethical stance towards the Other, 
voice is distended between the present voice of voice present, the present voice of 
voice past and the present voice of voice future. I show how the voice of the caregiver 
is inscribed by and inscribes itself in the interstices of an interrupted, suffering voice. I 
define life-narratives as textual interfaces between the self and the Other, between 
one’s own voice and the sufferer’s voice, as a mode of restoring the Other’s narrative 
integrity. 
 
Keywords: suffering, pain, memory, ethics, illness narratives, other, voice, diary, 
memoir, autobiography. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
 
 Cette étude porte sur la dimension intersubjective de la souffrance qui affecte 
le rapport du souffrant à son corps, au temps et à l’espace vécus de même que son 
identité narrative et sa mémoire narrative. Mon argument principal est que la voix 
narrative constitue le rapport intersubjectif dans les récits de maladie que les proches 
écrivent sur leurs partenaires souffrant de cancer de cerveau ou de la maladie 
d’Alzheimer. Ma discussion est basée sur l’éthique, la phénoménologie, les théories 
de l’incorporation, les études des récits de vie, la sociologie et l’anthropologie 
médicales et la narratologie. L’objet de mon étude est l’expérience incorporée de la 
souffrance dans les récits de maladie et je me concentre sur la souffrance comme perte 
de la mémoire et du soi narratif. J’analyse le journal How Linda Died de Frank Davey 
et les mémoires de John Bayley: Iris: A Memoir of Iris Murdoch et Iris and Her 
Friends: A Memoir of Memory and Desire. J’explore comment les récits de maladie 
constituent le rapport éthique à l’Autre souffrant de la rupture de la mémoire. La 
discussion de la voix est située dans le contexte des récits de vie et se propose de 
dépasser les limites des approches sociologiques et anthropologiques de la voix dans 
les récits de maladie. Dans ce sens, dans un premier temps je porte mon attention sur 
des études narratologiques de la voix en indiquant leurs limites. Ma propre définition 
de la voix narrative est basée sur l’éthique dans la perspective d’Emmanuel Levinas et 
de Paul Ricœur, sur l’interprétation du temps, de la mémoire et de l’oubli chez St-
Augustin et la discussion levinasienne de la constitution intersubjective du temps. 
iv 
J’avance l’idée que la “spontanéité bienveillante” (Ricœur, Soi-même comme un autre 
222) articule la voix narrative et l’attention envers l’Autre souffrant qui ne peut plus 
se rappeler, ni raconter sa mémoire. En reformulant la définition augustinienne du 
temps qui met en corrélation les modes temporels avec la voix qui récite, j’avance 
l’idée que la voix est distendue entre la voix présente de la voix présente, la voix 
présente de la voix passée, la voix présente de la voix future. Je montre comment la 
voix du soignant est inscrite par et s’inscrit dans les interstices d’une voix 
interrompue, souffrante. Je définis les récits de vies comme des interfaces textuelles 
entre le soi et l’Autre, entre la voix du soi et la voix du souffrant, comme un mode de 
restaurer l’intégrité narrative de l’Autre. 
 
Mots-clef: souffrance, douleur, mémoire, éthique, récits de maladie, autre, soi, voix, 
journal, autobiographie. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 While some scholars who study suffering tend to concentrate on suffering as 
an object of political argument, of engaged action or of discursive topics–“suffering at 
a distance” (Boltanski 9)–they risk neglecting the immediate, embodied proximity and 
the very language and discourse of suffering, the means through which the 
intersubjective relation to the suffering Other might become effective or not. 
 Definitions of “suffering” and “pain” formulated in the social sciences or 
philosophy point to the limits of bio-medical views on suffering and pain, to the 
difficulties in making a clear-cut distinction between them, and hence, as I shall argue, 
to the necessity of approaching suffering and pain from a contextual perspective. 
Moreover, as an existential experience, it compels the researcher to adopt a 
phenomenological point of view as the most appropriate way to understand the 
embodied condition of the sufferer and to put under scrutiny how one can relate to the 
suffering Other. Still, the phenomenological standpoint is not exempt from 
inconsistencies that plunge such approaches into the heart of aporias. I am thinking 
mainly of the phenomenologists’ assertion of the preobjective, prereflective status of 
embodiment while at the same time recognizing the distancing, objective relation to 
one’s body in pain.  
 In the social sciences, illness narratives have been among the privileged 
descriptors, and at the same time operators, where scholars have retrieved the 
embodied and intersubjective dimensions of suffering. However, though the temporal 
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structure of narratives is closely related to the problem of remembering and memory, 
the pervading interest is oriented towards the embodied condition of the sufferer, and 
less towards how one can relate to a disrupted remembering that turns into a disturbed 
lived time, and a disturbed lived story of the embodied self. It is significant to note the 
distinction made by Arthur W. Frank (The Wounded Storyteller) between the 
disturbance of “remembering” and the disturbance of “memory.” For him, it is only 
“memory” that can bear the weight of moral significance, as memory elicits the 
coherence of self. Illness affects memory so far as the sufferer is not able to give 
meaning to the past from the perspective of the present illness, and a blurred vision of 
the future. Finally the past is experienced as a painful incoherent present: “the illness 
experiences that are being told are unassimilated fragments that refuse to become past, 
haunting the present” (The Wounded Storyteller 60). Structured by storytelling, 
memory appears to be a means of restoring the sense of coherence that is threatened 
by illness. For Frank, storytelling is equivalent to the storyteller’s witnessing of 
his/her own condition, and reaching the readers as a community of witnesses to 
his/her experience. But what about experiencing oneself as an impossible storyteller 
whose memory is affected in its remembering capacity? What about a lived time 
where past, present and future lose not only their chronological sequencing, but the 
very quality of having ever been experienced or awaiting to be experienced? 
 In the case of Alzheimer’s disease or brain cancer, one is confronted with the 
prospect of the loss of memory, not only as the loss of narrative coherence, but also as 
the loss of remembering. What are at stake are not only the narrative structure of 
memory, but also what Adriana Cavarerro calls spontaneous acts of telling the story 
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of self, the “familiar experience of a narratability of the self” (34), “the self-sensing 
[assaporarsi] of the self as narratable” (35). 
 Thus, illness narratives, if they relate to us the suffering Other, have to be 
examined as operators of the intersubjective relation that can give access to a 
forgotten dimension of suffering, the loss of memory as remembering, as narratable 
self, and as an embodied self. 
 The main problem would then be to account for illness narratives as embodied 
stories that perform an ethical relation to the suffering Other who bears a lived 
impossibility to remember. Eventually, one will then have to answer the following 
questions: how does the narrative discourse convey the embodied condition of 
suffering, and how can narrative discourse constitute an intersubjective relation to the 
suffering Other as affected by the loss of remembering, by forgetfulness. What would 
the narrative mechanisms be that render this relation effective? As a consequence, one 
has to tackle the temporal aspects of intersubjectivity, a neglected domain among 
studies that question the intersubjective dimensions of suffering.  
 My aim is to show that the experience of suffering entails intersubjective 
dimensions, and to point towards narrative discourses as embodied tales performing 
the intersubjective relation with the suffering Other. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
SITUATING THE PROBLEM 
 
The Indeterminacy of Suffering and Pain 
 
 
Situated at the crossroads between body and mind, biology and culture 
(Bendelow, and Williams, “Pain and the Mind-Body Dualism,” “Emotions, Pain and 
Gender”; Jackson, “Camp Pain”), sensation and subjective experience; resisting its 
objectification through language, radically destroying language as a world of 
significance (Scarry, The Body in Pain; Good, “A Body in Pain,” “The Body, Illness 
Experience, and the Lifeworld”; Le Breton), incommunicable, impossible to share 
with others and which one can reach only by the invention of words referring to it or 
going back to the original emergence of language, (Scarry, The Body in Pain; Illich; 
Baszanger, “Pain: Its Experience and Treatments,” “Déchiffrer la douleur 
chronique”), physical pain deters any attempt at its reduction to an object of bio-
medical gaze (Baszanger, “Pain: Its Experience and Treatments,” “Déchiffrer la 
douleur chronique”; Loeser). The consideration of its psychological, affective, 
cognitive and sociocultural dimensions by Ronald Melzac and Patrick D. Wall led to 
the redefinition of pain as perception that should be tackled within a multidisciplinary 
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view.1 
The very nexus between mind and body led to the more or less undetermined 
use of the terms “pain” and “suffering.” At first glance, for Frederik J. J. Buytendijk, 
it seems that pain and suffering are equivalent experiences, both implying the 
bodily/psychic divide, despite his rejection of the Cartesian system. Physical pain is 
synonymous with “bodily suffering” (Buytendijk 16). It is the “irritation par 
excellence” (Buytendijk 15) that calls upon the immediate pragmatic act of looking 
for the remedy, as opposed to mental suffering or “psychic pain” (24; italics in the 
original) that would necessarily imply relations with others, social contexts, that 
activates a reflexive act upon it and a whole range of feelings, psychic processes, and 
volitional acts.  
But both physical pain and “bodily suffering” are associated with sickness and 
death, a memento of the frailty of our existence: “Fear of sickness and death is really 
fear of suffering” (15). Thus the boundaries between pain and suffering become 
blurred as “fear of suffering” and “fear of pain” seem to be interchangeable:  
[m]odern man … is irritated by old age, long illness, and even by death; 
above all he is irritated by pain. Pain simply must not occur. … The 
consequence is an immoderate state of algophobia (fear of pain) which is 
itself an evil and sets a seal of timidity on the whole of human life. (15-16) 
The apparent inconsistency ensues in fact from his acknowledgment of a basic 
“contradiction of union and body-mind parallelism [that] must be accepted as an 
irreducible fact” (Buytendijk 37); “union and body-mind [physical and psychological] 
                                                     
1 Neurologists are more and more aware of the limits of a stimulus-response definition of pain, taking 
into account the learned past experiences, the anticipated consequences and genetically formed 
responses that modulate the response to pain (see Loeser’s model). 
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parallelism” would mean a coexistence, co-dependency between body and mind that, 
at the same time, consolidates them as two distinct entities. 
Scholars have called attention to the suffering patient as a suffering person in 
his/her wholeness, an embodied person with a certain personality structure and located 
in a social world, not simply a “case” (Cassell, The Nature of Suffering; Buytendijk; 
Frank, At the Will of the Body, The Wounded Storyteller). Eric J. Cassell’s criticism is 
doubly oriented: towards either the analogy between a bio-medical definition of pain 
and suffering, or towards the exclusive identification of suffering with the domain of 
mind, and spirit:  
Suffering occurs when an impending destruction of the person is perceived … 
suffering extends beyond the physical. […] suffering can be defined as the 
state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the intactness of 
person. […] suffering can occur in relation to any aspect of the person. 
(Cassell, The Nature of Suffering 32) 
Nonetheless, Cassell makes the distinction between pain and suffering, arguing that 
there are forms of suffering without pain and forms of pain without suffering 
(“Recognizing Suffering,” The Nature of Suffering). But the same type of argument 
could be used against such a claim: as there are forms of pain that develop into forms 
of suffering and vice versa, one could argue for the non-distinctiveness between pain 
and suffering. Moreover, Cassell identifies the “whole person” as “not … solely the 
whole biological organism … although it may be the object of the threat, for persons, 
while they may be identified with their bodies, cannot be whole in body alone” 
(“Recognizing Suffering” 25, added emphasis), an argument which implies however 
that the biological organism is at least one dimension of the “whole person” affected 
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by pain. 
For Steven D. Edwards, pain is initially neither a necessary condition of 
suffering nor suffering a necessary consequence of pain; both pain and suffering 
might seem to be fairly independent of each other. However, while defining the 
“intuitive concept of suffering” (64), Edwards states as sine qua non conditions of 
experiencing suffering the “felt, mental experience of suffering” (65) assumed by the 
sufferer’s self, caused by physical pain,2 its “significant duration” (65), and the power 
to subjugate mental life, centering the subject’s attention on suffering. In a more 
nuanced stance, John David Loeser asks whether suffering, a  
negative affective response to pain originates within the brain when 
information saying ‘pain’ is received, or whether nociceptive information 
reaching the dorsal horn leads to the activation of circuits leading to the 
production of both pain and suffering at the spinal and brainstem levels. That 
is, is suffering added onto pain in the brain? Or does it have a structural 
underpinning that starts in specific projection systems? (19-20) 
At the same time he sustains a “generating” view on suffering, in which 
suffering is a part of a four-element model defining “pain.” This model is structured 
around nociceptive input, pain, suffering, and pain behaviour (exteriorized pain 
gestures, attitudes, socially learned somatizations), where suffering is “generated in 
the brain by pain, fear, anxiety, stress, loss of loved objects, and other psychological 
states” (19, emphasis added). Moreover, everyday talk seems to overturn any clear-cut 
distinction between pain and suffering, as pain vocabulary is used to denote suffering 
                                                     
2 “But the significance of such physical changes ultimately derives from the fact that they cause 
humans to feel awful, to feel ill, to suffer” (Edwards 64, emphasis added). The question to ask then 
would be: how can pain cause suffering? 
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(Loeser). 
Hence, far from being exclusively limited to the physical domain, physical 
pain is a “a hurtful mode of subjectivity; a way of being which is distorted, tortured, 
and distressed [it is] a form of suffering” (van Hooft, “Pain and Communication” 256; 
Morris, Illness and Culture). Physical pain is a dimension of suffering (Kahn and 
Steeves, “Witnesses to Suffering”). Suffering is the integrative experience comprising 
pain and illness: malady and being sick are forms of suffering too (van Hooft, 
“Suffering and the Goals of Medicine”).3 Emmanuel Levinas (“La souffrance inutile” 
interchangeably uses the terms of “useless suffering” and “useless pain.” He 
understands suffering as sensorial content or data which pierces the senses and 
consciousness against any intentional orientation; an in-spite-of-itself consciousness 
in which the unbearable cannot bear itself anymore, but still gives itself as data, as 
painful sensation. Suffering is then passivity, to be subjected to adversity, 
vulnerability, pathos: “ ‘le contenu’ dont la conscience endolorie est souffrance, son 
mal” (Levinas, “La souffrance inutile” 101). 
Eventually pain becomes an object of sociological, anthropological and 
philosophical investigation pointing to “the complexities of emotion” (Bendelow and 
Williams, “Emotions, Pain and Gender” 255), to the adversity and distress inseparable 
                                                     
3 In “Pain and Communication” Stan van Hooft offers a holistic view of suffering based on Aristotle’s 
four dimensional model of the soul (vegetative-biological; appetitive-emotional, desiring, relating to 
others; deliberative-rational, practical; contemplative-spiritual). The model constitutes the dimensions 
of the person affected, frustrated in his/her goals with respect to these dimensions, by pain, and malady. 
Though I accept his view of pain as a subjective mode of suffering, I do not agree with this four 
dimensional model, which tries, on the contrary, to offer an objective view of suffering on the basis of 
situations where people can suffer without being aware of their suffering. I challenge his objective 
perspective as under the name of different types of suffering, biological, emotional, practical, and 
spiritual, he re-formulates similar dichotomies as those between the former mind/body, pain/suffering. 
At the same time, Aristotle’s view of soul implies a hierarchical order which cannot be applied with 
respect to pain and suffering experiences.  
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from the sensorial experience (Leder, “Toward a Phenomenology of Pain,” The 
Absent Body; Jackson, “The Rashomon Approach to Dealing with Chronic Pain,” 
Camp Pain; Van Hooft, “Pain and Communication”), from the social and 
psychological dimensions engaged in the pain experience (Bendelow and Williams, 
“Emotions, Pain and Gender”). It is understood as the subjective experience eliciting 
pain stories and stories about pain (Scarry; Kleinman, The Illness Narratives; Saillant; 
Morris, The Culture of Pain; Good, “The Body, Illness Experience, and the 
Lifeworld”; Kleinman, “Pain and Resistance”; Kleinman, and Kleinman; Bendelow, 
and Williams, “Pain and the Mind-Body Dualism,” “Transcending the Dualisms”; 
Loeser), obliging the subject to start an interpretive work (Leder, “Toward a 
Phenomenology of Pain,” The Absent Body) whose instruments are the cultural and 
social meanings of the life world in which he is a participant. The very physiology of 
pain is filtered by social and cultural categories through which it is understood 
(Kleinman, The Illness Narratives, “Pain and Resistance”; Morris, The Culture of 
Pain, “The Plot of Suffering”; Good, “A Body in Pain”; Bendelow and Williams, 
“Pain and the Mind-Body Dualism,” “Emotions, Pain and Gender”; Kleinman and 
Kleinman, “Suffering and Its Professional Transformation”). Pain articulates then with 
existential suffering, with its subjective, intersubjective and cultural significances 
(Illich) because, integrated into the world of lived experience: “Pain is not a 
psychological fact, but an existential fact. It is not the body that suffers, but the 
individual in its thoroughness” (le Breton 45). It engages the human being with its 
moral consciousness in a process where pain and suffering are constituted in an 
interdependent relationship (le Breton).  
10 
The object of the present study is the subjective suffering experience in illness 
narratives, inseparable from physical pain, the “pain-related suffering” (Chapman and 
Volinn 74). I shall use, in an alternative way, the concepts of “suffering” and “pain” 
where pain is understood as an embodied dimension of suffering. My analysis will 
focus upon Frank Davey’s diary How Linda Died, John Bayley’s memoirs Iris: A 
Memoir of Iris Murdoch, and Iris and her Friends: A Memoir of Memory and Desire. 
As we will see further, pain and suffering are embodied, contextually, and 
culturally situated experiences (see p. 30). Hence, my purpose is not to formulate a 
general definition of pain or suffering that would establish their sufficient and 
necessary conditions. The review of different studies on pain and suffering enabled 
me to understand that such a project would be destined to fail. When talking about 
pain and suffering, one has to consider the contexts in which they are experienced: the 
illness context is different from sport or work effort; human pain and suffering are 
different from animal pain and suffering, etc. And even in the experience of an illness, 
one can seize differences among acute or chronic conditions, among different forms of 
disease. Trying to formulate an overarching definition while mixing these conditions 
would be a risky approach, vulnerable to the continuous expansion of types of pain 
and suffering. 
Therefore, my reading of different approaches of pain and suffering has been 
articulated by its explicit or implicit reference to the illness context of my research, by 
its relevance to the illness experience.  
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The Importance of the Study 
 
The contribution of my study is twofold: theoretical and methodological.  
From the very beginning, the illness narratives I have chosen to analyze plunge 
my research into unexplored territory: suffering as a loss of remembering in the 
context of an apparently strict physical and physiological disorder (brain cancer).4 My 
purpose then is to undo the silence to which forgetting condemns the patient through 
revealing how illness narratives can compensate for the loss of a remembering voice. 
Moreover, it will reveal how the “narrative prosthesis” (Mitchell and Sharon 2000) 
functions as “narrative negotiation” (1) with and for a suffering subject who is slowly 
losing her voice. 
Second, my study will supply a narrative method that I consider the most 
appropriate to account for the narratives with and for the suffering Other. My method 
questions narratological studies of narrative voice and focalization, an unvoiced story 
in sociological studies conducted on illness narratives.5 As I will show, qualitative 
studies of illness narratives have explored the multiple facets of emplotment, a central 
concept in narratology. But they ignore the value of other narrative elements 
(narrative voice) that are crucial for the narrative functioning as emplotment: no 
narrative exists without a narrating agent, the narrator. My study will allow me to 
understand the ethical issues of narrating for and about the Other’s illness, a pervasive 
problem in the context of the recent abundance of published life writings (see 
                                                     
4 Hence I depart from traumatic memory and mental disease as the topic of our study. However, I will 
bring up for discussion some of their aspects that can illuminate the cases I am analyzing. 
5 I first proposed this method and presented the incipient version of our analysis in Encountering the 
Other’s Suffering in Illness Diaries and Memoirs, a paper presented at the 20th European Conference on 
Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care, August 23-26 2006, Helsinki. 
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Couser’s detailed review in Recovering Bodies). I argue that applying such a method 
enables us to find a way out of the risks of misrepresentation, of false claims to 
narrative authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existential Domains of Suffering: Finding the Locus of Intersubjectivity 
 
 
Critical perspectives on bio-medical definitions of pain that bracket the 
sufferers’ voice have been formulated mainly within a phenomenological perspective 
and the paradigm of embodiment. These perspectives specifically take into 
consideration the lived, “phenomenologically embodied” experience of the sufferer in 
its day-to-day immediacy, transcending the division of body and thought (Bendelow 
and Williams, “Pain and the Mind-Body Dualism” 86, see also “Transcending the 
Dualisms”; Good, “A Body in Pain”; Jackson, “Chronic Pain,” “Camp Pain”; Kahn 
and Steeves, “The Significance of Suffering”). The pain of the ill body is part of the 
self and cannot be reduced to a physical object or physiological phase: “The body is 
subject, the very grounds of subjectivity or of experience in the world” (Good, “The 
Body, Illness Experience, and the Lifeworld” 116; see also Csordas, “Embodiment as 
a Paradigm”). As a “conscious body,” it is an integral part of consciousness, “the 
diseased body is therefore not simply the object of cognition and knowledge, of 
representation […] It is at the same time a disordered agent of experience” imposing 
changes in the whole life world (Good, “The Body, Illness Experience, and the 
Lifeworld” 116).  
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Hence, from the very beginning, one has to underscore that disruptive pain 
irrupts into the existential domains of suffering, anchored in an embodied condition, 
but pervading the whole person and his/her life world, “the experience of time, lived 
human relations, and lived space” (Kahn and Steeves, “The Significance of Suffering” 
13; see also van Manen, Researching Lived Experience; Steeves). Scholars 
demonstrated in phenomenological studies that pain affects, disrupts the experience of 
self that unites a prereflexive awareness of one’s body, one’s own sense of 
personhood, and social identity; pain converts into a suffering self, socially 
embarrassed, disfigured, and isolated (Steeves; Kahn and Steeves, “Witnesses to 
Suffering”), that cannot be in agreement anymore with his/her social roles, self-image, 
self-identity. Eventually it becomes a “loss of self” (Charmaz, “Loss of Self”; Good 
Days, Bad Days; “Stories of Suffering”; Good, “A Body in Pain”; “The Body, Illness 
Experience, and the Lifeworld”; Chapman and Volinn; van Hooft, “The Meanings of 
Suffering”; “Suffering and the Goals of Medicine”).  
Such approaches have to refer then, through a phenomenological description of 
the suffering experience (Good, “A Body in Pain”), to “the embodied experience, the 
intersubjective meaning, [and] narratives” (Good, “The Body, Illness Experience, and 
the Lifeworld” 118) reflecting and reconstructing illness and suffering experiences, 
the social practices that articulate illness behaviour. In the following section I shall 
define the concept of embodiment as I use it, second I will conduct the discussion of 
intersubjectivity in the phenomenological context and finally I shall examine the way 
different interpretations of suffering are defined with respect to the integration or non-
integration of intersubjectivity in the suffering experience.  
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Embodiment: Beyond the Body/Mind Divide 
 
The project of transcending Western thought dichotomies has appeared in 
sociological and anthropological studies of body and emotions. Their attempt is to 
offer an integrated vision of body-mind, nature-culture, emotion-reason relations 
(Rosaldo; Scheper-Hughes and Lock; Lyon).  
Anchoring his work in Maurice Merleau–Ponty’s “phenomenology of 
perception” (Phénoménologie de la perception) and in Pierre Bourdieu’s definition of 
the habitus concept, Thomas J. Csordas formulated, in medical anthropology, the 
paradigm of embodiment. He does not consider the body an object, but “the subject of 
culture, [as] the existential base of culture” (Csordas, “Embodiment as a Paradigm for 
Anthropology” 5; Introduction). Merleau-Ponty (Phénoménologie de la perception) 
has advanced such a position in his argument for the preobjective constitution of 
perception, before the reflective objectification of the self or the analytical distinction 
between subject and object. The primary requirement of this approach is to grasp “the 
preobjective and prereflective experience of the body” (Csordas, “Embodiment as a 
Paradigm for Anthropology” 6) and the way cultural significance and social 
limitations are entangled in the existential experience of the body through perception. 
From the very fact of our existence, the body inhabits the social world and carries this 
social world with itself in a prereflective way (see also Csordas, Introduction).  
At the same time, Csordas explores the solution of the suppression of the 
body-mind and sign-significance dualities proposed by Bourdieu through the concept 
of habitus: the disposition system constituting the principle of production and 
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unification of practices and representations, which is founded in the socially 
constructed body and relates the world vision with the objective structures of a 
specific social world.  
As far as the perception and the objectification of the self take place within the 
moment where subject and object are indistinct, experience is understood basically as 
an unstructured, and preobjective expression of a culturally formed self. The body is 
the locus of a spontaneous manifestation of the preobjective cultural sense, embodied 
as somatic disposition, to which individuals have immediate access. Hence, one has to 
shift from a definition of cultural meaning as an external reference to expression, and 
see it as embodied in the very act of somatic expression–the shared habitus. 
 
 
Intersubjectivity: A Starting Point 
 
The intersubjectivity problem has been one of the main concerns in the 
phenomenological approach in sociology. Though it had already appeared in the 
symbolic interactionsts’ work (Cooley; Mead; Blumer; Goffman), as my main concern 
is with the existential domains of the experience of suffering, I shall specifically 
discuss Alfred Schütz’s work, which is deeply rooted in the European 
phenomenological tradition and in the Weberian comprehensive sociology. 
Schütz’s phenomenological definition of intersubjectivity is based on the 
meaningful configuration of self-explanation, on the contents of consciousness. 
Central to his view is the thesis of the prevalence of the social world reality in relation 
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to the Ego’s reality. Social reality is taken for granted in the natural attitude and 
configures the situation of the human being in the world as reference to the we sphere: 
the common sphere to which the ego participates while relating to others, to Thou. 
The “We-Relationship” (Schütz, The Phenomenology of the Social World 163) is pre-
given to and a prerequisite for our mundane relationship with others. It implies the 
presupposition that the temporal structure of consciousness of the subject who 
apprehends the other is analogous to the other’s consciousness, that the “Thou knows 
its experiences only through reflective Acts of attention.” (Schütz, The 
Phenomenology of the Social World 98) which change over time too. Both are 
experiencing ageing. 
The temporal structure of consciousness is based on attention Acts 
accomplished as intentional Acts of orientation and selection of the consciousness flux 
moments. The interpretation of these moments of a lived experience depends on 
specific meaning configurations (contexts) synthetically formed throughout the 
successive acts of consciousness that give meaning to objects. They form the total 
stock of knowledge accumulated throughout the lived experience. The “intended 
meaning” of lived experience is constituted by the reference to the “meaning 
contexts.” In the context of intersubjective relationships, Schütz points then to the 
limits of apprehending the other’s comprehensive interpretation of his own lived 
experiences. It is impossible to reiterate exactly the intentional acts of the other, for 
his consciousness moments depend on an individual spatial and temporal situation. 
How then is intersubjectivity possible? The relationship to the other resides in our 
experience of his experience, his actions, his body and these are given in the 
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interpretation of our perceptions of the other who appears as an “other,” as an alter-
ity. In the everyday life world, the other is given to us as subject, a psychophysical 
unity between bodily movements and its psyche. Our interpretation is then a 
meaningful apprehension of the other for the other’s bodily movements are taken as 
the expression of other’s consciousness content, as signs or indications referring to his 
lived experiences and the experiences emergent from his reflective attention to which 
he confers an intentional significance. Intersubjectivity is then the reciprocal 
correspondence between the lived experience of Ego and the other, between the body 
of the Ego and the other. It is the sense of this correspondence that has to be clarified.  
 Even if the other’s experience is apprehended through the Ego’s experience, as 
far as the other’s lived experience is given in a significant intentional Act of Ego and, 
as a consequence, it is his intentional object here and now, the access to the other’s 
experience is not determined by a reflective act of attention to the experience of Ego. 
On the contrary, the gaze oriented towards the other can seize lived experiences of the 
other which belong to a pre-phenomenal sphere for himself, which are still not 
thematized, differentiated by his own reflective act. Thus, it is possible to have access 
to the other’s experiences during their very accomplishment, and not just to past 
experiences forming objects of the reflective attention of Ego. 
The possibility of constituting the other’s flux of consciousness as an 
intentional object here and now is the solution to the co-existence and simultaneity of 
consciousnesses, for their “intersection.” Schütz brings forward the notion of 
“synchronism of two streams of consciousness” (The Phenomenology of the Social 
World 102), of “simultaneity of two durations” (103). The natural attitude towards the 
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other implies the presupposition of the analogy between the temporal structures of 
Ego and the other’s consciousness; this means that durée is not only an “absolute 
reality” (103) of every subject separately, but durée is an absolute reality for the other. 
It appears then that a single intentional Act joins two flows of consciousness. 
Simultaneity is finally translated as “the phenomenon of growing older together” 
(103; italics in the original) making possible the subjective experience not only of our 
own durée, but of the other’s as well. Hence, one is able to apprehend the very 
character of otherness, the pre-phenomenal subjective experience of the other, its 
intentional Acts, and meaning configurations that have arisen simultaneously with 
those of the Ego. 
However, Schütz observes that simultaneity does not imply the identity of 
lived experiences because experience comprehension bears the interpretive marks of 
Ego placed in a subjective space-time and in a specific meaning context based on past 
lived experience. The comprehension of the other refers ineluctably to the “self-
explication” (100) of Ego. The other is understood and interpreted from the 
perspective of the meaning structures of the Ego. One could say that there is an 
interpretive obstacle that governs intersubjectivity, and that constitutes, at the same 
time, the intentional orientation towards the other. The other’s interpretation will 
always be fragmented, open to questions, and there will always be an imbalance 
between intended meanings attributed to experiences, and the experiences selected for 
interpretation. The comprehensive Acts (verstehende Akte) – of self and the other – 
are meaning correlates and it is only through intentional reference to the other as a 
synchronic temporal consciousness that it is possible to transcend the limits of “self-
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explication.” In true intersubjective comprehension, “the observer’s living 
intentionality” (115) is carried out in synchronicity with the meaningful constitution 
of the other’s lived experience. And this process takes the form of identification with 
the other’s experience in the We sphere. 
Still, the explanation of access to the synchronicity of durées and of 
intersubjectivity is circular because the intentional orientation towards the other’s 
lived experiences is played out from the starting point by the indications given by his 
expressive bodily movements. It remains anchored and has to go through (even by the 
act of transcending it) the “self-explication” of Ego. The other’s movements and 
expressive acts have to be integrated into the meaning context of the observer, in what 
he already knows from his own experience as similar expressions to those of the other, 
in what he may already know about the other’s manifestations. Moreover, the body is 
reduced to a mere index of consciousness content or is confounded with a meaning 
structure needing to be interpreted. As a consequence Schütz risks maintaining a 
body-mind dichotomy that I have already criticized. 
Nonetheless, it is important to retain Schütz’s openness towards grasping the 
pre-phenomenal lived experiences before its thematization as an object of reflexive 
attention.  
For Merleau-Ponty, intersubjectivity consists of a mutual understanding of 
gestures. The “embodied subject” engaged through movement in the phenomenal 
world understands the other’s gestures through the very deployment of his own bodily 
gestures. The other is coexisting with the “I” in the community of bodily adjustment 
to each other, and refuses any intellectual or common-sense interpretation. There is a 
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bodily recognition of the other as an active, embodied participant in the inhabited 
world whose significance is known by the very act of its embodied exploration. A 
common, “familiar way of treating the world” is recognized in the other which seems 
to prolong each other’s intentions (see also Leder, The Absent Body; Csordas, 
“Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology”). The experience of dialogue is based 
on the same structure: it constitutes another domain of the coexistence within the same 
world. Eventually, Merleau-Ponty affirms the already giveness of what pervades our 
certitude of coexistence: “before any voluntary position taking, I […] was already 
situated in an intersubjective world…” (Phénoménologie de la perception 408).6 
 
 
The Phenomenology of Pain and the Status of Intersubjectivity 
 
So far, I have identified phenomenological studies as the most appropriate to 
account for the experience of suffering and pain. At present, I intend to review the 
phenomenological descriptions of suffering and pain that exist in the social sciences 
as well as the phenomenological conceptual framework in order to explore in a more 
detailed way how existential domains of pain and suffering have been grasped, and to 
seize the views on the suffering–intersubjectivity relationship problem. At the end of 
this section it will be possible to understand that the strict application of 
phenomenological description reaches a paradoxical point where one has to adopt an 
                                                     
6 One can observe that, at this point, Merleau-Ponty joins Schütz’s idea of the pre-eminence of the 
common social reality (the “We relationship”) with respect to the Ego spheres, but the foundation of 
this pre-eminence in Merleau-Ponty’s view depends on the phenomenal structure of the body, and not 
on a correspondence between reflexive organizations of the consciousness moments. 
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ethical stance towards the suffering Other and to underscore the role of language and 
narrative discourse (illness narratives) in performing the intersubjective relationship in 
the context of serious illness. I have called “embodied tale” the expressive discourse 
through which the suffering Other calls upon a responsible, ethical attitude. 
Eventually, approaching intersubjectivity from a narrative standpoint will allow me to 
explore neglected existential domains of the experience of suffering: the narrative 
self-memory.  
Two perspectives can be generally identified in the effort to understand the 
status of intersubjectivity in the experience of suffering: 
1. Suffering as a lived experience of the radical and monadic subjectivity 
excludes any possibility of intersubjectivity.  
2. Suffering, a subjective experience, cannot be shared as it is lived, but its 
experience is mediated by the cultural and social significances of the life world 
in which subjects are situated. Intersubjectivity is then possible in the sense of 
the constitution of the suffering experience by the worlds of socially and 
culturally shared significances, or as mutual sharing of the same embodied 
condition. 
 
1. Suffering: Lived Experience of the Radical and Monadic Subjectivity 
  
Criticizing the definition of the essence of the phenomenal manifestation in the 
transcendental horizon (of objectification, of reflexivity and of the intentional 
donation of sense), Michel Henry argues that the original essence of manifestation and 
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of being resides in suffering. Its structure is defined by auto-affection. Through auto-
affection, to which it adheres completely, the being does not donate to itself by a 
reflective distancing; it does not manifest in the deployment of the transcendental 
horizon of appearance, but reveals to itself entirely. In its “originary passivity” 
towards itself, the being coincides with itself in the lived experience that constitutes 
and manifests the being. The very structure of suffering is determined by the 
experience of “enduring itself,” by the absence of any distance of effective suffering, 
by being bound to itself.  
Positing that the essence of manifestation resides in the auto-affection of 
suffering, Henry grounds his ontology in subjectivity. Because suffering is defined in 
terms of auto-affection and as the complete absence of any reflective distancing, of 
any objectifying transcendence, suffering is immanent to subjectivity and consumes 
itself within the limits of the being bound to itself. Suffering is then radical as it 
founds, in an originary way, ontology.  
One can observe that in this interpretation sharing and communicating 
suffering as lived experience of the radical and monadic subjectivity are denied; hence 
the impossibility to conceive any passage of suffering into discourse.  
However, a difficulty to distinguish clearly between the radical subjective and 
intersubjective experience appears in the difficulties in separating between pain and 
suffering that I have already presented. Frederik Buytendijk argued for the difference 
between “psychic pain” and “bodily suffering,” and the subjective/intersubjective 
opposition that follows as a consequence. The denial of broad metaphysical 
explanations brought by modernity with its fragmentation effect upon individuals 
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seems to have imprinted a radical and isolating character on the pain experience itself: 
“pain is a purely individual affair which has nothing to do with metaphysical reality 
and which is experienced more acutely than anything else” (Buytendijk 15).  
But I have shown that the distinction he proposed was questionable from a 
phenomenological and embodiment standpoint (see pp. 5-6). Hence, the subjective-
intersubjective divide itself becomes uncertain.  
 
2. Suffering: Subjective Experience, Cultural and Social Significances of the 
Life World 
 
Pain is a deeply personal experience that translates into the subjective 
experience of suffering. Though fully grasping this experience is a futile attempt, 
some voices claim “its sharable and intersubjective dimensions” (Morris, Illness and 
Culture 109). 
Situations of serious illness or other traumatic experiences elicit the radical, 
sometimes destructive transformations of the embodied experience of the lifeworld 
(Kleinman, The Illness Narratives; Good, “A Body in Pain”; “The Body, Illness 
Experience, and the Lifeworld”). The starting point of a phenomenological description 
of suffering and pain is then rooted in the embodied experience in so much as pain is 
essentially experienced through the body, which has become a vector of the pain 
situation in the preobjective domain of the indistinctness between subject and object.  
It is because the self is ontologically embodied that it relates to the body as a 
subject coinciding with its body and, at the same time, in an objectifying manner: a 
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“body-subject” refers to a “body-object” (Leder, The Absent Body 88; see also 
“Toward a Phenomenology of Pain”). From its non-thematized mode in daily life, an 
“unaware awareness” (Van Manen, “Modalities of Body Experience” 11), through a 
“sensorial intensification,” the body becomes the centre of the attentive consciousness 
in the pain experience (Leder, The Absent Body; “Toward a Phenomenology of Pain”). 
It “dys-appears” as dysfunction in the radical negativity and adversity of pain, which 
calls on the attention of the sufferer (see also Scarry; Steeves; Jackson, “Chronic 
Pain”; “Camp Pain; van Hooft, “Pain and Communication”; Cassell, The Nature of 
Suffering for the adversative quality of pain). As revealed by Drew Leder (“Toward a 
Phenomenology of Pain”; The Absent Body), through its embodied character and 
thematization of the body, pain radically changes our life in world: it dislocates and 
disrupts our intentional life, transforms the spatio-temporal horizon, and exerts a 
“teleological demand.” Van Manen refers to this disruptive attention to the body as 
“an encumbrance” (“Modalities of Body Experience” 12) experienced by the body. 
The diseased body, the injured body becomes a resisting entity, an object for the self. 
The attention oriented ecstatically during the bodily action towards the world is 
displaced towards the body whose “transitive use” (Leder, The Absent Body 74) is 
interrupted. The intentional reorientation as a consequence determines the 
modification of the relations to time and space under the form of centripetal and 
centrifugal movement in Leder’s terms. 
In the first case, pain operates a “spatio-temporal constriction” centering the 
perceptive attention and the motor capacities on the spatiality of the body, on the 
immediate here and now limits of the painful body, limiting actions and practical tasks 
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(van Hooft, “The Meanings of Suffering”); hence, the isolation and alienation of the 
sufferer (Leder, The Absent Body; see also Scarry; Steeves). Pain deviates 
consciousness from an engaged “attitude of full attention to life” (Schütz, “On 
Multiple Realities” 213) towards the hurting body and medication, or barely exhausts 
the sufferer (Good, “The Body, Illness Experience, and the Lifeworld”). Physical 
adversity, crises, drugs, overtake the body and feelings and translate them into 
disrupted temporal order (Good, “A Body in Pain”; 1994; Charmaz, “Stories of 
Suffering”), uncertainty about the future, blurred memory, “loss of control,” and loss 
of autonomy (Charmaz, “Stories of Suffering”). Life projects are bracketed or 
suspended as the taken-for-granted common-sense world is threatened by doubts, by 
the emergence of one’s awareness of mortality (see Good’s interpretation of Schütz’s 
“cognitive style” of the everyday world). Self-identity is anchored in continuity 
throughout time, in a coherent idea that one has constructed about one’s self, in its 
purposes and projects for actions. Suffering disintegrates the cohesiveness of “identity 
expressed in purposeful action” as it has been designed in the past to be accomplished 
in the future (Cassell, Recognizing Suffering 25).7 Moreover, suffering decomposes 
the memory of a stable surrounding world (Cassell, Recognizing Suffering). It 
threatens thus all the landmarks that constitute the memory of one’s self.  
Second, the very adversity of pain imposes a centrifugal movement in an 
active quest for escape possibilities through projections towards the external world, an 
active quest for remedy, an imaginary one or an escape into memory. However, it is 
the centrifugal orientation which finally re-establishes, in a paradoxical way, the 
                                                     
7 One might observe that martyrs unify identity through pain. I would rather suggest that the unity of 
identity is based in this case on the idea of a future embodied salvation and not on the experience of 
pain as such. Pain has no value per se; its significance is understood in the horizon of salvation. 
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“constriction of pain” (Leder, The Absent Body 76), the coincidence between self and 
body. Then, again, the very structure of perception through which the body gives itself 
immediately to the self, commands the distancing of what is perceived and transforms 
the body into an objectified, strange entity, or an enemy (Leder, The Absent Body; 
Good, “A Body in Pain”; “The Body, Illness Experience, and the Lifeworld”; Cassell, 
The Nature of Suffering), a dissociated entity that hurts. It is not the self that acts and 
experiences the world through an agentive body, but “the pain [which] has agency” 
(Good, “The Body, Illness Experience, and the Lifeworld” 124; “A Body in Pain”). 
Analyzing the modes through which the body dys-appears in illness and pain, 
Leder (The Absent Body) refers to the dysfunctional sense of the body’s thematization 
and the distancing process between body and self. From what I have seen so far, these 
modalities are founded in the separation that takes place within the body itself, in the 
dislocation of the prethematic synergy of the body.  
It is within the distancing horizon of pain that a hermeneutic (pain 
interpretation and comprehension) and a pragmatic moment (action towards escaping 
or controlling pain, help request) can emerge (Leder, The Absent Body; Cassell, The 
Nature of Suffering). One is displaced from the prethematic sense of pain, the 
“embodied comprehension” of immediately felt distress (Leder, “Toward a 
Phenomenology of Pain” 259), to an interpretation transcending the immediacy of 
pain. This will confront the sufferer with the vulnerability, and finitude of being, with 
moral judgments and authenticity (Leder, “Toward a Phenomenology of Pain”; 
Cassell, The Nature of Suffering). Interpretation, the view on events, can become a 
source of suffering if one cannot find the existential meaning of suffering (van Hooft, 
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“The Meanings of Suffering”), but also an incitement towards doing. One way of 
avoiding suffering is the merging process between interpretation and the demand for 
action (Frankl) in “the timeless instant” (Cassell, The Nature of Suffering 57). The 
person is aware of the happening of the events of pain and distress in the here and 
now, and this very moment calls for an immediate action that resolves the present 
situation. 
Finally, as far as the body in pain transforms not only the modality of 
experience but also the world of experience, the meaning of pain can develop into the 
deconstruction of the meaning underlying the day-to-day lifeworld (Leder, “Toward a 
Phenomenology of Pain” ; Good, “The Body, Illness Experience, and the Lifeworld”) 
of the world itself (Scarry). 
The structure of the pain experience described in this section contrasts 
radically with the one identified by Henry and risks contradicting the paradigm of 
preobjective embodiment while still affirming the embodiment of pain. Referring to 
the preobjective status of the embodied experience of pain, some observations should 
be made. If Merleau-Ponty and Csordas argue that, at the preobjective level of the 
embodiment process, the body cannot be thematized as an object, maintaining the 
embodied definition of pain while sustaining the body’s thematization becomes 
problematic.  
In a dialectical way, embodied pain calls forth the imaginary, the objectifying 
reference to the painful body as a foreign entity to the subject, as well as the 
subjectification of pain as indistinct from the painful body, suffered within the limits 
of the body: “pain is a part of the subject, a ‘thing’ of the body, a part of the self.” 
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(Good, “The Body, Illness Experience, and the Lifeworld” 124). Ultimately, it 
transforms the body into an “aversive agent […] invested with menacing autonomy” 
(Good, “The Body, Illness Experience, and the Lifeworld” 124-125). Then, speaking 
about indistinctness between subject and object (Jackson, “Chronic Pain”) cannot be 
an appropriate formula. The described relationship to pain appears more as 
coexistence and inseparableness from the distinct realization of objectification and 
subjectification of pain. It is in the very embodied character of pain, in the subject 
anchored in the painful body and because of its embodiment, that the objectification is 
implied as a distinct moment. Objectification is constituted as a moment of 
embodiment. Consequently, the problem that should be addressed is the 
reconsideration of the objective status of pain. How can embodied pain be 
intentionally referred to as an object if, as specified by Merleau-Ponty, the experience 
of our body is that of an active, adroit engagement, and movement in the phenomenal 
world, and of a bodily space whose knowledge coincides and coexists with it. 
Speaking about pain and illness, Merleau–Ponty (Phénoménologie de la perception) 
agrees with this phenomenology: 
Je veux dire que la douleur indique son lieu, qu’elle est constitutive d’un 
‘espace douloureux’. ‘J’ai mal au pied’ signifie non pas: ‘Je pense que mon 
pied est cause de mal,’ mais: ‘la douleur vient de mon pied’ ou encore ‘mon 
pied a mal’. C’est ce que montre bien la ‘voluminosité primitive de la 
douleur…’ (110) 
Le malade piqué par un moustique n’a pas à chercher le point piqué … mais 
de rejoindre avec sa main phénoménale une certaine place douloureuse de son 
corps phenomenal, et qu’entre la main comme puissance de grater et le point 
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piqué comme point à grater un rapport vécu est donné dans le système naturel 
du corps propre. L’opération a lieu tout entière dans l’ordre du phenomenal, 
elle ne passe pas par le monde objectif … (123) 
The very status of objectification and embodiment should be clarified for a 
comprehensive understanding of pain and all of its dimensions. I have suggested 
above that thematized objectification appears as a moment in the very subjective 
experience of pain, a moment of embodiment. 
Asserting the co-dependency between subjectification and objectification 
opens the horizon for interpretation, for the discursive reference to pain, and relations 
with others even under the form of their denial or deformation. In this sense, far from 
being limited to the domain of the body as object of consciousness, in the experience 
of pain and suffering, the social and political bodies are engaged as “source and 
medium of experience” (Good, “The Body, Illness Experience, and the Lifeworld” 
127). The suffering experience, as experience, is intersubjective and involves the 
dialogue, polemics–or extreme confrontation–with others that reproduce social 
structures (see Good’s reference to systematic torture, even bio-medicine aggravating 
suffering). Based on Schütz’s (“On Multiple Realities”) analysis of our experience of 
everyday life,  Byron J. Good shows that sociality, constitutive of the reality of 
common sense, is called into question and finally “ ‘unmade’ ” (“The Body, Illness 
Experience, and the Lifeworld” 124; see also “A Body in Pain”) by chronic illness and 
pain. Relations with others, the social presence of self in the world, will be distorted 
and limited to and by the “expressions of pain” (“The Body, Illness Experience, and 
the Lifeworld” 126; see also “A Body in Pain”). 
One can observe throughout different approaches the effort to grasp the social 
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and cultural constitution of suffering and pain experience while simultaneously trying 
to attend to the implacable living of a being that is bound to his/her own embodied 
limits of pain. 
While revealing the determining factors of pain experience (culture, anxiety, 
attention, and interpretation), Ivan Illich orients towards the moment of its questioning 
and interpretation, a cultural act modelled by the encounter between mythical and 
narrative traditions, cultural models or pharmacopoeia. However, the sufferer is 
plunged in the certitude and solitude of his suffering, which is impossible to share 
with the other, a different person unable to understand pain the same way as the 
sufferer. The other can be certain only of his/her own compassion towards the 
sufferer, hence “arguing” the sufferer’s solitude. Still, one cannot deny the perception 
of the other’s pain. At the same time, Illich’s approach leaves the opportunity for a 
discursive vehicle to intervene in the suffering experience.  
At the level of interpretations of the first dysfunctional signs, the quest for and 
access to treatment, the negotiations with health professionals, Joseph W. Schneider 
and Peter Conrad examine the relationships between sufferers and family members, 
friends, and the work world. They underscore the necessity of understanding the 
sufferers’ self-perceptions and modes of experiencing identity transformations in 
relation to oneself and others as determined by illness dysfunction. As indicated by 
David L. Kahn and Richard S. Steeves, (“The Significance of Suffering in Cancer 
Care”) suffering elicits a continuous interaction between the intrapersonal struggle for 
coping and the interpersonal process of caring for the sufferer. 
Even if suffering is experienced within the topos of the unique person, it 
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“exists, and often can only be understood in the context of others” (Cassell, The 
Nature of Suffering  34), being affected by and affecting the social context (especially 
caregivers–see Steeves; Kahn and Steeves, “Witnesses to Suffering”). This can be 
understood if, as explained by Cassell, one considers the sources of the suffering 
experience: the disruptive effect of disability and chronic illness on everyday 
interaction with others, the conflict between personal limits of the sufferer and his 
desire for socially normative self-esteem, recognition by the other and 
competitiveness. The conflict with the public world shifts towards an internal conflict 
of the sufferer with himself because the external world and the inner world are not 
isolated, but form a continuum based on the sharing of the same world of objects and 
persons and of symbols and language as vehicles of this sharing. Gender, class, 
ethnicity, social roles, personal biography imprint the chronic pain sufferer’s 
experience that configures suffering’s intersubjective character (Jackson, “How to 
Narrate Chronic Pain”), its recognition, legitimacy, perception, and search for 
treatment (Lasch). 
In the attempt to clarify suffering and pain as an intersubjective, socially and 
culturally constructed experience, Arthur Kleinman and Joan Kleinman (Kleinman 
and Kleinman, “Suffering and Its Professional Transformation”; Kleinman, “Pain and 
Resistance”) situate their research in the particular social micro contexts of 
experience, “the local worlds of the lived experience” (Kleinman, “Pain and 
Resistance” 120). They aim at seizing experience as it is determined by what is of 
“primary practical relevance in the processes and forms of experience.” (Kleinman 
and Kleinman, “Suffering and Its Professional Transformation” 97), by what is “at 
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stake” for individuals in everyday life. This will give access to understanding the 
experiential status of suffering. 
“Local moral worlds” are constitutive of experience–and of suffering–, insofar 
as they form the space of social transactions, contestations and political negotiations 
in the situation of limited access to survival resources. It is through social and political 
transactions that existential priorities, what is existentially relevant, are constituted. 
Their coherence is insured by symbolic forms depending on cultural traditions but, at 
the same time, it is subject to transformations within the local worlds. Symbolic forms 
then construct experience, starting with the very individual and collective engagement 
in local actions, in social interactions permanently referred to what is relevant for 
interpersonal relations situated in a certain time and space (Kleinman and Kleinman, 
“Suffering and Its Professional Transformation”; Kleinman, “Pain and Resistance”).  
Inhabiting a world of encounters and transactions with others activates the 
points of resistance to existential projects, the boundaries imposed by the shared 
human condition and in particular, socially and culturally formed structures of 
relevance. It is in this world, through its social and interpersonal elaborations, that the 
limitative experience of suffering emerges. A central concept for this approach is 
“somatization,” the embodied illness and suffering experience translating and 
reproducing forms of political actions against individuals or traumatic interactions. 
Suffering then becomes a form of critique, of delegitimation and political resistance. 
Simultaneously, one can observe that pain will be transposed in cultural metaphors of 
personal embodied pain, moral suffering or social body suffering (Kleinman and 
Kleinman, “Suffering and Its Professional Transformation”; Kleinman, “Pain and 
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Resistance”). At different levels engaged in experience, somatic processes are loaded 
with common cultural and social significances. Somatic memory activates and retells, 
with every illness story, the social suffering memory, the general stories of suffering, 
the biography and social history (Kleinman, “Pain and Resistance”). Pain cannot be 
reduced to biological aspects, but is translated in the experience of suffering. It 
becomes a “biological object culturally constituted [and] a biological heritage which 
constrains cultural sense” (Kleinman, “Pain and Resistance” 125; Kleinman, The 
Illness Narratives) crossing the personal, local, and eventually societal boundaries. 
A few comments are necessary following this review. 
First, it is difficult to account for the lived, alienated experience of suffering, 
while still maintaining the social and cultural construction of the suffering experience. 
If I carefully consider the interpretation of Good from the phenomenological 
perspective of Schütz (“On Multiple Realities”), I will also note the dissonance, or at 
least the lack of a clear description of the relation, between “cognitive style” (230) and 
the experience of embodiment affected by pain and suffering.  
For Schütz, each “sub-universe of reality”–and the reality of common sense is 
one such sub-universe, if not the most important one–, is organized in “finite 
provinces of meaning” (230) (italics in the original). Our experiences are regrouped in 
different provinces of meaning and we engage in one or another province that we take 
for “real” at a certain moment, we “attribute” it a certain “accent of reality” (230) to it. 
The “accent of reality” that we attribute depends on the maintenance of our 
experiences in the reference frame of a specific “cognitive style” that characterizes 
each of these “finite province of meaning.” For instance, we engage in the world of 
35 
work (the everyday life) following our pragmatic interest to answer the fundamental 
necessities of our life and our everyday experiences, whether they are valid or not, 
confirm its unity and coherence as a meaningful framework to formulate and check 
hypotheses about its reality. The particular “cognitive style” of the everyday world is 
constituted by: “full attention to life” that guides our consciousness; the suspension of 
doubt in the “appearances” of the everyday world; work as a form of spontaneity 
based on a projected purpose and the intention to accomplish it through an 
externalized movement of the body; the experience of self as unity; sociality and a 
specific temporal order.  
Then, if the traits of each “finite province of meaning,” of the reality of 
common sense too, are defined in terms of “cognitive style,” what will be the status of 
the body in this context? So far, it would appear to be defined itself in terms of 
“cognitive style,” a blatant countersense to the definition of embodiment.8 On the 
contrary, it is the attention to the body that chronic pain requests and imposes with 
insistence which becomes an incentive for the quest for meaning: “Physiological 
aspects of chronic illness shape explanatory models and the meanings they 
encapsulate” (Kleinman, The Illness Narratives 45). The solution to linking the socio-
cultural constitution of suffering and the physiological experience finally resides for 
Kleinman in their interrelation and reciprocal determination to which the “human 
dialectic” is submitted.  
Second, the process of intersubjectivity, the way others are involved as 
subjective presences in the suffering experience, is still undetermined. How is 
                                                     
8 The same question could be addressed with respect to sociality: can sociality be reduced to a trait of 
“cognitive style?” 
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intersubjectivity carried out, what are its relations and moments that will articulate 
symbolic mediations set off by the orientation towards what is at stake in life? 
Eventually, what are the mechanisms by means of which intersubjectivity channels 
the psychophysiology of experience towards a “symbolic physiology” (Kleinman and 
Kleinman, “Suffering and Its Professional Transformation” 118)? What does it mean 
to be in the presence of the suffering Other? 
As I have already noticed, the phenomenological description of suffering 
follows a path whose fundaments are anchored in the embodied experience of 
suffering and pain. It is the very definition of how one can intersubjectively relate to 
the embodied presence of the sufferer that has not been addressed by previous 
approaches, and that could clarify the link between an embodied foundation of the 
suffering experience and its socio-cultural significances. Otherwise, the meaning of 
intersubjectivity is reduced to a socio-cultural constructivism, refutable from the 
paradigm of the embodiment perspective. 
For instance, Margot L. Lyon criticizes the attempts of cultural constructivism 
to approach emotions, as it eludes the social praxis and the context of experiencing, 
expressing and conveying emotions. Cultural constructivism grasps emotions through 
symbolism, which simultaneously applies to cognition. Symbolism refers to non-
rational (cultural models and taken-for-granted interpretations) as well as rational 
domains (conceptualization, verbal and nonverbal expression). Defining emotions and 
cognition in terms of symbols and culture conveys the ambiguity between them, as 
they can pertain to both the rational and non-rational domains of culture and 
symbolism, hence, the occultation of a problem that has to be raised: the conventional 
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distinction between emotion/cognition, between rational/irrational, as the symbolic 
constitution of emotion risks perpetuating the “non-rational” label convention of 
emotion and, consequently, interpreting emotion as mental process. Thus, the 
embodied and material dimensions are eliminated. 
Consequently, I intend to clarify the way one relates to the suffering Other. 
The question to be answered and that orients my research is: can intersubjectivity be 
constituted at the level of the embodied experience of pain, of the embodied memory 
of our personal life and self-narrative? The challenge will be to define 
intersubjectivity in terms of embodiment, to formulate an integrative definition of 
intersubjectivity that comprises the existential domains of suffering, its embodied 
condition, the discursive and social space that emerges through the dialectical 
interplay between the subjectivity and objectivity of the suffering experience. 
 
 
The Limits of Phenomenology. The Ethical Stance, Embodied Narratives,  
And the Time of Suffering 
 
 The possible answer to Schütz’s difficulties seemed to come from Merleau-
Ponty’s viewpoint. But the problem that has to be brought forward concerning this 
view relates to what I have identified as an “aporetical” experience of pain where 
embodiment implies pain objectification. How could the community of the embodied 
subjectivities be concordant with the objectified experience of pain? 
Following Merleau-Ponty’s framework, Leder posits the formula of “mutual 
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embodiment,” of the “communicative sociality” (Leder, The Absent Body 94). The 
common and unitary phenomenon that is constituted is defined as “the natural 
empathy [through which] a body retakes the affective responses of the other” (Leder, 
The Absent Body 94). However, even if pain is deep-rooted in the body, Leder 
interprets pain as a disruption of intersubjectivity. The mutual embodiment is then 
lived as its refusal, as “social dys-appearance” (Leder, The Absent Body 96), as 
objectification under the other’s gaze. The body is at his/her disposal and dys-appears 
either as dissonance with respect to the socially constructed body (the handicapping 
physiological manifestation), or as the submitted body (in patient-physician, prisoner-
guard relations). Alternatively, more brutally, the body can be deserted of its 
subjectivity under the action of force inflicting pain (torture), or by regimentation. 
In Leder’s interpretation, pain, a mode of the body’s dys-appearance, would 
correspond then to its social dys-appearance, a negative mode of intersubjectivity. 
This perspective, hence, denies any possibility for a dys-appearing body to partake in 
an intersubjective relation, the situation of embodied co-presence. Nonetheless, one 
can identify “places” where the body’s dys-appearance can be present in mutual 
intersubjectivity. Care giving relationships between sufferers and physicians or nurses, 
between sufferers and close others like family members are just a few I can identify. 
As Cassell points out, they are centered on suffering and pain recognition. 
Still, how does suffering and pain recognition occur and what are its 
consequences when facing a suffering Other? 
Contesting the position maintaining the incommunicability of pain, van Hooft 
(“Pain and Communication”) tackles the problem of intersubjectivity from the point of 
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view of Levinas’s ethics. The immediate subjective experience of pain, of its adversity 
and negativity is fundamentally anchored in the sufferer’s subjectivity and cannot be 
lived by anybody else. Nonetheless, the impossibility of sharing pain does not 
preclude its communication. Van Hooft suggests that pain metaphors and other 
socially acquired linguistic designations identify the Other or the self as a sufferer, 
and may operate as media for communication. But the possibility of communicating 
about pain is based on the referential function of language. Another function of 
language is to establish intersubjective relations. However pain undermines this 
function. Severe pain isolates the sufferer from the social world and binds him/her to 
his/her body. Thus, linguistic forms of intersubjectivity are deconstructed and 
inoperable. Another mode of intersubjectivity has to be implemented, founded this 
time on empathy. Its definition is developed from the metaphysical perspective of 
Levinas (Totalité et infini). The Other, a profoundly mysterious subjectivity cannot be 
seized through a comprehensive or perceptive relation; he/she demands that one take 
an engaged, ethical attitude in front of the sufferer. In this encounter, one offers the 
Other the freedom to manifest itself in the infinity of his/her mystery. Hence, the 
Other’s pain, a mysterious domain, cannot be formulated by an act of knowledge or 
classification. It claims through its embodied expressivity an intersubjective encounter 
between two subjectivities, through empathy and compassion. This will break the 
sufferer’s isolation circle and pain communication becomes effective. 
Nevertheless, I cannot agree with van Hooft’s reduction of pain metaphors and 
other linguistic descriptors to indicators of a referent, nor with his assertion that 
language and discursive forms have no place in establishing any intersubjective 
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relation in the context of pain experience. In the following section, I will uncover the 
embodied character of discourse and the way discourse implies the intersubjective 
relation. I will show that suffering and illness narratives are embodied discursive 
modes of pain and suffering, functioning as fundamental “operators” of 
intersubjectivity, of sharing suffering and pain. Finally, illness narratives as narratives 
give access to disrupted self-memory; they are far from being a mere vehicle for 
linguistic reference to objects.  
Phenomenological perspectives on language demonstrated that language has 
an embodied basis, and at the same time, the body is invested with linguistic meaning 
(Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception; Csordas, “Embodiment as a 
Paradigm for Anthropology”): “The word is a veritable gesture, and it contains its 
sense as the gesture contains his” (Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception 
214; see also Csordas, “Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology”). It does not 
refer to a world of thinking exterior to its actualization as a “phonetic gesture” 
(Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception 211). Through “phonetic gesture,” 
the body is existentially situated in a world of sense and language. At the same time, 
language is rooted in “natural life as an embodied act” (Csordas, “Embodiment as a 
Paradigm for Anthropology” 25).  
Considering the bodily basis of conceptual metaphors, cognitive linguistic 
scholars (Lakoff and Johnson; Johnson) have argued for the embodied foundation of 
language and conceptual thinking. Concepts have a metaphorical structure translating 
the spatial orientation of the body, its experience of the world of physical objects and 
substances; they also pointed to the socio-cultural dimensions of metaphors (Lakoff 
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and Johnson). The coherence of this experience depends on its organization in “image 
schemes” (Johnson xix) or experience gestalts transposed in and structuring in a 
figurative way the sense and reasoning domain. 
For Cassell (The Nature of Suffering), the bare “physicality” and bodily 
experiences call for interpretation and are constitutive parts of meaning. They are 
transposed into conscious content through the medium of meaning, as meaning forms 
the horizon through which symptoms can affect us, can be interpreted as a foretaste of 
the future on the basis of pre-existing understandings. Meaning is ultimately the locus 
where body and thought meet in reciprocal determination: 
Elements of the body are part of all meanings–for example, the inherent 
physicality of many words (e.g., “push”), sensory perceptions, feelings with 
their inherent physiological concomitants […] when meanings arise or are 
assigned in thought, they are necessarily accompanied by the bodily 
dimensions of those meanings. On the other hand what happens in the 
person’s body … are bodily experiences. As experiences they also give rise to 
meaning. Bodily experiences thus elicit the ideas or concepts that generate 
meaning. Meaning-ideas, or concepts–include bodily effects.… meaning is 
the medium through which thought flows into body and the body flows into 
thought. (222-223; italics in the original) 
Studying pain metaphors, Laurence J. Kirmayer (“The Body’s Insistence on 
Meaning”) interrogates the relationship between painful body and text (language, 
sense, discourse). The body intervenes and questions thinking: 
Through the pain and suffering (…), the body drives us to seek meaning, to 
take our words as seriously as our deeds. Ultimately, the body insists that we 
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finalize our temporary mental constructions, committing ourselves to some 
view of reality. Any theory of meaning that hopes to address the experience of 
illness must give weight to the primacy of the body not only as an object of 
thought, but as itself a vehicle of thinking, feeling and acting. The body 
cannot be contained by a theory of representation–for the body is not the same 
as the body-image. The body’s influence on thought is more presentation than 
representation… (325) 
Kirmayer explores the ways the body is imbricated in the patients’ and 
physicians’ mental life and demonstrates the embodied and social foundations of 
metaphor. Similarities and equivalences marked in synesthesia and nonverbal 
metaphors are indicators of the bodily presence in thought. So, metaphors have 
sensorial and motor roots. They can also be set up on affective dimensions. 
Consequently, Kirmayer advocates that sense, words and gesture be anchored in the 
bodily experience. Through metaphors, the body transforms and acts on concepts and 
representations: “Metaphor provides ways of acting on our representations or of 
making presentations to others…” (335). For our approach, it is also important to 
underscore that metaphors account for the immediacy between body and words: “Talk 
of flesh and blood makes our words immediate” (335). 
 Even if pain resists objectification and communication attempts, through a 
descriptive language of the everyday world, it is not devoid of meaning; but it is a 
metaphorical meaning referring to the meaning of the body, and it can be 
communicated through an “embodied communication” (Jackson, “Chronic Pain” 214; 
“Camp Pain”). But in spite of her concordant assertions with an embodied 
perspective on intersubjectivity and pain, Jean E. Jackson explains neither the way 
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embodied metaphors are constituted, nor the process of “embodied communication” 
of pain. However, she observes the conscious communicative intentions of the 
sufferers and their feeling of shared identity.  
By trying to explain the metaphorical meaning and the intersubjective 
mechanisms involved in “the embodied communication,” Elaine Scarry speaks about 
the essay of “inventing” linguistic structures (pain stories, memoirs and accounts) 
capable of objectivizing an inexpressible lived pain. On the one hand, her work has in 
view the referential distance with respect to pain that is imposed by discourse. Pain 
attributes may or may not be associated with the body as referent. Consequently, 
attributes, as elements of the lived experience of pain, will be attached to other 
referents. This makes their ideological utilization or their appropriation by power 
possible. On the other hand, she points to the emergent moment of language, the cries 
of the wounded when he/she struggles to articulate language, and to the invention of a 
referent of pain while the real referent is absent, unmade by pain. 
The invention is realized through metaphorical imagination where imagination 
becomes an intentional object for pain and pain the intentional state for imagination. It 
is only through imagination that pain can transcend its passivity and modify, objectify 
itself. The relationship between pain and imagination is that between two extremities 
of a continuum; “perceptions, somatic, and emotional events” (Scarry 165), the 
territory of the psyche unfolds within its limits. Imagination can then function as the 
reconstruction of a world undone by pain.  
Scarry’s comments allow us to maintain not just the idea of the language 
embodiment in pain experience, of its embodied emergence, but also that of the 
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objectification of pain (through imagination) as a moment of the pain embodied 
experience. 
However, “embodied metaphors” do not only express the embodied character 
of pain language. Metaphorical meaning extends to the discursive level. Formulating 
the basis of a “discursive theory of metaphor,” Paul Ricoeur studies the “metaphoric 
utterance” (La métaphore vive 87). Hence, it is at the level of narrative discourse, in 
our case illness narratives, that one has to be situated in order to grasp the whole 
significance of the embodied language of pain and suffering. 
An ethical based view on illness and suffering is central to Frank’s (The 
Wounded Storyteller) insight that can be translated into a valuable alternative for a 
constructivist definition of intersubjectivity and exploration of the embodied character 
of illness stories. The relation to others is discussed as a “body problem” of action to 
which ideally “the communicative body” corresponds as an ethical choice on a 
continuum between “monadic body” and “dyadic body” (Frank, The Wounded 
Storyteller 29). Acting as a “dyadic body” means to situate oneself towards others 
within the common space of the same embodied being, as “a body for other bodies 
[…] placing one’s self and body within the ‘community of pain’ ” (Frank, The 
Wounded Storyteller 37). It is the condition of sharing the suffering experience in an 
empathic way. Suffering and illness storytelling is one mode of assuming the 
“communicative body” situation. It is fundamentally an act of responsibility emerging 
from and “through suffering bodies” (24), a testimony and a guide–in a pedagogical 
sense–“for an other” and for oneself (17; see also Frank, At the Will of the Body) 
where teller and listener are sharing the dialogue of the effective experience of telling. 
45 
Audiences can also share the narrative space where a disrupted self-memory and 
fractured subjective time are restored. The ill person who writes or tells his/her story 
(Frank refers exclusively to self-narratives written or told by the sufferer 
himself/herself) offers his/her witnessing to be witnessed by a whole community of 
listeners that might share a similar suffering condition. 
Frank offers viable paths of access to an embodied definition of 
intersubjectivity in the space of shared body condition, storytelling, and storytelling 
reception. However, one can observe that embodiment, the embodied condition of 
pain described above, and the storytelling relation still remain undetermined. While 
Frank mentions the “call for stories” (Frank, The Wounded Storyteller 53) elicited by 
illness experience, the construction and reconstruction of illness and suffering 
experience through telling and its reception, the way the body addresses this call, the 
way it shifts into storytelling are not clarified. There is a gap to be explained and 
transcended, namely that of the passage between lived embodiment, lived suffering 
and storytelling. 
Furthermore, Frank’s embodied perspective risks being restricted exclusively 
to the immediacy of the sufferer’s presence, and leaves out the temporal dimensions 
of being with the sufferer (see the temporal aspects of intersubjectivity in Schütz, The 
Phenomenology of the Social World). These are not approached, in spite of his 
recognition of time (and memory) as existential dimensions affected by pain and 
suffering. 
So far, time, as a way of apprehending the Other’s suffering, has been 
neglected. And yet, if placed in the narrative domain, plots, and narrative structure in 
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general (pathographies specifically) have already been the terrain of numerous debates 
about their temporal and intersubjective dimensions.9 The focus of contemporary 
pathographies “both upon the lived body and upon the lived body’s relatedness in 
time” can hardly be ignored (Wiltshire, “The Patient Writes Back”). Regarding 
suffering from a narrative stand, is it not legitimate to claim that narrating the Other’s 
illness is already an act of temporally positioning oneself in relationship to the Other’s 
suffering? 
How does one stand in front of a suffering memory and disarticulated time, 
symptoms of a disarticulated self?  
The problem of “recognizing suffering” has been explicitly tackled by Cassell 
(“Recognizing Suffering”), while he related it to the temporal dimensions of suffering 
and self. I have already glimpsed at Cassell’s view on suffering and pain. In the 
following section I shall detail it, emphasizing the way it determines the 
intersubjective relationship to the suffering Other. 
Cassell suggests that it is possible to acknowledge others’ suffering, to be 
aware of it through knowing, understanding the natural facts perceived about the 
sufferer, knowing the purposes, goals of the sufferer, his/her values (desires, interests, 
concerns, fears, beliefs) as they developed over time, finally through an “aesthetic 
knowledge” that grasps the consonance/dissonance of events with “the living-through 
time individual” (Cassell, “Recognizing Suffering” 29), with the cohesiveness and 
harmony of a personal life organized around central life purposes. It is possible to 
reach such an understanding on the basis of the shared commonsense knowledge, the 
                                                     
9 See Elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps for a synthesis of studies referring to the temporal dimension in 
personal narratives. 
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proximity of community, of a “we-ness” in a shared space, the “universe of facts, 
values, … aesthetics [and] our similarities with other persons” (Cassell, “Recognizing 
Suffering” 29). One recognizes that in similar disruptive conditions, one can 
experience suffering; our consciousness is hence provided with “categories of 
recognition” (Cassell, “Recognizing Suffering” 31). 
It is the very tragic experience of suffering that obliges us to encounter 
suffering as an unavoidable reality and can thus “awaken us to … the brute fact that 
we and others suffer” (van Hooft, “The Meanings of Suffering” 18). Bearing our own 
suffering opens the path towards the other’s suffering, towards compassion and efforts 
to relieve suffering. The ultimate meaning suffering can have resides in the 
compassionate act itself, which binds persons within “the community of suffering” 
(van Hooft, “The Meanings of Suffering” 18). 
But the emphasis Cassell puts on “the intelligence that enter into our 
knowledge of others … as they know themselves” (“Recognizing Suffering” 30) 
eludes the embodied relation to the Other, and to his/her expressive discourse, to 
his/her embodied tale. With a more attentive regard, Cassell seems to echo Schütz’s 
problematic definition of intersubjectivity centered on the meaningful configuration of 
self-explanation, on the content of consciousness. Moreover, though concerned with 
temporal aspects of identity, with a suffering self-memory, the play of time in relating 
to the Other’s suffering is neglected. 
Based on the transcendence and radical heterogeneity between the Other and 
the Same, Levinas’ metaphysics implies an asymmetric ethical relation to the Other. If 
the Other cannot be given through the objectifying, totalizing regard, nor through 
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comprehension acts rendering him intelligible and reducing him to intelligibility, he is 
the presence of a face, the Desired. The Desired asks for, calls forth, the metaphysical 
Desire for the transcendent, Infinite, for the absolute Other, radically strange, 
disinterested Desire, humaneness in the Same. Through Desire, the Same receives the 
Other. The Other’s presence calls out the Same’s transcendence towards what 
constantly eludes him. The relation to the Other is then necessarily an ethical 
relationship interrogating the self-sufficiency of the Same. The latter engages in 
passing through an infinite distance towards the Other under the imperative of the 
Other’s presence. First, the Other’s way of being present is in his expression, in his 
revelation through discourse (dire) because the Other’s infinity would go beyond any 
attempt at manifesting it through an objectifying thematization. Opening towards the 
encounter with the Other would mean consequently opening towards his 
expressiveness through discourse. This is realized by the interpellation addressed to 
the Other in a face-to face discourse that maintains the distance and radical difference, 
the plurality between the Same and the Other. To talk means to keep recognising the 
Other as an interlocutor, “the beginning of his own discourse” (Levinas, Totalité et 
infini 75), impossible expression to be integrated into a system that equalizes the 
status of its terms or elements by means of an overarching, generalizing intelligibility. 
Through discourse, the Same is displaced out of his sameness and experiences an 
absolute estrangement, “the trauma of astonishment” (Levinas, Éthique et infini 46; 
italics in the original). Language maintains the Other’s autonomy and sovereignty. 
Under the imperative of the Other’s presence which requests his recognition, the 
opening act towards the Other’s discourse signifies not only an ethical commitment, 
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but at the same time recognizing the majesty of the Other and of his discourse, his 
pedagogical power–as it functions as a critical referral of objectifying knowledge.  
In this context, being in front of the suffering Other means bearing 
responsibility for his/her absurd suffering–the pure passivity that imposes itself to 
consciousness as refusal of significance, that cannot be synthesized into a meaningful 
content. It means non-indifference, attention towards the Other’s useless suffering, 
generosity that does not subsume his/her otherness to a general category, nor awaits 
for reciprocity, and thus becomes meaningful “suffering ... for another’s suffering ... 
the nexus of the very human subjectivity” (Levinas, “La Souffrance Inutile” 104).  
In Le temps et l’autre, Levinas defines time as the transcendence opportunity 
towards the Other. He emphasizes the future orientation of the diachronic relationship 
to the Other, to the unpredictable difference that cannot be apprehended through, or 
reduced neither to a simultaneous formal coincidence, nor to what one could 
anticipate in the present about future acts (see also Levinas, Éthique et infini). And, 
significant for my approach, time as such is a function of suffering (physical suffering, 
pain, and not anxiety in front of nothingness). While pain imposes an inescapable 
confinement to it, from which no refuge seems possible, it implies, as its essence, an 
inevitable persistence of being. While suffering, one cannot elude being; suffering “is 
the fact of being backed onto life, onto being. [it] is the impossibility of nothingness” 
(Levinas, Le temps et l’autre 56). But at the same time, pain, through its very 
paroxistical adherence to being, alerts us to an imminent event, completely different, 
mysterious, infinite Other, that can be grasped neither by the subject’s intentional acts, 
nor through reflexivity, that denies the possibility of any project: death. The suffering 
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subject’s solitude is hence disrupted by the event of the absolute otherness that has to 
come, and that prepares the terrain for his/her transcendence towards the Other. 
Nonetheless, the ultimate significance of otherness does not reside in its future value; 
on the contrary, future depends on the very structure of its very otherness: “The 
future, is the other” (Levinas, Le temps et l’autre 64). 
Still, the future does not constitute time yet. Any connection between present 
and future seems to be out of the question due to their very radical difference. If one 
were to grasp the future through anticipations, there would be an inauthentic 
representation of time, “le présent de l’avenir” (64). What could then account for the 
difference between the present and the future, and at the same time for their temporal 
order and relation, for being situated in the present, and yet being able to transcend the 
present instant towards a radically different, unpredictable event?  It is only in the 
face-to-face immediate relation with the Other that present can transcend itself 
towards future, as the intersubjective relationship implies the transcendence moment 
towards the Other. Intersubjectivity, taking an ethical stance in front of the Other, 
ultimately orders temporality; it is the very condition of the temporal interval between 
the present and the future. The intersubjective moment instantiates time as the 
immediate face-to-face relation exposes the subject to the difference of the Other in a 
unexpected way that cannot be represented, contained or seized in the present. Hence, 
time cannot be dissociated from relating to the Other’s suffering. 
The significance of considering this aspect is capital for any attempt to 
understand intersubjectivity in illness narratives as time is not only a function of the 
suffering experience, but also modulated by personal biography. Illness narratives are 
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temporal constructions of the meaning of illness experience, of the self-image in the 
horizon of the personal story, representations and reflections upon the experience of 
illness in the everyday life (Hydén). They are efforts to confer meaning to the 
experience of suffering, to articulate it in a coherent world of significances, to fix the 
temporal and spatial landmarks of a biography disrupted by suffering and pain, to tie 
up again its temporal plot as a way of countering the dismantling of the world (Good, 
“The Body, Illness Experience, and the Lifeworld”; Hydén; Charmaz, “Stories of 
Suffering”; see also the emergence of a new survival discourse in Saillant).  
 
 
Narrative Self-Memory: Intersubjective and Ethical Relation 
 
Scholars in the social sciences have already pointed towards memory, 
particularly self-memory, as an intersubjective, social and cultural construction 
(Halbwachs; Connerton;10 Kirmayer, “Landscapes of Memory”; Culbertson; Leibing). 
And the commonsensical meaning of identity in modernity, the social, folk 
understanding, attributes the self-identity coherence and persistence to the continuity 
of memory (Leibing)–the recollection “folk view” on memory mentioned by 
Kirmayer (“Landscapes of Memory”). Self-identity is defined by individuals in 
everyday life in function of the social meaning of memory, which has a significant 
impact on their life, acts and gestures. Memory, the marker of identity, can become 
                                                     
10 Paul Connerton discusses social memory in ritual commemorative performances sustained by enacted 
“master narratives.” He specifically opposes them to personal autobiographies and diaries, of mere 
cognitive and reflexive value. My intent is to show, on the contrary, that personal diaries go far beyond 
a reflexive content, and are anchored in the very life of the sufferer who experiences loss of memory as 
an embodied condition. 
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then a mode of suffering, but also the victory upon it, the loss of memory meaning the 
loss of identity while remembrance equates reliving at least fragments of the past, 
“bring[ing] back people and events that have vanished eternities earlier; … say[ing] 
no to the sand of time covering the landscape of our being, … saying no to 
forgetfulness, no to death” (Wiesel 15); it “defines the fragility, the vulnerability but 
also the invincibility of the human condition” (13).  
One path of approaching the relationship between suffering and self is Kathy 
Charmaz’s (“Stories of Suffering”) symbolic interactionist and conceptual analysis of 
the self as a continuous process, and as a consistent self-concept organized around 
specific attributes, values, feelings that help individuals to define themselves. Crises 
moments like illness episodes bring into question and discredit the taken for granted 
self-definitions. They affect the “moral status” of individuals, the meanings of self-
worth and moral values in the context of social settings where individuals interact 
with others. Hence suffering is etched by moral significance. One way of maintaining, 
retrieving the lost moral status or gaining a renewed one is the storytelling of one’s 
suffering, contouring the history of self. 
However, her comprehensive effort to grasp in one overall view what “loss of 
self” means in chronic illness, risks obliterating what might be the particularly 
affected domain of the self in a specific illness. Hence, a whole absent territory in 
Charmaz’ approach: the loss of the self’s memory so relevant for a brain cancer or 
Alzheimer’s disease sufferer. 
But when I talk about the loss of self’s memory and suffering loss of memory 
as “loss of self,” I go beyond a hermeneutic understanding of memory, where memory 
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functions as an operator of the coherence of self (Frank, The Wounded Storyteller). I 
argue that the most critical meaning of the loss of memory resides less in the inability 
to reconstruct the landmarks of identity–though I consider this as a highly important 
dimension of suffering–than in the loss of the memory’s remembering capacity, the 
lived experience not of a lack in temporal structure, in the text of memory, but in its 
retrieval capacity, in its going towards past and back again to the present. 
Hence, memory and its retrieving power cannot be reduced to a mere 
intentional, imaginative act of consciousness. On the contrary, as put by Cavarero, 
memory is a spontaneous act of telling the self’s story: 
the work of memory … in a totally involuntary way, continues to tell us our 
own personal story. Every human being, without even wanting to know it, is 
aware of being a narratable self–immersed in the spontaneous auto-narration 
of memory … in the spontaneous narrating structure of memory itself. (33-
34) 
that does not depend on a conscious, intentional effort of remembering. Even 
the distinction between the I as the subject who narrates and the narrated self as the 
object of the narrative becomes questionable. Finally, Cavarerro’s view situates 
against a constructionist perspective where the self is seen merely as a product of a 
narrative text and a narrative performance, or the product of memory. The self is not a 
narrated, reconstructed textual object; his/her identity emerges out of “the familiar 
experience of a narratability of the self” (34), of a constitutive, irrepressible desire for 
story, the natural “narrative attitude of memory … the uncontrollable work of 
memory” (35). The primary experience is that of the “the self-sensing [assaporarsi] of 
the self as narratable” (35), an immediate relationship expressing the temporal 
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unfolding of our life story.  
Moreover, for Cavarero, experiencing the self as narratable enables us to relate 
to others, to perceive in others a correspondent “narratable self” with his/her own life 
story. This is possible as an effect of Aristotle’s cathartic mechanism through which 
one can identify as audience with the tragic experience of the Other, with his/her fear 
and plot of suffering. Narrative is the medium through which one is situated in front 
of ourselves and in front of the Other, it “measures” the tragic gap between our goals, 
projects, and factual situation, and those of the Other,  
It is pivotal in creating at one and the same time self-awareness and awareness 
of others … Stories of illness evoke a ‘me too’ response. They speak to us 
because in recognizing the vulnerability of others we recognize our own: we 
must face illness and death.” (Skultans 8) 
While grounding their approach on a narrative definition of identity, numerous 
scholars have explored relating to the Other as a narrative self. Still, the emphasis has 
been put on configurative narrative models, and not on narratability as the natural 
attitude of memory. The meaning and unity of self is constructed around a life history 
structured around a beginning-middle-and-end or birth-life-death equation in Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s terms, the biographical, consequential, plot (MacIntyre; Polkinghorne, 
“Narrative Configuration,” Narrative Knowing; Taylor; Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un 
autre; MacAdams; Baumeister; Charmaz, “Stories of Suffering”; Charon, Narrative 
Medicine etc.). As our actions are connected to the Other’s actions, to what has been 
before we can become the “author” of our deeds, narrativity also confers “social” and 
“cultural” settings and contexts to the interpretation of the self (MacIntyre; see also 
Taylor). We are plunged into a “dramatic narrative” (MacIntyre 215) of playing roles 
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constructed since childhood through character stories from our lifeworld (MacIntyre; 
Bruner, Acts of Meaning). Hence the self has the unity of a character in a narrative, 
he/she is the subject of a personal history, and at the same time is called upon, in the 
narrative drama of social settings, to be accountable for his/her actions, happenings, to 
be witness to himself/herself, to others, and correlatively, to ask for the others’ 
account, to “put others to the question. I am part of their story, as they are part of 
mine. The narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives.” 
(MacIntyre 218). The same, while telling his/her story, the suffering storyteller claims 
an identity portrait in front of the others (audience) (Charmaz, “Stories of Suffering”). 
Through stories we encounter the Other, his/her actions and our own life story. 
Stories enact intersubjective relations of disclosing one’s self and meaningfully 
receiving the Other’s sense: “narrative situations always join one human being with 
another,” the teller and listener, the writer and the reader (Charon, Narrative Medicine 
52). But narrative structure not only implies an intersubjective relationship (see also 
Carr), the very intersubjective relationship unfolds as a narrative act, which therefore 
obliges both the writer-teller and the reader-listener to engage in an ethical attitude 
towards each other:  
The receiver of another’s narrative owes something to the teller by virtue, 
now, of knowing it.… The act of reading or hearing an author’s work confers 
upon the receiver an uncanny intimacy, as if learning a new private language. 
The learner of such a personal language incurs duties toward the originator of 
it; once one is fluent in the language of another, one harbours toward him or 
her a great and sacred trust. (Charon, Narrative Medicine 55) 
From an ethical point of view Elie Wiesel emphasizes the active effect that 
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memory has upon future, in Levinas’ terms its going beyond the same movement, its 
capacity to engage a dialogue between different life-worlds, ultimately its 
intersubjective and ethical condition, the “ethical memory” (Loureiro 167; italics in 
the original), through which the individual transcends himself towards the Other: 
To remember is to allow the past to move into the future and shape its course. 
To remember is to acknowledge the postulate that time does leave traces and 
scars on the surface of history, that all events are intertwined, all gates open to 
the same truth.… Memory means to live in more than one world and in more 
than one time, to be tolerant and understanding with one another, to accept the 
mystery inherent in questions and the suspicion linked to answers.… To 
remember is to open oneself to someone else’s image of himself. It is to 
accept his or her right to remember … (Wiesel 15-16) 
At the same time “memory is both cognitive and experiential” (Whitfield 17), 
it is framed not only by images and representations, but anchored in our embodied 
condition, in our spontaneous, habitual bodily skills that one only reflects upon in 
cases of disability: “In habitual memory the past is, as it were, sedimented in the 
body” (Connerton 72). The wounded body contains the memory of the inflicted pain 
and suffering, the tale of the suffering to be told, even when the experience of 
suffering is unconscious. The “imaginal body,” meaningfully related to the world it 
inhabits (Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception), is the medium through 
which soma and psyche are connected, making possible the embodied remembering of 
the body’s tales (Slattery).  
 
 
57 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout my review of literature I have followed first the embodied 
definitions of intersubjectivity, pain and suffering with the aim at retrieving their 
intersubjective dimensions in the context of illness experience. I pointed to the limits 
of phenomenology–the paradox of an embodied objectification of the body in pain, 
and the unadressed intersubjective communication in care-giving situations–and to the 
necessity to integrate phenomenological advances into an ethical understanding of 
intersubjectivity and of the suffering experience. The value of the ethical approach 
resides in re-centering the attention on the discourse problem, on the expressive 
discourse actualizing a presence–distinct from the mere indication of a reflexive or 
consciousness content–, which becomes a way of accomplishing the intersubjective 
relation. This demonstrates that pain and suffering discourses, pain and suffering 
stories, are embodied discourses witnessing to the subjective experience of pain and 
suffering, expressing it in its phenomenological complexity. 
A neglected aspect of intersubjectivity has been identified: the temporal 
dimension and its remembering facet. I have shown that memory is founded on the 
immediate and spontaneous experience of the self as narratable. The narrative self also 
governs intersubjective relations as we perceive the Other as a “narratable self” too. 
Furthermore, narrative memory has an ethical value because it makes possible the 
relation to the Other in an active way. At the same time, from the perspective of the 
paradigm of embodiment, a non-constructivist approach, I uncovered the embodied 
character of memory, the memory of experienced wounds, pain, and suffering. 
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Moreover, I indicated a neglected existential domain of the experience of suffering: 
the loss of memory and remembering as “loss of self,” as loss of identity.  
Thus I am able now to indicate the whole range of existential domains-themes 
affected by suffering and pain that emerged throughout the whole analysis. Pain and 
suffering affect human beings at the locus where embodied condition, temporal and 
spatial lived situation, relations with others, language, memory, self and self-
narratives as expressive discourses meet. It is through analyzing the illness narrative 
written about Alzheimer’s disease and brain cancer sufferers that I shall try to retrieve 
these existential domains and uncover the mechanisms that constitute the 
intersubjective relationship to the suffering Other. I identified illness narratives as 
expressive discourses performing an intersubjective relationship. In the following 
section I shall uncover the narrative mechanisms that actualize the ethical relation to 
the suffering Other. 
I shall study the narrative mechanisms following two main problems: the 
definition of “pathographies” as sub-genre of life narratives, and the functions of 
voice (narrative instance) and mood (narrative perspective or focalization).
CHAPTER 3 
 
ENCOUNTERING THE OTHER’S SUFFERING IN ILLNESS DIARIES 
 
 
As I demonstrated in the preceding chapter, what characterizes writing about 
the suffering and pain experience, in the social sciences or philosophy, is the 
impossibility to escape their paradoxical indeterminacy. They are viewed as profound 
subjective and/or intersubjective experiences, destroying language and/or, on the 
contrary, eliciting language, pain and suffering metaphors and stories.  
An ethical perspective following Levinas offered a pertinent starting point to 
integrate the embodied condition of suffering and its intersubjective dimension 
(Frank, The Wounded Storyteller; van Hooft, “Pain and Communication”) as the 
sufferer’s condition becomes an embodied call for the other’s testimony in co-
presence, or through the act of writing and reading illness narratives. Illness memoirs 
are particular cases of pathographies in which the self-writing is replaced by 
pathographies recounted by individuals close to the sufferers. Thomas G. Couser 
(Recovering Bodies) argues that illness memoirs do not give access to the subjective 
experience of illness. My purpose is to challenge this view, which restricts the access 
to the subjective experience of the sufferer, and to uncover the intersubjective 
possibilities opened by writing about the other’s suffering.11 Writing is both a means 
                                                     
11 The selection of the corpus, the texts of two highly literate authors, might seem problematic. One 
could read them as exceptional vs. typical illness narratives. Nonetheless, the distinction is difficult to 
maintain as any published text is filtered through the professional editing work and, as in the as–told–to 
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by which the embodied self asks for the listener’s ethical response, and a dialogical 
performance of the answer itself. 
This will imply reconsidering the limits of generic definitions of self-writing 
(mainly autobiography and diary), and their ethical implications, the relations between 
narrative discourse and ethical presence. 
 
 
Illness Life Writing: Genre Definition and the 
Narrative-Ethic Relation Dilemma 
  
In the context of the contemporary trend countering the objectifying bio-
medical definitions of personhood and suffering or body-mind dichotomisations, 
pathographies, as emphasized by Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, are a means of rendering 
coherent or negotiable the illness experience, of bridging “the suffering self and the 
outside world by an overt act of communication” (25). They answer the urge to 
express one’s illness experience, to tell it to another, to read about another’s 
experience, and offer socio-cultural rhetorical (metaphors, images), and mythical 
devices to constitute or transform the models of its understanding.  
When referring to autobiography, biography, memoir, essay, and diary as 
writings that gravitate around a life account, one is situated in the domain of “life 
                                                                                                                                                        
autobiography for instance, it is so difficult to distinguish the limits between the voices of the text (the 
voice of the narrator and the voice of the interviewer or editor). Moreover, it might also be problematic 
to exclude such texts from the ethical right to be recognized as texts about suffering, just because they 
belong to intellectuals. The right to suffering does not belong to a specific social class; see the 
fundamental work of Paul Celan, Primo Levi, Viktor Frankl, Elie Wiesel, Alexandr Soljhenitzyn, 
Varlam Shalamov, to name just a few. Their work emerged from the experience of suffering.  
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writing” (Frank, “Moral Non-fiction”), “life writing genres” (Couser, Recovering 
Bodies; see also Smith and Watson, Reading Autobiography). More narrowly, “life 
narratives” are restrained to the “self-referential writing”–especially autobiography 
(Couser, Recovering Bodies).12 They may function as “counterstories” Nelson) or 
“counterdiscourses” (Couser, “Signifying Bodies”)13 reconstituting and reinstating the 
moral identity and right for agency of marginalized individuals. 
The term pathography has been recently revived from Hippocratic medicine 
by Oliver Sacks, but, from its basic meaning–the description of the illness case–, the 
author shifts towards an experiential significance of the term that refers to the 
suffering subject, the person confronting his/her illness and body in illness. For Sacks 
this meant reorienting the focus point from the case history to a story of illness. 
Pathography in this last sense refers to personal illness narratives, subgenres of life 
writing, concentrating on illness episodes and life experiences. 
Anne Hunsaker Hawkins records under the term of pathography 
autobiographical illness writings, collaborative autobiographies, illness journals, and 
biographies about the illness and death of a close other. However the latter can be 
considered also as “autobiographical accounts of the author’s experience as witness … 
thus they override the conventional boundaries of self and other or biographer and 
subject” (Hunsaker 3). Hence, the significance of pathographies is extended to the 
account of grieving and suffering loss.  
                                                     
12 Some theorists have insisted on differences between personal/intimate writing, depending on whether 
they are public oriented, published /non-published writing. For the purpose of my dissertation, the 
distinction is irrelevant as I approach exclusively published work. 
13 For an analysis of the counter-discursive value of life writing and its importance for the claim and 
restitution of social and political identities, see Frank (At the Will of the Body; “Moral Non-fiction”), 
and Couser (Recovering Bodies; Vulnerable Subjects). 
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For Frank the use of the term pathography would mean prolonging the bio-
medical gaze on the sufferers, as the term belongs to a bio-medical jargon, and does 
not seem to express the sufferer’s definition of his/her own writing; so he resolves to 
use the phrases “life writing about illness” or “personal narratives of illness” (“Moral 
Non-fiction” 175-176). However, if we go back to the roots of the term, pathography 
is one of the most appropriate to signify the continuity between the experience of 
suffering and the experience of writing, as it is composed by the Greek pathos, 
meaning ‘suffering,’ ‘passion,’ ‘experience,’ ‘emotion,’ ” and “ [the] Greek graphein, 
[meaning] ‘writing or representation’ ”;14 it expresses suffering as the motor of 
writing, the writing intention and performance anchored in the suffering experience. 
The hand that writes participates in and communicates the suffering condition: 
“writing goes right to the place that hurts, and writing heals” (Klauser x). 
Couser is specifically concerned with “autopathograph[ies]– autobiographical 
narrative[s] of illness or disability” (Couser, Recovering Bodies 5)–and illness 
memoirs. If initially he contrasts autobiography, or illness self narrative, with illness 
memoirs written by significant others (family members or friends) about the sufferer, 
and in which the narrator is a witness to the ill, later he displaces the authorial 
emphasis of autobiographical writing by taking into account the presence of the close 
other in autobiography:15 “all autobiography is necessarily heterobiography as well 
because one can rarely if ever represent one’s self without representing others.” 
(Couser, Vulnerable Subjects x; italics in the original). However, technically, 
                                                     
14“graphy.”Encyclopædia Britannica from Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ‹http://search.eb.com/dicti  
onary?va=graphy&query=graphy›.  
15 He uses the term “auto/biography” to refer specifically to “life writing that focuses on the relation 
between the writer and a significant other” (Couser, Vulnerable Subjects ix) 
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autobiography is still defined by Couser through the identity between writer-author, 
narrator, and subject. 
Moreover, authoring or not the autobiographical narrative (especially in 
auto/biography), expressing or not one’s own voice seems to decide between an 
ethical / nonethical representation. Hence he disqualifies one-voice narratives, or as-
told-to autobiographies, with a clear distinction between writer-author and character-
narrator, as “simulations” of the other’s voice: in  
“as-told-to autobiography, in which the writer is one person but the narrator 
and subject are someone else.… Although the process by which the text is 
produced is dialogical, the product is monological; the single narrative voice–
a simulation by one person of the voice of another–is always in danger of 
breaking, exposing conflicts not manifest in solo autobiography. The two 
voices are permitted to engage in dialogue only in supplementary texts–
forewords and afterwards–and even there, the dialogue is managed and 
presented by one party, the nominal author.” (Couser, Vulnerable Subjects 35) 
 Couser’s reasoning can be translated in the following way: one voice can just 
simulate another’s voice because in fact one voice is equal to (belongs to) the person 
who speaks. The confusions between the writer as person and the narrator (voice) 
inside the text would mean automatically that the voice inside the text represents the 
writer and can only simulate the Other’s voice, even if he is also a narrator, but a 
narrator outside the text. The Other outside the text risks being ethically 
misrepresented if he/she does not speak in the text. One of the problematic points is 
that the relation between the outside text narrative and the inside text narrative is 
undetermined. 
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 This leaves the place for a reconsideration of the autobiographical genre, 
which is also relevant to the life writing genre (including diaries, memoirs). 
 The monument of self-confessional autobiography, Saint Augustine’s 
Confessions, opens with the narrator’s incapacity to remember his early infancy, and 
with the appeal to others’ memory (what he was told about it by close others), or 
examples seen later by the author (other children in his own life-world). Self-
confessional memory seems paradoxically to be anchored in the memory of the social 
world, inextricably linked to the Other’s voice and perspective cast upon one’s own 
life.  
 It will be then necessary to clarify the relation between narrative voices and 
ethical presence and relation to the Other. What do narrative instances express in the 
autobiographical discourse, but also life writing in general, from an ethical point of 
view? How do grammatical persons relate to ethical persons if, in the words of Paul 
John Eakin, “the subject of autobiography to which the pronoun ‘I’ refers is neither 
singular nor first … that the first person of autobiography is truly plural in its origins 
and subsequent formation” (True Relations 63)? The same question can be asked 
regarding the diary, which would imply normally a similar author-narrator-subject 
identity. How is non-fictional genre expressive of an ethical genre, and what are the 
consequences of this relation for illness life writing? All these questions pinpoint to a 
necessary analysis and elucidation of the connection between narrative and ethical 
presence in life writing.  
Many critics have been alarmed at the real dangers of ethical misrepresentation 
of the Other through one-voice discourses, or through the insertion of a distorting 
65 
external gaze in the I’s autobiographical discourse; and disability is a state most prone 
to asymmetrical power relations between interviewer and interviewee (Rosen; H-
Dirksen L. Bauman; Couser, Vulnerable Subjects). Nonetheless, even in this case, 
limits are permeable: “Deaf persons are clearly aware that the interpreter is an 
extension of them. Where one body ends and another begins is, at best, difficult to 
discern” (H-Dirksen L. Bauman 57), and a rigid position risks denying intersubjective 
encounters in what would appear to be eliding the Other’s voice and presence.  
 
 
The “I – Other” Genre 
 
In what follows I will focus on sorting out the generic structure of the illness 
diary, which, as we will see, goes beyond the limits of the autonomous, soliloquial I. 
Though I shall focus my analysis on a diary and two memoirs, for theoretical reasons I 
shall also refer to autobiography. Scholars have included diary and autobiography in 
the domain of life writing, and, from a generic perspective, they have focused their 
attention on autobiographical writing. Comparing both up to a certain point can lead 
to valuable observations in each field. The discussion of autobiographical writing is 
also motivated by the structure of John Bayley’s memoirs that include 
autobiographical narratives. I shall tackle the restricted inclusion of illness life writing 
in the “arch genre” of the I (Hubier) and its different figures, but also its You oriented 
definition (Frank, The Wounded Storyteller). 
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What is then the correspondence, or divergence, between the personal life 
narrative–their narrative re-presentations, and the ethical otherness, the I-Other 
relation? What is the ethical grammar of encountering the suffering Other through the 
life writing act?  
 
1. The “Arch Genre” of the I 
 
Until recently, discussions about “self-writing” (Hall 2) or the “arch genre” of 
the I designating life writing and fictional writing in the first person, concerned 
emphatically the referent of the I, hypostasised as the author identical with the 
narrator recounting the author’s life; its “hypogenres” would be autobiography, 
memoir, and diary (Hubier). The self-writing genre, centred on self-exploration, 
seems to become the mode of embodying the experience of the self, implying the 
presence to one’s own self, the adherence to one’s own being (Gusdorf, Les écritures 
du moi), not just a representation of the self and body, but its vivid presentation; the 
embodied self is written, writes itself, accomplishing the continuity between self, 
body, and text (Hall). Still, while affirming the I, self-writing performs a relational act 
with oneself as an other (the I who reads himself/herself), with other readers (Gusdorf, 
Les écritures du moi). It opens towards a dialog with a whole community, and stands 
for a means of witnessing for others (Frank, The Wounded Storyteller; Goulet). 
In the fields of diary and autobiography, two main theoretical positions are 
hence at odds. On the one hand, in a centripetal movement, diaries have been defined 
as an I centred, “autarchic” genre, where the I tends to be configured as isolated (the 
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imprisoned I, the ill I) (Girard; Aronson; Simonet-Tenant), profoundly inclined 
towards auto-analysis (Metzger; Amen), and revealing the genesis of self (Lejeune, 
Les brouillons de soi); autobiographical writing by the pretensions to individual 
autonomy and the capacity of the writing self to render past life coherent through the 
work of memory (Gusdorf, “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography”; Les écritures 
du moi, and Lejeune, Le pacte autobiographique). The autobiographical act is a means 
of interpretively construing and constructing personal life on the basis of cultural and 
social codes available to the individual (Bruner, “The Autobiographical Process”).  
On the other hand, in a centrifugal movement, diary is ontologically grounded 
in the dialogical space opened by the presence of the Other; it is only when the other 
ruptures the autonomous self that diary becomes a necessity:  
The diary becomes possible, and perhaps necessary, with the appearance of 
the Other, who disrupted the established mental order. Because of the Other 
and the questions he never stops asking me, I become my own interlocutor, in 
order to react to those disturbing influences that come from this absolutely 
separate partner apart, whose attitudes and behaviour are unpredictable. Such 
an encounter creates a need to settle accounts, not merely with the other, but 
with oneself. (Gusdorf, “Scripture of the Self” 116) 
The Other has also infiltrated as subject or look at the diary. From a secret 
auto-analysis, through conversations and encounters with others mentioned by the 
diarist, one acknowledges the status change of the Other in diaries which affects the 
attitude, perspective of the diarist (Gusdorf, “Scripture of the Self” 124; see also 
Girard, for the other as “judge” of the diary). 
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Still, until recently, one can observe that in the end the Other is bracketed as 
the diary strives for recovering the self’s integrity, reducing multiplicity “to sameness 
to which all selves conform” (Aronson 64), or, at best, becomes a reflecting mirror for 
the self: “Scriptures of the self are glosses on the I” (Gusdorf, “Scripture of the Self” 
127; Rousset; Aronson). The most expressive figure of this movement is 
“autohospitality,” the process through which a reflected-upon-self, separated, 
estranged, is re-assumed, received as otherness of the self (Montandon). The I is the 
only moral authority that seems to back the writing of a diary, as recognized by 
Felicity A. Nussbaum–a position that I intend to contest as it is menaced by the 
discontinuity between the past and present I in the absence of a daily record of time 
that would compensate for the fragility of memory, or, on the contrary, that would 
convey the very expressions of the I’s temporal fragmentation. Hence the diarist I 
seems to be in a perpetual crisis and battle for determination: “change may be the only 
constant in the daily depiction of self” (Nussbaum 134). 
Consequently some theorists have considered the Other’s presence as less 
consistent than that of a novel character. In spite of recognizing at a certain point of 
her study the openness towards the other, Béatrice Didier concludes by claiming that 
in diaries, “… the other does not exist.… has neither a face nor a body, nor a name” 
(178). At the same time the insertion of the Other as reader remains fugitive or, as 
Didier writes, “tolerated:” “We are far from the ‘pact’ that binds author and reader in 
autobiography …. The reader has infiltrated [diary] by fraud…” (167). Thus, the diary 
still remains a privileged place for the writing I. 
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Autobiographical writing, however, starting with feminist critiques16, has been 
the battlefield for the contesting view that claims a relational perspective not only for 
the autobiographical self, but also for autobiographical writing as such. 
The main phases of this argument concern a pervasive problem in self-writing 
in general (especially autobiography and diary), the limits, status, and identity of the I.  
What appears to ground a self-oriented autobiographical genre is the identity 
between the real author, narrator, and main character throughout an autodiegetical 
narrative (Lejeune, Le pacte autobiographique). The consequence for Philippe 
Lejeune is that the autobiographical overlap between author, narrator and main 
character seems to settle a non-problematic differentiation from biography (in which 
the author and narrator are distinct from the main character): 
Here [in autobiography], there is neither transition, nor latitude. An identity is 
or is not. There is no possible degree, and any doubt triggers off a negative 
conclusion.” (Lejeune, Le pacte autobiographique 15) 
The distinction between autobiography on the one hand, and diary on the other 
hand (non-retrospective narrative account), personal essay (non-retrospective, non-
narrative account), and memoir (the other’s story) is, however, blurred by the genre 
“hybridization” whereby diary, memoir and essay fragments can be inserted in 
autobiography, and also by an extension of autobiographical writing as representative 
of life writing. The identity rule formulated for autobiographical writing seems 
                                                     
16 In female autobiographical writing the I is consistently related to the other, the male reader, reviewer, 
presence, or reference point for the female identity. For a comprehensive analysis of the main 
theoretical steps of the feminist approach towards recognizing autobiographical writing as the 
expression of a “relational identity” see Eakin (“Relational Selves, Relational Lives”) and his critique 
of the radical dichotomisation of life writing by gender studies, S. Stanford Friedman, James Olney 
(“Autobiography and the Cultural Moment”). As it is too far from the scope of my dissertation, I shall 
not tackle directly feminist studies of autobiography. However, throughout the analysis of the texts, I 
shall refer to several gendered aspects that might intervene in the relation to the suffering Other. 
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encompassing enough to be extended to intimate literature in general, and to constitute 
the “arch genre of the I”: “To have autobiography (and more generally intimate 
literature), there has to be identity of author, narrator, and character)” (Lejeune, Le 
pacte autobiographique 15; see also Vitoux). Still, the question arises: how far can the 
I encompass the life writing genre? 
The linguistic paradox unveiled by numerous scholars is that the I can refer to 
himself/herself as the main character and the narrator of the story but is expressed and 
addressed by all the personal pronouns “I/we,” “you,”17 “he/she/they” (Lejeune Le 
pacte autobiographique; Je est un autre; Didier; Hubier). Moreover, the first-person 
expression can throw doubts on the identity of the I.18 
Ochs and Capps, Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson (Reading Autobiography), 
Peter T. F. Raggatt, and John Barresi talk about the heteroglossical narrating self, 
referring to the social polyphony that underwrites the narrative instance, the multiple 
voiced narrator analyzed by Mikhaïl M. Bakhtin (Esthétique et théorie du roman). 
The realm of the I is anything but homogenous and limited to the contours of an 
autarchic subject (Charon, Narrative Medicine). Appealing to postmodern theories of 
the subject’s deconstruction, some scholars have already pointed towards the de-
centering, fragmented, fluid, and multiple autobiographical and confessant self 
(Loureiro; Halse; Gill; Charon, Narrative Medicine). The I unfolds in 
autobiographical writing in a polymorphous manner as the past narrated I and the 
present narrating I made up of heterogeneous figures and voices, the outside-
                                                     
17 Lejeune (Le pacte autobiographique) has identified this type of writing especially in fictional 
literature; still he notes that autobiographical references to the I through the second person is at least 
fragmentarily present in predominantly first person accounts. 
18 Lejeune (Le pacte autobiographique) refers to the problematic identity of the I in quotations, long 
distance talks with low or no checking possibilities of the identity of the speaker, and finally to writing. 
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text/inside-text I (Lejeune, Le pacte autobiographique), the historical, concrete 
I/narrating and narrated I (subject of enunciation/subject of utterance), the “ 
‘ideological I,’ ” itself a multiple I articulated by continuously transforming and 
conflicting ideologies of identity (Smith, qtd in Smith, Subjectivity, Identity and the 
Body). Thus narrative voice in autobiographical accounts might sound as a confusion 
of the voices of I (Lejeune, Je est un autre). Autobiographical identities, as “self-
interpretations,” are rooted in the cultural and social rhetoric of self and human nature; 
autobiographers are addressed by and address the reader through a public discourse 
about self, strategically handling their “presentations of self” ’ for the reading other 
(Bjorklund). The basic dimensions of autobiographical writing–i.e. memory, identity, 
experience, and embodiment–manifest an intersubjective relating to the other (Smith 
and Watson, Reading Autobiography; Watson and Smith, Introduction). As far as it is 
grounded on self-memory, identity is intersubjectively formed. Hence, 
autobiographical identity cannot be anything else than dialogical, collaborative, an 
intertextual fabric of the self-story that narrates himself/herself through reference to 
cultural and social discourses, models of subjectivity and identity, to 
textual others … historical others, the identifiable figures of a collective past 
… contingent others who populate the text as actors in the narrator’s script of 
meaning … significant others, those whose stories are deeply implicated in 
the narrator’s and through whom the narrator understands her or his own self-
formation. (Smith and Watson, Reading Autobiography 65; see also Smith 
and Watson, Introduction; Lejeune, Les brouillons de soi) 
Ultimately autobiography is relational, as far as identity itself is relational; the 
very fact that autobiography is embedded in a certain cultural discourse of what 
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personhood is, obliges individuals to continuously negotiate their selfhood definitions, 
which starts with the narrative formulas learned by children in their families (Eakin, 
“Relational Selves, Relational Lives”; 1998b). “Relational lives” (Eakin, “Relational 
Selves, Relational Lives”; “The Unseemly Profession”) or, for Couser (Vulnerable 
Subjects) collaborative auto/biographies written about close-others or proximate 
others, and “as-told-to” autobiographies, disconcert the reader. They are instruments 
for exerting power, but at the same time may constitute the privileged display mode of 
the Other’s story–, sometimes in an explicit deterministic way: “the space of 
autobiography, the space of the self, is literally occupied by the autobiography and 
self of the other” (Eakin, “Relational Selves, Relational Lives” 71). The extreme case 
of “relationality” is literal “autobiocopy,” where one’s own biography is, as a matter 
of fact, the copy, imitation of another’s life, not just one element of a conventional, 
codified series of the life narrative model (Lejeune, Les brouillons de soi 14, see also 
“L’Autobiocopie”).  
Scholars converge thus towards highlighting the definition of autobiography as 
“heterography” located at the discursive nexus of referentiality, address, rhetoric, and 
ethical stances (Loureiro). The reflected self becomes eventually an-other: the e-
stranged self. From this stage, the door is opened to transcending oneself towards 
another I, a different subject from the authorial I. It is the interstices of the self’s 
disruptions, questionings, fragmentation that create the space for the Other’s insertion, 
the insertion of the Other’s autobiography and biography in one’s own autobiography 
(Eakin, “The Unseemly Profession”; Gudmundsdottir).  
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Writing one’s own experience in an autobiographical account implies relating 
to the Other. Illness and disability autobiographies are among the most indicative of 
this aspect that may enable the narrating I to relate to the “community of sufferers” 
(Juárez 133; see also Frank, The Wounded Storyteller) through using the pronoun we 
instead of I.  
In a reversed movement then, if references to the I are possibly expressed 
through all grammatical persons, one can legitimately ask whether references to the 
Other could not be implied in the grammatical and narrative expression of the I. 
Furthermore, one is confronted with a variegated linguistic and narrative presence of 
the Other, the same way as the I can be expressed through all the grammatical persons 
and through different structures that usually would be associated with the Other’s 
identity. Gertrude Stein’s The Autobiography of Alice Toklas has been considered the 
reference for “the work of otherness” (Watson, “Shadowed Presence” 185) where the 
first person account tells the story of Alice Toklas written by Stein, a seemingly 
disguised biography of Alice Toklas written in the first person instead of the third one, 
but where, in fact, Toklas, the explicit narrator, recounts Gertrude Stein’s life authored 
by Gertrude Stein (Cavarero). What puzzles the reader is an implicit process of 
“making it [Gertrude Stein’s life-story] told by another; by Alice, her friend and 
partner, her lover,” by another’s voice, of staging Gertrude’s self desiring for a 
narration that cannot be accomplished without the Other, the “necessary other … who 
watches Gertrude and tells her story” (Cavarero 82-83). 
The domain of the writing I is multifaceted and polyphonic, hence opening the 
horizon towards an ethical dialog with the Other.  
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2. I-Other in Pathographies 
 
My intention is to uncover the modes of this ethical dialog with the Other in 
illness narratives. So far, narrative scholars have been concerned especially with the 
writer-reader (teller-listener) meeting in the text (Keniston; Zoloth and Charon, 2002; 
Radley, “Illness Narratives”). Through the medium of “vicarious imagination” readers 
can experience the lives textured in illness narratives (Marshall). 
Thus non-fiction personal writings have been considered as moral attitudes, as 
“acts of remoralization” (Frank, “Moral Non-fiction” 176). It is a dialogical test of 
one’s own moral free stance that requires the response of the Other-the reader. Still, 
this very moral stance engaging the reader implies a deeper relation to those whom the 
writing is about. Frank (“Moral Non-fiction”) shows that narrative is a technique 
which avoids formulating any conclusion about lives, and keeps open the horizon of 
the future. Writing becomes a medium of performing morality. Narrative-experience 
relationship is that of homology: narrated intimate gestures of caring–like washing a 
disabled child–sensitize the parental narrator to his own experience as 
compassionately attending to the Other, and the world to the experience of the child; 
experience inflects in a narrative way following what Cheryl Mattingly (Healing 
Dramas and Clinical Plots) defined as the narrative structure of social action. As she 
showed in her analysis of clinical encounters, the narrative plots emerge from 
interactions between occupational therapists and patients, from dramatic negotiations 
and interchanges between clinicians and patients within the temporal frame of the 
therapeutic session.  
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Hence, what writing performs is an invariable reiteration of speech (dire), of 
language expressing an ethical stance. In one of his interviews, Levinas identifies the 
fundamental ethics with writing, for writing functions as an invariable form of speech 
(dire) “already verse, already texture of the text, already citation, already solicitude, 
already revelation” (“Entretien avec Emmanuel Lévinas” 19), already call for 
attentiveness to the Other. Not only the verbal, sacred utterance, menaced by the 
ending of its breath, is materialized in a scriptural memorabilia (Gusdorf, “Scripture 
of the Self”), but, as in Marguerite Duras’ work, “the sacred is in the writing which 
extends the body, feeds on its suffering” (Danou 4). Language is able to convey 
experiences that point to our vulnerability, fragility, often situated at the prelingual 
level, like pain, unspeakable fears, bearing so much of the heaviness of our being that 
they spill over into linguistic expression (Charon and Spiegel). 
 Hence, discourse and writing are primeval modes of expressing the 
intersubjective relation. They are means of witnessing not only for oneself, but also 
for the Other, for a whole community, where the self-story becomes a metonymy for a 
social life-world (see the case of testimonial writing, testimonio, in Beverley; 
Tierney). And I have already seen with Frank that illness, and suffering narratives 
accomplish an embodied communicative act that binds the writing I and the reader in 
an ethical community; illness narratives cannot be reduced to social and cultural 
constructs, but convey and share an embodied suffering condition. 
 But so far, the temporal aspect of the ethical relation to the other has been a 
relatively rare topic in life narratives studies. To be mentioned here is Ángel Loureiro 
who invokes the address of the autobiographical I to the Other as reader or witness to 
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a remembered event. However, the Other’s role is not limited to a certification of 
one’s own memory, it is the Other’s responsibility that is called upon, and so memory 
itself performs a responsible act towards the Other: “Memory … is not simply marked 
or haunted by the other, but it is also addressed to the other, it is for the other” (97-
98). Still, the analysis proposed Loureiro concerns the responsibility of the reader 
addressed to take a position (the political responsibility). What I intend to elicit is the 
work of memory and temporality in illness memoirs ordered by the other’s suffering, 
by his/her authoritative presence that asks to be written and remembered, for an 
ethical stance. I shall approach memory in its capacity to restore dignity (Hacking).
 What in fact triggers writing pathographies? One of the incipit mechanisms of 
autobiographical writing is “coaxing,” a compelling act that solicits autobiographical 
writing, the request for life writing addressed by authoritative instances or individuals 
(“the coaxers”) to possible narrators (Plummer qtd. in Smith and Watson, Reading 
Autobiography). 
 If one takes on the position of the reader outside the text, pathographies call 
upon our questions on caring in real life situations:  
when such a person is in a so-called persistent vegetative state ... should 
family members be encouraged or not try to communicate or worry about 
pain? Can such individuals still hurt, hope, dream? If neurological substrates 
are destroyed, are there any grounds for hopes or for talk? Are there any 
similarities to someone who is 'locked in' yet alert and still quite alive? (Zaner 
193) 
 Illness and suffering narratives act upon us, responsive and responsible 
readers, as authoritative instances; they are our “coaxers” to witnessing illness and 
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suffering, “coaxers” at a second degree, however. The primordial authoritative 
instance to compel illness and suffering narratives is the sufferer and his/her embodied 
tale that marks the rhythms of his/her self-memory and remembering, an expressive 
call for attentive listening. In the presence of the suffering Other we are asked to be 
attentive listeners of the here and now unvoiced tales of the body-selves, their plight 
and necessities (Charon, Narrative Medicine), their memory, an expressiveness that 
verges on the interval where the untold shifts into the told. Through his/her very 
expressive presence of life, the sufferer obliges us to an answer that can take the form 
of writing: writing the Other’s suffering, an experience bestowed upon par excellence 
with the authority of “real life” as the source of any story (Benjamin). The Other’s 
experience constitutes not only an experiential moment in the written narrative, 
integrated in the author’s narrative, but triggers an encounter in the horizon opened by 
what can be narratable (Mattingly, Healing Dramas; Frank, “Moral Non-fiction”). 
Experience is narratable because our life itself, and others’ lives are narratively lived 
out and understood in a storied manner; narratives are not post-experiential forms of 
understanding, but constitutive of our life: “Stories are lived before they are told…” 
(MacIntyre 212). 
I intend to show that it is the narratability condition of any body-self, the 
embodied narrative memory untold yet, that constitutes the expressive story, “ ‘locked 
in’ yet alert and still quite alive” (Zaner 193), that asks for a telling (writing) to 
witness its very narratability, for listening to a silent story and telling it for the Other.
CHAPTER 4 
 
WHAT METHOD FOR THE ETHICS OF ILLNESS NARRATIVES? 
 
 
 The recent growth of illness life writing has been considered to constitute a 
new genre articulating the “previously unmet need among the public to know about 
illness experience” (Radley, “The Aesthetics of Illness” 779). Illness narratives have 
been linked to the general concern with health and illness as an expression of the self-
control of and responsibility for one’s own body: in this context, bodily impairment 
disrupts the managed body and asks for either an active reconquest or an artful form 
of translating its anxiety (Couser, Recovering Bodies). Illness life writing is then a 
mode of reasserting life significance and identities (see also Hunsaker; Frank, “Moral 
Non-fiction”). It is one form of the narrative constitution and restitution, through the 
narrative memory, of identity, of self. Moreover, the very act of writing and 
remembering a life narrative performs the preservation and restoration of a disrupted 
self; it is a means of countering the debilitating effects of trauma and illness (Henke; 
Mills). Finally, narrative writing adjourns an anticipated death, “writing works against 
death” (Danou 114). 
 However, as I have seen in the preceding chapter, a pervasive concern that 
emerges as an explicit or implicit theme of illness narratives is the ethical stakes as 
mode of the intersubjective relations, that is the meaning illness experience has not 
only for the suffering self, but for the close others, or for the community of readers. 
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Moreover, the problem of authorship has developed in an ethical turn of the so-called 
“narrative turn” in social sciences. Until recently scholars have seen authors as 
subjects empowered with a “given authority over the life that is written about.… an 
authority that is given by the very conventions that structure the writing or telling of 
the story in the first place” (Denzin 42). Consequently, the clear-cut problem one has 
pointed at was the risk of misrepresentation when someone else tells a story for 
another who had told his/her own story. 
 No doubt, this problematic point had to be indicated. But so far, scholars have 
been quite limited, not to say oblivious, in offering the instruments to discern between 
what might be a relevant or authentic representation of the other, or his/her 
misrepresentation. The very problem of voicing the other floated in a methodological 
vacuum. 
 It is in order to compensate this void that I suggest the use of narrative voice, 
as a way out of a methodological dead-end, as the most appropriate way to reveal the 
ethical stance in illness narratives. 
 
 
Narrative Voice, Telling the Other’s Illness: 
The Forgotten Stories of Illness Narratives 
 
 As pointed out by Lars-Christer Hydén studies of illness narratives have been 
mainly concerned with either understanding the “reality ‘behind’ the narrative [with] 
‘what’ is said” (50; italics in the original), or with “how people talk and present” (50) 
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the experience of illness. However Hydén suggests a path towards transcending this 
distinction: formal aspects of narratives articulate the illness experience at the 
personal and social level (see also Radley, “The Aesthetics of Illness”). It is this view 
that I will adopt throughout my effort to uncover narrative mechanisms that perform 
an ethical intersubjective relation to the suffering Other. 
 One of the most important concepts in medical sociology has been chronic 
illness as “biographical disruption” launched by Michael Bury in 1982. His analysis 
puts forward the disruptive effect of chronic illness on individuals’ everyday lives, 
their meaning structures, their biographies, self-concepts, and, if we pay attention to 
the “narrative quality of lives” (Gubrium and Holstein 163), on personal narratives. 
Thus, from a narrative point of view, “biographical disruption” would correspond to 
the “turning points,” transformation moments or “epiphanies,” critical or “significant 
events” which radically change individuals’ lives and which govern autobiographical 
and biographical texts about lives (Denzin 22). With chronic illness, pain, suffering, 
and death emerge as factual possibilities. Chronic illness interrogates common sense, 
the taken-for-granted social relationships and statuses, individual autonomy, and life-
projects. Disease causation from a medical perspective finally conflates with the 
interpretation of meanings from a personal life view (regarding what event or action 
from the past could be related to the onset of the disease), and often, from a moral 
perspective (Bury). 
 But, as Simon J. Williams observes, the theme of “biographical disruption” 
does not go without saying. The onset of illness does not necessarily mean disruption. 
If seen through the lense of a whole life trajectory of disability (starting from early 
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childhood and birth), illness episodes are elements of biographical continuity and 
“confirmation or reinforcement” (Williams 50; italics in the original). Moreover, if 
one pays attention to the age, class, gender, and ethnic differences, illness may have 
the connotations of “ ‘normal’ crises” (50) events, something to be expected, 
anticipated, in the context of life-long difficulties, hard work, or social definitions of 
the “life clock”: “timing, and context, norms and expectations, alongside our 
commitments to events, anticipated or otherwise, are crucial to the experience of our 
lives, healthy or sick, and the meanings with which we endow it” (51-52).  
In a radical way, Williams finally interprets “biographical disruption” as a 
cause of illness genesis: life narratives retrospectively construe life events (accidents, 
work conditions, social and power relations) as “causal factors” (50) in the aetiology 
of illness. Drawing on the arguments of the sociology of body and emotions, Williams 
focuses on the “emotional expressive body” (55), a catalyst of emotions as responses 
to radical changes in the course of life (in the day-to-day routinised activities or in 
intentional projects and plans). From this perspective, situated in “embodied 
biographies” (54), emotions have a profound “pathogenic effect” (54), which, 
however, can be shaped through the social medium of social support, social conditions 
and structure. When placed in the context of late modernity, biographies are subject to 
continuous reflexive revisions and re-evaluations depending on the multitude of 
available lifestyles and the plurality of values and choices. 
One cannot help asking then, what could be a possible answer available to the 
sufferer confronted with the onset of illness, with suffering, with bearing illness in its 
disruptive or predictable, normalized aspects? Situating illness genesis in the horizon 
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of one’s life history and life narrative is suggested by Williams, a solution that has 
been largely explored by scholars of illness narratives, and that I intend to follow. As 
put by Trisha Greenhalgh and Brian Hurwitz, “the onset of … disease is inextricably 
embedded in a narrative structure” (49). 
In the first chapter I showed that scholars have located the experience of 
suffering at the nexus of existential domains-themes affected by suffering and pain, 
namely embodied condition, temporal and spatial lived situations, language, memory, 
self and self-narratives, expressive discourses. 
However, if I turn specifically to the relationship between narrative and 
suffering, narratives are not just one existential domain of suffering among others. 
Pain and suffering paradoxically obstruct objectification through language, but at the 
same time dominate verbal expression (Scarry; Good, “A Body in Pain”). Following 
the arguments of Hannah Arendt–see also Mattingly (“The Concept of Therapeutic 
Emplotment”) and Jackson (“The Rashomon Approach”)–, suffering is a necessary 
condition of narratives. Starting a new action means disclosing oneself through speech 
as an actor-subject (“who” we are), inserting one’s initiative into an already existing 
web of social relationships, confronting obstacles and resistance, beginning a unique 
life story that intersects others’ life stories, becoming actor and sufferer of one’s life 
story: “Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold sense of the word, namely 
its actor and sufferer…” (Arendt 184).  
Thus suffering and pain trigger the narrative search for making sense of illness 
experience, the interpretation of its ruptures, transformations or continuities 
throughout biographical trajectories, an already significant history that casts meaning 
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upon illness episodes (Kleinman, The Illness Narratives). Conversely, illness narrative 
“does not merely reflect illness experience, but rather it contributes to the experience 
of symptoms and suffering” (Kleinman, The Illness Narratives 49; see also Good and 
Del Vecchio Good, “In the Subjunctive Mode”). For Good, the very experience of 
illness is endowed with “narrative qualities” (“The Narrative Representation” 164). 
He enumerates five narrative features of illness. First, knowledge about illness is 
conveyed by storied experiences of other sufferers, by accounts of medical staff or 
healers, hence illness is structured around stories. Second, stories shape experience 
and stock it in a corpus of stories that remembering and storytelling acts revive; they 
make “past experience available to sufferers themselves” (164). Memory rediscovers 
past experience. However, I argue that the narratable remembering not only unveils 
past, but also transforms the very experience of present illness. Third, the open 
endings of narratives and the sufferer’s multiple interpretations are expressions of the 
human teleological orientation towards the future, of the human trait of engaging in 
life projects: “Narratives are organized as predicament and striving and as an 
unfolding of human desire” (164). Fourth, the sufferer is involved in the illness 
experience as the reader of an ongoing story, confronting the unknown, awaiting 
outcomes, hoping, judging, reinterpreting events and actions, striving for a 
comprehensive meaning that would explain discrete episodes. Fifth, illness and story 
refigure reality; both make the mysterious, non-ordinary irrupt through the rifts of 
conventional thinking, unlocking the creative interpretation of the “reading” sufferer, 
offering him/her the instruments to tame the accidental. The sufferer is reading his/her 
own experiential text. 
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Since I have pointed out the specificity of illness narratives and their relation 
to the suffering experience, it is time to ask which are the appropriate instruments to 
analyse and interpret illness narratives, while keeping in mind that our ultimate 
purpose is to identify the narrative mechanisms that constitute the intersubjective 
relation to the suffering other. 
 Configurative definitions of illness narratives are modeled on narrative studies 
that argue for the coherence of a plot constructed around a beginning, middle and end.  
Plot is defined as a “thematic thread” organizing the events of the narrative in a 
causal, temporal totality in function of an ending (Polkinghorne, “Narrative 
Configuration” 5; see also Mattingly, “The Concept of Therapeutic Emplotment”; 
Charon, Narrative Medicine). Emplotment sets in motion human actions within a 
temporal frame and along a “temporal sequence, human motivation, chance 
happenings, and changing interpersonal and environmental contexts” (Polkinghorne, 
“Narrative Configuration” 7). From this perspective, illness narratives are means of 
reframing a disrupted time (Hydén). Particular events and episodes are interpreted 
from the perspective of the whole story (Mattingly, “The Concept of Therapeutic 
Emplotment”). 
Therefore, the dramatic and temporal structure of the plot has been one of the 
main topics scholars approached in illness narratives studies.  
 For Kenneth J. Gergen and Mary M. Gergen, individuals construct “self-
narratives” (“Narratives of the Self” 255) through the attempts at retrieving coherent 
sequences among life events. Directionality towards a goal is one of the basic means 
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of structuring accounts of actions and life experience along the positive-negative 
evaluation of the episodes of accounts:  
To succeed as a narrative the account must first establish a goal state or 
valued endpoint ... establishing the value of a protagonist’s well-being, the 
destruction of an evil condition, the victory of a favored group, the discovery 
of something precious, or the like. With the creation of a goal condition, the 
successful narrative must then select and arrange events in such a way that 
the goal state is rendered more or less probable. (Gergen and Gergen, 
“Narrative Form” 25-26; italics in the original) 
Depending on the progression/nonprogression towards a goal, three basic 
narrative forms have been identified: the “stability narrative” in which the trajectory 
of protagonists, their self-images and concepts remain relatively unchanged as far as 
the evaluative considerations are concerned; the “progressive narrative” where “one 
steadily progresses toward a goal” (Gergen and Gergen, “Narrative Form” 27), and the 
“regressive narrative” in which “one is continuously moving away from the valued 
state” (27). Alternations between progressive-regressive-stability punctuate each case: 
progression followed by regression render a tragic outcome, regression followed by 
progression render the comedy-melodrama case, the progressive followed by stability 
narrative figure the “happily-ever-after myth” (260), and successive alternations 
between regressive-progressive stages constitute the romantic narrative. 
If one considers the relations among events, the expressive dimension of 
narrative comes to the fore, namely the ability to induce dramatic tensions, emotions 
and feelings, “dramatic engagement” (Gergen and Gergen, “Narratives of the Self” 
261). Its components are: “the acceleration of the narrative slope” (Gergen and 
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Gergen, “Narrative Form” 28), and “the alteration in the direction of narrative slope” 
(30; from a high position falling down to a very low one in tragedy). Suspense is 
created when the protagonist is pursuing an intended end, but is threatened by 
setbacks endangering the anticipated outcome.  
Drawing upon both Saymour Chatman’s concept of “narrative macrostructure 
and typology” of plot (Robinson 1175), and on Gergen and Gergen’s (“Narrative 
Form”) temporal frame, Ian Robinson identifies a threefold temporal macrostructure 
(stable, progressive, regressive) in illness accounts of people suffering from multiple 
sclerosis. His aim is to identify the temporal juncture/disjuncture points among the 
biomedical trajectories of disease, the personal accounts (life stories, autobiographies) 
of illness and the social career of sickness. 
In her analysis of “therapeutic emplotment,” Cheryl Mattingly (“The Concept 
of Therapeutic Emplotment” 811; see also Healing Dramas) argues for the narrative 
constitution of experience and social–and therapeutic–action, following Paul Ricœur’s 
view on the correspondence between the temporal structure of life and the temporal 
order of narratives, noting that both are based on the plot structure. This does not 
mean imposing a controlled coherence upon lived life: various plots and subplots can 
be lived at the same time, leaving the door open to “possibilities, rather than 
certainties” (“Performance Narratives” 75). Engaging in an action means, for 
Mattingly, to strive for an intended direction, goal, ending, “to make certain things 
happen” (“The Concept of Therapeutic Emplotment” 813), to make others participate 
in one’s actions. Six features of narrative time are developed in her approach and 
considered in the context of occupational therapy sessions: 1) events unfold and 
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become meaningful as parts of a temporal whole, the integral figure of plot with 
beginning, middle, and end, while at the same time they maintain their particularity, 
their “vividness” (“The Concept of Therapeutic Emplotment” 813); 2) narrative time 
is triggered by human actions and motives, by interactions among actors; 3) the 
discrepancy between a present state and a desired one prompts the actor-protagonist to 
pursue an ending that would fill in the “gap” between present and the desired project 
(813); 4) narrative time is riddled with changes, “tricks and reversals” (814) in a non-
linear way; 5) conflicts, obstacles, enemies, difficulties, interpose between actor and 
his/her goals, cause the suffering of the actor eliciting a multitude of perspectives, 
conveying the dramatic tension of the narrative; 6) therefore, uncertainty, doubt, 
suspense, surprise about the outcome are expressive of the temporal fragility of lived 
life and its meanings, suspended between a possible, unknown future, and its 
interpretive reflections upon present and past. 
The main focus in Good (“The Narrative Representation”) and Byron J. Good 
and Mary Jo del Vecchio Good is precisely on the “subjunctivizing tactics” (Good and 
Good, “In the Subjunctive Mode” 839) that epileptic sufferers and their caregivers use 
in their narratives legitimizing hope for cure and sustained search for care. Endings 
are “hypothetical; outcomes which were feared were juxtaposed against those 
desperately hoped for. Beginnings and previous experiences were subject to re-
evaluation…” (“In the Subjunctive Mode” 837). Based on Wolfgang Iser’s reader 
response theory, the authors identify the suffering teller of the illness story with its 
own reader, striving for actualizing the potential meaning of a story, his/her own 
illness story, “synthesizing” (838) the elements of the story (perspectives, actions, past 
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and unfolding events), filling in the gaps in meaning, understanding and transforming 
himself/herself through the act of reading (see also Good, “The Narrative 
Representation”). The uncertainty about the ending of illness supports the definition 
of the teller-reader of illness narratives as reader of a “ ‘virtual text’ ” (838). The 
authors underscore however that comprehensive aspects of illness narratives do not 
exhaust their complexity; tellers are engaged in “subjunctivizing reality” (838), the 
reality of seeking cure in spite of unsuccessful treatments, and keeping an open 
horizon towards desired outcomes, towards any possibility of healing, even a 
mysterious one in an undetermined future. Two techniques are specifically illustrated 
in the study: 1) maintaining the plurality of sometimes conflicting perspectives and 
readings of illness episodes (the narrator, the religious healer or the physician’s point 
of view juxtaposed in the same account of the sufferer); 2) representing “encounters 
with the ‘mysterious’ ” (840). 
 Nonetheless, “subjunctivizing” is not the only means of construing, eventually 
“coping” with endings. Oncological practice and the condition of terminally ill 
patients are among the most problematic contexts from this point of view.  
Comparing two local cultural dominant models of managing endings (the 
American and Japanese), del Vecchio Good et al. highlight the differences between 
two therapeutic narratives among oncologists. The American model is concentrated on 
the immediate experience in a step-by-step framing of time and close future, while 
long-term horizons are blurred. Specific metaphors reinforce the significance of the 
immediacy of the struggle with illness. In the Japanese context, concealing diagnosis 
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is the most frequent tactic until an aggravated stage. Here too, multiple perspectives 
adapted to different audiences, explicit or silent narratives, frame the narrative plot. 
Based on the same reader response theory mentioned above, Hydén shows 
how the ill person’s story is voiced from an inner perspective, from the vantage point 
of the ongoing suffering. The sufferer’s voice contrasts with “the voice of the healthy” 
(62) who looks at illness either as a strange entity that threatens to invade personal 
life, or as an unfortunate past event. However, both voices can be intermingled in the 
sufferer’s story, leading to a double-voiced narrative. 
 Insisting on the meaning-endowing value of narrative endings, Catherine 
Belling shows how the sufferer becomes the author of his/her final chapter through 
writing terminal illness stories. Following Gérard Genette’s (Figures III) analysis of 
narrative discourse, Belling suggests that the “strategy of proleptic narrating” (151) 
can be a possible way. Modes of temporal dissonance that intervene in the “present,” 
“the moment of the story where the narrative discourse has been interrupted to make 
place” (Genette, Figures III 89) for a more or less remote moment in the past or in the 
future, analepsis and prolepsis, refer to the ulterior account of a prior event, and to the 
anticipating account of a subsequent event with respect to the present moment of the 
story where one is situated.19 So, in order to transcend one’s own ending, and become 
its author, Belling claims that it is possible to go beyond the moment where “the 
narrator stops narrating” (151) and asserts that “the advance directive and the living 
will are verbal acts that can be narrative and are always proleptic” (151). The 
                                                     
19 It is important to note the distinction that Genette makes between story, diegesis, the unfolding of 
events accounted for, and narrative discourse or narrative text accounting the story. 
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injunction addressed to a close other to write the end, as the sufferer would, actively 
determines the conditions of the end. 
Drawing attention to the limits of the emplotted structure of illness narratives, 
Alan Radley (“Illness Narratives”) signals the breaks, gaps in narrative discourse, that 
appear in accounts of illness. Illness narratives do not only consist of first person 
accounts of suffering and pain. Third-party accounts break through the silence of 
suffering to reach the reader or listener, but only if suffering and pain can be “shown 
again” (254), portrayed, re-presented, and recognized as the suffering and pain 
experience of the person in pain, which is displayed, showed in an other, initial 
moment. For Radley, “the world of suffering” can be presented, “figured,” “alluded to 
through their effects and through the way that people deal with their consequence,” 
but not explained (255). Fragments of the pain and suffering world displayed in illness 
narratives become “exemplars” of this world (256); they make the world which 
sufferers bear appear for readers or listeners. Hence, what is communicated through 
suffering accounts is not merely a meaning, nor just the “how” of the experience, but, 
in an aesthetic way, from horror to healing, the fact “ ‘that it is what it is’ ” (256). 
Such appearances can be seized in a witnessing act to the other’s suffering and 
presence, when suffering is recognized for what it is and the very act of witnessing 
made apparent. Then, the narrative order is interrupted by essential brief descriptions 
that give us a glimpse into the witnessing act. The narrative devices that can portray, 
or re-present suffering in this way are metaphors, allusive words, the display of 
contradictions, silences, and evocations. In spite of their “intruding” character in the 
narrative configuration, such “non-narrative” (260) devices are complementary to the 
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sequencing of actions, motives, and endings: “Representations of actions and events 
presume description, because even the simplest sentence involves some statement of 
thing or attribute” (260). 
As I have seen throughout my presentation, a plurality of perspectives 
intervenes in the narrative configuration of experience. But the multiplicity of 
viewpoints refers not only to the multitude of actors implied in the plot, but also to the 
dialog-conflict between inner perspectives of the same actor. Jackson refers to the 
“shifting-persona narrative” (“The Rashomon Approach” 824) in the narrator’s 
attempt at construing intractable chronic pain that seems to elude any meaning. Pain 
narratives are devices meant to reconfigure not only textual stories, but also the illness 
experience itself, to render it acceptable, to “tame” the pain. Conflicting positions can 
be assumed by the narrator-protagonist in the effort to understand pain, reflecting in 
an “experimental narrative … the currently confused lived world of this particular 
chronic sufferer” (Jackson, “The Rashomon Approach” 830). Nevertheless, I would 
ask, does the problem of perspective elucidate the narrator’s stance, the narrative 
persona? And how is perspective narratively “conveyed” in the context of an 
embodied pain narrative? What would be the discourse of “perspective”? How much 
does it depend on the reading effect (Fludernik, “New Wine in Old Bottles?”) on the 
reader, on the sufferer as reader? 
Few scholars have explicitly approached the problem of narrative perspective, 
however. Moreover, they still lack the appropriate narrative concepts to address its 
pertinence. The play of perspectives and different readings is viewed as a mode of 
“subjunctivizing reality” (Bruner, 1986 26; qtd. in Good, “The Narrative 
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Representation” 153) through competing stories and interpretations, and not as a 
specific, “autonomous” category of narrative analysis. The shift in perspective-
persona, is analyzed by Jackson at the level of logic contradictions throughout an 
open-ended interview with a chronic pain sufferer. At the same time, neither 
Mattingly, nor Good and del Vecchio Good et al. identify the narrative devices that 
must be studied when approaching this topic. As for the problem of narrative voice in 
illness narratives, it has recently become a capital matter with respect to the authentic 
re-presentation/misrepresentation of the sufferer. Who can claim, except the sufferer 
himself/herself, to voice suffering from the inside (see the above presentation of 
Hydén)? Here lays, in fact, the problematic point that necessitates the clarification 
between the category of voice and perspective and the examination of their pertinence 
for the study of illness narratives. For Hydén for instance the inner perspective (the 
“vantage point”) amounts to the inner voice, and the outside perspective to the outside 
voice (61-62). Moreover, he approaches illness narratives as being exclusively told by 
the sufferer himself/herself. What about illness narratives told about the sufferer by 
someone else? 
Though Alan Radley finds an elegant solution to the problem of re-
presentation of suffering in illness narratives, the very solution illustrates the lack of 
concern related to the problem of narrative voice: who is talking throughout the 
account; who expresses the account of suffering and pain, and whose voice tells the 
suffering story, or disconcerts the reader-listener through picturing suffering? Whose 
voice witnesses the sufferer’s experience and how does the witnesses’ voice relate to 
the sufferer’s voice? How does one become transparent for another? 
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Moreover, as I have already indicated, suffering is the necessary condition of 
narratives and affects the very storytelling capacity of a subject. While impinging on 
the narrative dimension of human being, suffering also disrupts the self-memory 
narrative, leading to the “loss of self.” Therefore it may be difficult to accept that 
suffering as “loss of self,” as loss of self-memory narrative might be portrayed, 
figured through non-narrative means. How is it possible then to make “appear” the 
witnessing act to the loss of memory, to the loss of the narratable self as it is? What 
are the narrative means to accomplish witnessing? I argue that narrative voice 
articulate the intersubjective relation to the other suffering the loss of remembering, 
the dissolution of his/her narratable self. Therefore, the analysis I will undertake aims 
at revealing how narrative voice performs this relation. 
Rita Charon is the only one to have explicitly referred–though very briefly–to 
the problem of narrative voice in clinical encounters and fictional narratives 
(Narrative Medicine 118). However, she does not undertake any analysis based on 
this category. She discusses both focalization and narrative voice from Genette’s 
(Figures III) point of view and includes both topics in the same section dedicated to 
the “narrator,” which contravenes the distinction that Genette established between the 
question concerning “who sees” in a narrative text and questions concerning “who is 
the narrator” and “who talks” (Figures III 203; italics in the original). As I intend to 
show further, this distinction is problematic and demands further examination. 
In what follows I shall take up the task of uncovering the complexity of 
narrative mood and narrative voice and demonstrating their limits if maintained in a 
structuralist frame (see Genette, Figures III). I shall examine whether the discussion 
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of narrative perspective from an ethical stance is relevant for the study of illness 
narratives. 
The texts I intend to analyze are Frank Davey’s diary How Linda Died and 
John Bayley’s memoirs Iris: A Memoir of Iris Murdoch, and Iris and her Friends: A 
Memoir of Memory and Desire. The main subject (protagonist) of Davey’s diary is 
Linda, Frank Davey’s wife, who suffers from brain cancer. This eventually fatal 
illness affected Linda, and as I shall show Frank too, at the level of all existential 
domains mentioned above. In Bayley’s memoir Iris: A Memoir of Iris Murdoch, 
though the title announces the “memoir of Iris,” the text recomposes also fragments of 
the relation between John and Iris (his wife, the writer Iris Murdoch), before Iris’ 
diagnosis with Alzheimer’s disease and during the first stages of illness. The second 
memoir, Iris and her Friends: A Memoir of Memory and Desire is written during the 
last stages of Iris’ illness until her death. Nonetheless, the memoir conflates the 
present illness episodes with John’s autobiographical retrospection. 
The inclusion of diaries within narrative literature might be questionable. This 
is so because, following the more or less systematic daily records, diaries are far from 
taking on an emplotted structure. However, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan argues for the 
inclusion of the diary in the narrative form since it respects the basic definition of 
narration, i.e. verbal communication between an addresser (narrator) and addressee 
(narratee), of a succession of events (happenings): “The writing of a diary or a letter is 
thus a form of narration, although the one who writes it may not intend to or be 
conscious of narrating” (Narrative Fiction 90). Though she applies this definition to 
narrative fiction, Rimmon-Kenan affirms that “some of the procedures used in the 
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analysis of fiction may be applied to texts conventionally defined as ‘non-fiction’ ” 
(3), in this case, Davey’s diary.  
In order to grasp the mechanisms through which Linda’s and Iris’ illness 
stories can articulate an intersubjective relation to the suffering Other, I intend to 
formulate my analysis in the context of an ethical approach20 based on Emmanuel 
Levinas and Paul Ricœur. The main argument will be constructed around the 
redefinition of narrative voice from an ethical perspective. Thus, I shall uncover the 
way narrative voice is a means of ethically responding, witnessing, the Other’s 
suffering as loss of narratable self-memory and identity; writing the diary or memoir 
of the other is viewed as a means of ethically facing the Other’s suffering, of 
intersubjectively compensating for her “loss of self.” 
Still, as the aim of my analysis is to explore narrative voice, the starting point 
of my discussion is Genette’s approach to narrative discourse, a fundamental 
narratological study that caused tense debates around the categories of narrative mood 
(especially focalization) and narrative voice (Figures III).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20 Though common in the social sciences, I shall not use thematic techniques that do not reflect 
temporal aspects of narratives and that decontextualize fragments of accounts (Mishler). Neither shall I 
situate my analysis within an interpretive model, seeking “structural-objective factors that have shaped” 
the individual’s life (Denzin 56). 
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Analytical steps 
 
1. The Descriptive Step 
 
Using Hydén’s typology of illness narratives, I shall identify the type to which 
the texts of my corpus belong. 
 
2. The Interpretive Step 
 
I can affirm for the moment that the originality of my approach consists in 
considering elements of narrative voice as fundamental for the study of illness 
narratives, but most importantly, for the possibility of telling the suffering Other’s 
story, for intersubjectively relating to his/her suffering experience. 
 
 
Typology 
 
 From a formal point of view, following “the relationship between narrator, 
narrative and illness,” Hydén (54) identifies three main “types of illness narratives: 
illness as narrative, narrative about illness and narrative as illness” (54; italics in the 
original).  
 The first one can be based on the identity between narrative, narrator and 
illness. Narrative has the function of expressing and articulating illness; narrative is 
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the medium through which illness affects life, “illness is the narrative” (54; italics in 
the original). It represents illness episodes and formulates the issues illness poses to 
the ill. Thus the narrative construes the emerging problems and offers paths towards 
coping with or solving them.  
 The second type refers to narratives conveying knowledge about illness. 
Hydén discusses the case of medical knowledge. However, I consider that “narrative 
about illness” is manifested in different forms, from the common sense narratives 
circulating in the universe of everyday life to cultural narratives about illness (Good, 
“The Narrative Representation”), para-medical universes and layers of knowledge. As 
I will see my analysis, different types of knowledge are engaged throughout the effort 
to understand illness symptoms, to find possible solutions, to maintain hope.   
 The third type, the most relevant for our study, is constituted by cases “in 
which a narrative, or an insufficient narrative, generates the illness” (Hydén 55). Brain 
injury for instance “impedes [the sufferer’s] ability to use the medium of the narrative 
to connect experiences with particular events” (55), or simply annihilates the very 
“narrational means” (55) for temporally organizing experiences and events, “the 
ability to formulate narratives.… it is this lack that is the basis for the suffering” (55). 
 
 
Interpreting Voice 
 
 Starting with Genette’s narrative devices in Figures III, Mieke Bal’s (On 
Story-Telling; Narratology), and Rimmon-Kenan’s (Narrative Fiction) studies, I will 
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attempt to reveal aspects of the grammar of an ethical relation to the Other’s suffering 
in the texts I propose for analysis. Before taking up the analysis, I will proceed to the 
overview of the following concepts: narrative voice,21 narrative mood, distance, 
narrative perspective (focalization) since narratological debates around the problem of 
narrative voice started with the battle to distinguish it from the problem of narrative 
perspective. 
 The term “narrative mood” (Genette, Figures III 183; italics in the original) 
indicates the way of asserting narrative facts, of rendering a piece of information, in a 
narrative discourse: telling more or less about the facts in “a more or less direct way” 
(183), and telling from different perspectives. Variable distance, hiding or disclosing 
details, and assuming one point of view or another, depending on the characters’ 
knowledge and perspectives upon the events, inform the reader.  
Regarding the effect of distance, Genette makes the distinction between the 
“account of events” and the “account of words” (186). The account of events strives to 
convey the illusion of mimesis, which should imply maximizing the amount of 
information about narrated facts and minimizing “the degree of presence of the 
narrative instance” (187) in the narrative discourse. But, as the analysis unfolds, 
Genette reveals the Proustian case where the extreme of “showing” parallels the 
extreme of “telling” through the interplay of memory. Eventually, the point is not 
telling the story of events, but telling the story of memory, the “traces” the story 
leaves behind, their effects on memory which, however, do not obliterate the quality 
                                                     
21 It is necessary here to mention the differentiation between diegesis, narrative discourse, and the act of 
narrative enunciation established by Genette: “the discourse or the narrative text” (72) signifies a series 
of events, the story, or diégèse, the “signified or narrative content” (72) of the text enounced through an 
enunciation act, the narration that regards the narrator and the person addressed, “and, by extension, 
the whole real or fictional situation in which it takes place” (72). I shall use hence “narrative discourse” 
for the French récit, and “story” for diegesis and “histoire.” 
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of being in the present of the story: “But this trace, so belated, so remote, so indirect, 
is also the very presence.… Extreme mediation, and, at the same time height of 
immediacy” (188-189). Normally, the account of events should follow the third 
person account rule, the “focalized account” (189), where the narrator, though not 
being among characters, takes the perspective of one of them, so that the reader is 
present to the immediate effect of events on the characters’ consciousness, without the 
mediation of memory. 
The account of words is articulated upon the mimesis of pronounced or inner 
words of characters, and, depending on the mimetic degree it can reach, it involves 
three discursive forms: the reported discourse, the narratized or recounted discourse, 
and the transposed discourse. 
At the highest level of mimesis, the reported discourse consists of recopying 
the words of characters, as they pronounce them, or as they think. The inner 
monologue, or “immediate discourse” (193) epitomizes the reported discourse. The 
reader is able to follow up in an immediate way the thoughts, happenings, and actions 
of the character, as they emerge at the surface of consciousness, “freed from any 
narrative patronage” (193) or narrative distance between a narrator and character, 
where a narrator would account for what is in the mind of the character. 
The “narratized discourse” (190) implies the reduction of pronounced words 
to telling an account about them, so that pronouncing words is transformed into 
accomplishing an act among others. One of the examples given by Genette is from 
Marcel Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past. Instead of Marcel who tells his mother 
in a dialogue: “ ‘I absolutely have to marry Albertine,’ ” we will have in a narratized 
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discourse: “ ‘I informed my mother of my decision to marry Albertine’ ” (190-191). If 
one wanted to report the inner thinking about such a decision, one would have the 
analysis of an inner reflection, the “account of thoughts, an inner narratized 
discourse” (191). 
The “transposed discourse in indirect style” (191) implies the conversion of 
direct speech or inner discourse, into an indirect discourse through the medium of a 
“declarative verb” (192): “ ‘I told my mother that I absolutely had to marry 
Albertine,’ ” and “ ‘I thought that I absolutely had to marry Albertine’ ” (191-192; 
added emphasis). While condensing the syntax of the direct discourse, the narrator 
intervenes here with his own interpretive perspective and style upon words. A second 
form of indirect discourse is the “ ‘free indirect style’ ” (192) that one can identify 
through the “absence of a declarative verb” (192), but where the narrator intervenes in 
the discourse by “assuming the discourse of the character, or … the character talks 
through the voice of the narrator, and the two instances are then confounded” (194; 
italics in the original). Hence we will have the following transformation in the text: “ 
‘I went to find my mother: I absolutely had to marry Albertine’ ” (192), which 
conveys a double indeterminacy in the second clause: between the thoughts of Marcel 
and the words he might have uttered, and between the pronounced or inner discourse 
of the character and the discourse of the narrator.22 The narrator lends his voice to the 
expression of the inner discourse of the character. 
                                                     
22 See also the following excerpt quoted by Genette: “ ‘Ah! Si le destin avait permis qu’il pût n’avoir 
qu’une seule demeure avec Odette et que chez elle il fût chez lui, si en demandent au domestique ce 
qu’il avait à déjeuner, c’eût été le menu d’Odette qu’il eût reçu en réponse, si quand Odette voulait aller 
le matin se promener avenue du Bois-de-Boulogne, son devoir de bon mari l’avait obligé, n’eût-il pas 
envie de sortir, à l’accompagner…alors, combien tous les riens de la vie de Swann qui lui semblaient si 
tristes … auraient pris, même les plus familiers … une sorte de douceur surabondante et de densité 
mystérieuse!’ ” (195). 
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As for the narrative perspective, it concerns “the choice (or not) of a restricting 
‘point of view’ ” (203); the questions to be asked are: “who is the character whose 
point of view orients the narrative perspective … who sees” (203; italics in the 
original), different from the “who is the narrator?” and “who talks?” (203; italics in 
the original) questions. The restriction of point of view implies a restriction of 
knowledge, “field” or “vision” (206). Three cases have been identified by Genette: 1) 
the “zero focalized narrative,” or “non-focalized narrative” (the case of the 
omniscient narrator) where “the narrator knows more than the character or, more 
precisely, tells more than any of the characters knows ” (206); 2) the “internally 
focalized narrative” where “the narrator only tells what the character knows” (206); 3) 
the “external focalization” (207), the “ ‘objective’ narrative,” where “the narrator tells 
less than what the character knows” (206), so that the actions of the characters are 
presented from an exterior point of view that gives no access to their inner life: “the 
hero is described at length and followed as a stranger with a problematic identity” 
(207-208, my emphasis; see the presentation of Philéas Fogg referred to by Genette). 
 But this typology is not a rigid one, and narrative discourse plays a lot with the 
ambiguity of perspectives. The internal focalization normally supposes the strict 
limitation of the perspective to what the character sees.23 If internal focalization 
supposes that no external, objective description be made, one might find cases, 
however, where an external narrator’s view construes inner experiences, and parallels 
the view of the character. The purest form of internal focalization can be retrieved in 
                                                     
23 Compare Genette’s quotations from Stendhal’s La Chartreuse de Parme for the “impure” internal 
focalization: “ ‘Sans hésiter, quoique prêt à rendre l’âme de dégoût, Fabrice se jeta à bas de son cheval 
et prit la main du cadavre qu’il secoua ferme; puis il resta comme anéanti; il sentait qu’il n’avait pas la 
force de remonter à cheval. Ce qui lui faisait horreur surtout c’était cet œil ouvert.’ ” (209); and the 
pure internal focalization: “ ‘Une balle, entrée à côté du nez, était sortie par la tempe opposée, et 
défigurait ce cadavre d’une façon hideuse; il était resté avec un œil ouvert’ ” (209). 
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the case of interior monologue. At the same time, it is also important to note that for 
Genette, a first-person account (except the interior monologue), can also convey 
elements of zero focalization, but that one could not identify properly with a true 
omniscient narrator (first person accounts can never claim to possess complete 
knowledge of the world they are in). If one considers the autobiographical account, 
where the narrator is identical with the hero, the temporal distance between his 
younger hypostasis and the present narrator, gives to the narrator the advantage of a 
surplus of knowledge: “The narrator almost always knows more than the hero, even if 
the hero is him…” (210). Hence, we will have an internal focalization on the narrator. 
If, as in the case of diary, interior monologue or correspondence, “the narration is 
contemporaneous with the history … the internal focalization on the narrator is 
reduced to a focalization on the hero” (214). 
But it is important to note the ambiguity of an external focalization on one 
character, which can be understood as internal focalization upon another and the 
reverse, and that focalization would depend on the verbal modes of expression. 
Edmiston shows that modal expressions like maybe, it seems that, as if can be used by 
a first-person narrator to express “his ignorance of others” and to justify an external 
focalization: “Internal focalization by one character logically implies an external view 
of the others who inhabit the same world” (732).  
 Narrative voice refers to the narrative instance producing the narrative 
discourse with respect to “the time of the narration, the narrative level and the 
‘person’ (the relations between the narrator–and possibly his narratar(s) [addressee of 
the discourse]–and the story he recounts” [Genette, Figures III 227]).  
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 The temporal aspect of the narrative voice can be grasped through a four 
dimensional typology (229): the “anterior narration” (predictive narrative); the 
“ulterior narration” (a post happening narrative); the “simultaneous” narration (the 
narration unfolds as the action progresses); and the “inserted narration (between the 
moments of the action.” In the case of the diary, one can observe the dispersion of 
narrative discourse into an extended monologue that blurs the temporal landmarks: “la 
forme du journal se desserre pour aboutir à une sorte de monologue après coup à 
position temporelle indéterminée, voire incohérente” (229). Moreover, the diary 
verges on an extreme temporal proximity, however indelible distance between the 
account of just happened events, the story of what happened to the hero-narrator the 
selfsame day, and the immediate discourse of his/her thoughts, what he/she thinks 
about what happened. Hence, the immediate narrator, though transformed in the 
aftermath of the events, is still the hero, and the focalization on the narrator is at the 
same time a focalization on the hero. The ulterior narration (a past oriented narration) 
can also be “fragmented so that it [is] inserted in between the diverse moments of the 
story” (229), until it is bordering the simultaneous account. 
 The way narrative levels inflect narrative instances can be identified through 
the shifting between diegetic universes, the crossing of diegetic borders: “tout 
évènement raconté par un récit est à un niveau diégétique immédiatement supérieur à 
celui où se situe l’acte narratif producteur de ce récit” (238; italics in the original). 
The first narrative instance producing the original account is hence an “extradiegetic” 
narrative instance; a character situated inside the original account and telling a story is 
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an “intradiegetic” or “diegetic” instance; and the character situated in the intradiegetic 
story, and telling another story is a “metadiegetic” instance (238-241). 
 If one considers its relation to the diegetic narrative, the “metadiegetic 
narrative” (238) has three main functions: 
1) The “explicative function” (242): the metadiegetic narrative answers to 
causal questions about the events which led to certain events in the diegetic 
narrative 
2) The “thematic function” (242): the metadiegetic narrative works as 
analogy, contrast or similarity with respect to the diegetic narrative 
3) As Genette gives no specific name to the third function, I will appeal to 
Rimmon-Kenan’s (Narrative Fiction) term, “the actional function” (93; 
italics in the original), as it implies the same meaning as for Genette: 
through the very fact of being narrated, metadiegetic narrative insures the 
progression or maintenance of the action in the diegetic narrative.  
The category of “person” refers to the “narrative attitudes” (Genette, Figures 
III 252) the author chooses: letting a narrator tell a story from which he/she is absent – 
the “heterodiegetic” (252) narrator–, or making a narrator tell the story in which 
he/she is a character, hence the narrator is identical to the character– the 
“homodiegetic” (252) narrator. Two types appear in the homodiegetic case: the 
“autodiegetic” (253) narrator, where the narrator is the main character, the hero of the 
story, and the “weak” type where the narrator is just a witness, a spectator, observer of 
the events and hero. 
However, Genette’s theory of “narrating” is not exempt from inconsistencies. 
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Bal (Narratologie; On Story-Telling) criticized Genette’s confusion between 
the quantitative (degree) and qualitative criteria when he discussed the types of speech 
(distance), his subject-oriented definition of focalization, and ambiguous status 
between the internal and external focalization. Bal puts forward the idea of “the 
tension … between subject-orientedness and the pluralization of the subject” (On 
Story-Telling 73). 
When Genette defines the distance between events or the uttered discourse and 
the way informers communicate them, he makes the distinction between the account 
of events and the account of words. He argues that both can be more or less mimetic 
or diegetic, depending on the conveyed quantity of information and the quantity of the 
informer’s presence. Bal observes that he “uses a quantitative criterion (‘more or 
less’) to distinguish ways (mimetic or diegetic) of affirming, that his reasoning slides 
from degree, via quantity, to manner” (On Story-Telling 80). At the same time, both 
the account of events and the account of words are defined in function of the quantity 
of information and the quantity of informer (narrative instance, the manifestations of 
the narrator), which blurs the claimed distinction between focalization (and 
consequently mood) and voice. If one maintains Genette’s criterion, the consequences 
are ultimately the reduction of his distinctions. The narratized discourse, at the 
diegetical pole, becomes an integrated event into the narrative of the narrator, 
“indistinguishable from the narrative of events … narratized speech is not speech” 
(On Story-Telling 81). The reported, direct discourse, at the absolute pole of 
mimetism, is inserted in the narrative text and becomes a metanarrative, at a lower 
narrative level than the narrative that contains it. The transposed discourse, while 
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tending towards a maximum of mimetism, is situated at the same narrative level as the 
narrator’s discourse. Hence, both the narratized and transposed discourse belong to the 
same narrative level as the narrator’s discourse, and finally are indistinguishable from 
a narrative of events. They are narratives of events at the diegetic, respectively 
mimetic pole of a narrative of events. As for the “metanarrative” discourse, it is 
simply another “virtual account” (Bal, Narratologie 27) in another account. 
Consequently, Bal concludes that the distinction between the narrative of events and 
the narrative of words, and hence, the very category of distance, are superfluous.  
Focalization itself, as defined by Genette, is highly problematic for Bal. First, 
in order to define focalization, Genette uses three different terms, vision, point of view, 
and field which imply different meanings: sight, the object of sight and opinion. 
Though she recognizes that all should be integrated into a theory of focalization, Bal 
suggests that it is necessary to distinguish these dimensions, but also proposes the 
term “centre of interest” (Bal, Narratologie 249), as a more comprehensive one, 
which complicates the scheme as it designates at the same time selection, vision, and 
presentation.  
She also notices that Genette uses a slippery criterion to distinguish between 
internal, external focalization and the restriction of field. Genette shifts from the 
“knowledge” of the “seeing” agent, to the “seen” object. When he makes the 
distinction between non-focalized narrative and internal focalization, he evaluates 
who is the focalizing agent, “ ‘who sees’ ” (Bal, On Story-Telling 83), in which case, 
either the narrator is omniscient and sees more than the character, or the narrator sees 
“ ‘with’ the character, sees as much as s/he does” (83). But the external focalization is 
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defined in function of who “is seen. The difference this time is not between the 
‘seeing’ agents, but between the objects of that seeing” (83). The character in this case 
is seen from without, observed throughout his/her objective manifestations. 
Moreover, if Genette’s typology implies three ways of relating what the 
narrator tells and knows, and what the character knows, again, the distinction between 
focalization and voice is questionable. Bal will eliminate the “knowledge” aspect of 
focalization, considering it “figurative” (Bal, “The Narrating and the Focalizing” 249). 
But problems do not stop here. Theoretical flaws threaten narrative voice too. 
When Genette analyzes the three possible temporal orders between story and 
narrating, he does not seem to realize that it is possible to do that only if the narrator is 
manifest, which means that the “problem of the temporal relationship cannot be 
separated from the problem of the status of the narrator.” (Bal, On Story-Telling 85; 
see also Narratologie). One can seize the narrator’s presence throughout the narrating 
only in the first person narrative. As for the third person narrative, the narrator is 
“absent or invisible” (Bal, On Story-Telling 85), hence one cannot determine whether 
he/she knows about the events or not, which makes impossible any indication about 
the time of the narrating: before, after or simultaneously with the events. 
The absence or invisibility of the narrator also undermines the difference 
between narrative levels: it is impossible to retrieve the narrative level in the case of a 
narrator who cannot be detected. 
In Genette’s analysis of voice, the difference between homodiegetic/ 
heterodiegetic narrators, the presence/absence from the narrated story, seems to be the 
only valid criterion to classify narrative instances. But here, Bal observes that there is 
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no difference in level between homodiegetic and heterodiegetic narrators because in 
so far as narrators are concerned, they can never be present as narrators in the narrated 
story, but only as characters: “The narrator as narrator is always at the higher diegetic 
level; at the very most, s/he can as person be identified with a character” (Bal, On 
Story-Telling 86). The narrator is just an agent of narrating, not a person. 
And yet, if one follows closer her argument, problems might appear in Bal’s 
own reasoning. She states that: 
No difference of level exists between the narrator who narrates in the third 
person (the absent narrator) and the narrator who tells in the first person a 
story from which s/he is absent: but neither does any difference of level exist 
between the latter and the narrator who tells his own story–for in that story the 
narrator is present not as the narrator but only as a character. (Bal, On Story-
Telling 86) 
So, due to the distinction between the narrative agent and character, there is no 
difference of level between a heterodiegetic first-person and third-person narrative, 
and finally no difference of level between heterodiegetic first-person narrative and 
homodiegetic first-person narrative. In fact, a narrator will always be absent, as 
narrator, from the story he/she tells. Though Bal does not explicitly say so, the 
ultimate logical consequence would be that in fact, no difference exists between 
heterodiegetic and homodiegetic narrators. Unfortunately the final outcome of her 
argument is left in suspense, so that at page 89 and sq., when discussing the status of 
the narrator, she maintains Genette’s distinction between homodiegetic/heterodiegetic 
narrators. In fact, Bal cannot avoid herself the identity criteria when she tries to 
determine the status of the narrator. In her later Narratology, when she defines the 
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“character-bound narrator” (22), though sustaining two distinct functions, the narrator 
as agent and the character, she arrives basically at the same relation of identity as the 
relation posited by the homodiegetic narrator: “the ‘I’ speaks about itself.… if the ‘I’ 
is to be identified with a character in the fabula it itself narrates, we speak of a 
character-bound narrator, a CN” (22). As for the heterodiegetic narrator, the term Bal 
suggests is “external narrator” (22): the narrating ‘I’ refers in this case to someone 
else. 
It is also difficult to grasp the applicability limits of her definition of the 
“external narrator”: “When in a text the narrator never refers explicitly to itself as a 
character, we may, again, speak of an external narrator (EN)” (22; added emphasis). 
To say that a narrator “never” refers to someone else, one has to know precisely what 
are the limits of the text considered, and for that, what are the criteria to define those 
limits. A text can be minimally constituted by a phrase, and expand to a whole novel. 
In the last case it would be difficult to retrieve a “never” happened situation. 
However, Bal does not explain what are the limits of a text, so it would be difficult to 
apply her “never” happened rule. 
As a way out of Genette’s difficulties, Bal proposes a hierarchical model of the 
narrative agents who assume specific narrative functions in relation to a specific 
object: the actor acts and “creates the story,” “the object of the acting,” the focalizer 
focalizes a focalized object, “chooses the angle from which” he/she presents the story, 
the narrator narrates the narrated, “puts the narrative into words: with the narrative he 
creates the narrative text” (Bal, “The Narrating and the Focalizing” 244-245). Hence, 
it appears to be necessary to distinguish between the subject/object of narrating and 
110 
focalization, namely between narrator (subject)–the “narrating agent” (Bal, On Story-
Telling 87)–and the narrated (object) of narration; between focalizer (subject)–“the 
agent that sees” (87)–and the focalized (object) of focalization.  
Creating the story, the narrative and the text, each agent realizes the transition 
from one plane to another. However, she sustains that “theoretically, each agent 
addresses a receiver located on the same plane: the actor addresses another actor, the 
focalizer addresses a ‘spectator’–the indirect object of the focalizing–and the narrator 
addresses a hypothetical reader” (“The Narrating and the Focalizing” 245, emphasis 
added).  
As we have already seen, for Bal only the first person narrator exists (see also 
Bal, Narratology). It can be visible, present “inside the narrative” (Bal, On Story-
Telling 89, italics in the original), or invisible, absent from the story he/she tells. She 
maintains thus the difference between homodiegetic/heterodiegetic narrator. But, it is 
clear that whether visible or invisible, no narrator can escape the status of a subject “I” 
narrating, uttering the narrative.  
The narrated, the uttered, is subordinated to the narrating subject, so the 
narrated is redefined by Bal as “hypo-,” “hyponarrative” instead of the genettian 
“metadiegetical narrative” (Genette, Figures III 240). In the case of reported speech, 
for instance, a change of narrative level takes place. The character of a narrative 
becomes the narrator of an inserted narrative: “the intradiegetic narrator becomes 
extradiegetic with respect to the new, hypodiegetic narrative formed by the direct 
discourse that the character-subject becomes narrator of” (Bal, On Story-Telling 90). 
As for the inserted discourse that does not constitute a narrative, Bal defines it as the  
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“ ‘dramatic’ intrusion in the narrative,” a “hypo-discourse” (Bal, “The Narrating and 
the Focalizing” 247). It is always situated at an immediately lower narrative level than 
the narrator who, at the very moment of his narration, is situated at an extradiegetical 
level with respect to the narrated. 
The focalizer/focalized distinction also allows to refine, at the level of the 
focalized object, the distinction between the “perceptible”/“imperceptible” (Bal, “The 
Narrating and the Focalizing” 250) focalized, between what can be perceived through 
senses from the outside (external focalization), and what is accessible only to the 
internal consciousness (internal focalization). 
This detailed presentation has put forward the important place the narrative 
level has in Bal’s attempt at clarifying the problems of focalization and voice. 
However, this very central place is questionable. As I mentioned she affirms 
that, theoretically, narrative communication (narrative address) takes place between 
agents who belong to the same plane. But are these planes so “theoretically” 
impervious to what agents communicate at a different plane? At the same time, Bal 
ambiguously states that transitions take place between planes through transfer 
connoters (253) that would mark the passage from one narrative level to another (from 
narrator to character for instance). Nonetheless, in her functional model, it is not clear 
how acting creates the story so that it shifts to the following plane of focalization, how 
focalization creates a narrative that shifts to the story level (a similar observation has 
been made by William Nelles (373). Moreover, in her essay “The Laughing Mice: Or: 
On Focalization,” Bal also uses focalization as the common mediator between 
different planes represented by characters which pertain to the fabula, and the 
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spectator who is situated outside the fabula, a position that contradicts the specific 
“location” of narrative functions: 
The relation between the sign (the relief) and its contents (the fabula) can only 
be established by mediation of an interjacent layer, the view of the events. 
The cat sees Arjuna. The mice see the cat. The spectator sees the mice who 
see the cat who has seen Arjuna. And the spectator sees that the mice are 
right. Every verb of perception (to see) in this report indicates an activity of 
focalization. Every verb of action indicates an event. (203) 
Narrative planes are far from being isolated. Rhetorical elements pass through 
boundaries addressing at the same time characters, the implied narratee, and the 
implied reader (Phelan). Also, from an enunciative perspective, as one can see in 
testimonial narratives, “voice” can be modulated by, mediated through discursive, 
cultural hybridizations (Chanady) that blur borders. 
Moreover, it is difficult to rigorously apply her distinction between 
“perceptible” and “imperceptible” focalized. For instance, in her analysis of Colette’s 
La chatte, in the phrase: “ ‘She watched him drink and felt a sudden pang of desire at 
the sight of his mouth pressing against the rim of the glass.’ ” (“The Narrating and the 
Focalizing” 252), Bal considers the focalized “watched,” designating a perceptible 
action, and “felt a sudden pang of desire” to belong to the same “perceptible” 
category, just because “felt” is preceded by “watched.” Still, we consider it is difficult 
to define “felt a sudden pang of desire” as “perceptible” from outside. 
In a similar vein, targeting the narrative level problem, Pierre Vitoux observes 
the genettian ambiguity (264) of the term “diegetical” in the extra/intradiegetical and 
hetero/homodiegetical oppositions. “Diegetical” refers to the “succession of events” 
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(Vitoux 264) that Genette proposed only in the second opposition, while in the first 
one it is related to the narrative act, and designates the story as discursive product. In 
the first case, the narrator is situated outside or inside the narrative discourse, in the 
second one, it participates or not in the history of events he/she narrates. This 
distinction allows Vitoux to clarify the status of the narrator as producer of a 
narrative: the narrator is always external to the story he tells, even if he acts inside the 
story. 
As for the very definition of focalization, he equates it with the concept of 
“champ” and uses the quantitative and qualitative restrictions of focalization as 
criteria of classification: when he has in view the object of focalization, he 
distinguishes between the external focalization restricted to the perceptive access to 
objects, and internal focalization restricted to the consciousness contents of 
individuals; when referring to the focalizing subject, he opposes the unrestricted (non-
delegated) focalization of the narrator and the restricted (delegated) focalization of a 
character-narrator. 
Nonetheless, Vitoux is confronted with the ambiguity of the autobiographical 
novel where paraleptical and paraliptical incursions in the narrative discourse24 
document the ambiguity of the heterodiegetical narrator who recounts events that 
he/she could have learnt only by taking part in the “diegetical universe” (270) he 
narrates. It is the case of the narrator as editor of documents (letters) he/she could get 
only by participating in the narrated diegesis. Thus, he/she becomes a situated 
character-narrator in the “diegesis” he/she recounts, with a restricted, “delegated” 
                                                     
24 Paralepsis designates “abusive interpretations” (Vitoux 268) authorized by the prospective 
knowledge of the autobiographer who narrates known events, and “hypothetical projections” (268) 
based on “perceived signs” (268). Paralipsis designates aspects that cannot be clarified by the narrator. 
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“champ.” Vitoux tries to solve the problem replacing the “delegation” criteria with the 
“diegetisation”/”non-diegetisation” distinction, without explaining the terms. We 
consider his manoeuvre leaves the problem unsolved and only replaces one 
terminology with another one. 
Another critic of Genettte is Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (Narrative Fiction). 
Though her critique integrates some of Bal’s observations, the Genettian relation 
between mimesis and diegesis remains theoretically unchanged; her main aim is to 
complete it with McHale’s scale of forms of speech presentation. 
However she explores facets of focalization that had been neglected by 
Genette, namely its optical, cognitive, emotive, and ideological dimensions. What is 
important to note is that Rimmon-Kenan examines the same Genettian distinction 
between narration and focalization: “in so-called ‘third-person center of 
consciousness’ … the center of consciousness (or ‘reflector’) is the focalizer, while 
the user of the third person is the narrator” (Narrative Fiction 74); even in first-person 
retrospective narratives, narration and focalization are distinct; there are however 
situations where focalization and narration conflate, but without losing their functional 
distinctiveness. Nonetheless, following Bal, she distinguishes between the subject of 
focalization, the focalizer, and the object of focalization, the focalized, and adds 
another criterion to be considered throughout the attempt at discerning different types 
of focalization: the “degree of persistence” (75), the constancy or variability of 
focalization throughout a narrative. The “position relative to the story” (75) has the 
same heuristic value as for Bal, determining the internal/external opposition. 
115 
External focalization is, in Rimmon-Kenan’s terms, “felt closer to the 
narrating agent, and its vehicle is therefore called ‘narrator-focalizer’ ” (75). It can 
appear in third person narratives, but also “in first-person narratives when the 
temporal and psychological distance between narrator and character is minimal … or 
when the perception through which the story is rendered is that of the narrating self 
rather than that of the experiencing self” (75). The internal focalization is generally 
centered on the character as focalizer and is situated inside the represented events. 
However, Rimmon-Kenan does not explain how we can “feel” and appreciate 
the closeness to the narrating agent. Thus, I consider it is difficult to apply her 
analytical criteria with respect to the focalizer. 
If one considers the focalized object (person or thing), the external/internal 
opposition applies equally. Thus one has four possible combinations between an 
external or internal focalizer perceiving an object “from without or from within” (77). 
If one perceives the object from without, the records will refer to external aspects of 
the object, if one perceives the object from within, the focus will be on inner thoughts, 
feelings. In the case of an internal focalizer presenting an object from within, the 
focalizer and the focalized object might coincide. 
Once the different types of focalization settled, Rimmon-Kenan explores how 
they articulate throughout the dimensions of focalization: perceptual, psychological, 
ideological. 
When referring to the spatial dimension, the external/internal focalizer 
opposition translates either into a panoramic or simultaneous view on events, the 
“narrator-focalizer” position, or a restricted perspective whose reference point is the 
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viewing character, “the character-focalizer,” or the “unpersonified position internal to 
the stor” (79). 
The temporal dimension modulates the viewpoint either as a “panchronic” 
focalization in the case of an external unpersonified focalizer, or as a retrospective 
regard if the character grasps his/her own past. On the other hand, “internal 
focalization is synchronous with the information regulated by the focalizer” (79), and 
follows up the present of the characters. 
The psychological dimension is doubly faceted, comprising “the cognitive and 
the emotive orientation of the focalizer towards the focalized” (80). 
The elements of cognitive orientation are “knowledge, conjecture, belief; 
memory” (80) so that internal/external focalization is defined by the limits imposed on 
the focalizer’s knowledge of the focalized:  
the external focalizer (or narrator-focalizer) knows everything about the 
represented world, and when he restricts his knowledge, he does so out of 
rhetorical considerations…. The knowledge of an internal focalizer, on the 
other hand, is restricted by definition: being a part of the represented world, 
he cannot know everything about it. (80) 
The emotive component is viewed as an opposition between “ ‘objective’ 
(neutral, uninvolved) vs. ‘subjective’ (coloured, involved) focalization” (81) that 
parallels the external/internal opposition, and refers both to the focalizer and focalized 
(if the focalized is a human subject). The focalizer can perceive in an 
objective/subjective way, and the focalized can be perceived either from without, 
restricting perception just to “external manifestations, leaving the emotions to be 
inferred from them” (82) or from within, revealing subjective, inner aspects of the 
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focalized. In this latter case, the focalized is either his/her own focalizer (as in interior 
monologue), or, an external focalizer scrutinizes his/her consciousness.  
The ideological component refers to the general norms that govern the 
evaluation of characters and events in a story and that can be constituted around a 
single dominating view, of a single narrator-focalizer, or fragmented among multiple 
narrator-focalizers. 
However, in spite of their classificatory rigour and attempt at theoretically 
refining Genette’s theory, in so far as still rooted in the Genettian model, both Bal and 
Rimmon-Kenan’s approaches are vulnerable to criticism, either from those scholars 
who tried to save the categories of “focalization” and “voice” through clarifying its 
ambiguities and filling in its gaps (Nelles;25 Nieragden) or from those scholars who 
tend to eliminate focalization and voice as consistent categories. My next step will be 
to examine these last ones as they radically scrutinize the necessity and foundation of 
both focalization and voice. They have argued that in spite of their logico-
terminological or typological refinements, structuralist narratological interpretations 
of focalization and narrative voice, are confronted with problems related to their 
practical usefulness for the interpretation of texts and the theoretical questions about 
the ability to produce new interpretations, instead of simply arguing for the extant 
ones (Gibson, Towards a Postmodern Theory of Narrative; Fludernik, “Histories of 
Narrative Theory”). 
                                                     
25 It is at least surprising, that, even if William Nelles recognizes how unnecessary the difference 
between focalizer as agent and narrator or characters is, he still suggests “modifications” to Genette’s 
theory to maintain it. He calls focalization as a “relation between the narrator’s report and the 
character’s thoughts, to which the narrator either has no access, or has (and is limited to) access, or has 
(but is not limited to) access” (368). But why should one privilege the cognitive relation between 
narrator and character? The cognitive relation, as one has seen with Rimmon-Kenan, is not the only 
possible one. Should one coin a new term for each relation? 
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 An advocate of formulating specific terms for each discursive function implied 
by the term “point of view” and focalization,26 Saymour Chatman makes a clear 
distinction between story and discourse, arguing that only characters within the story 
are able to see events, while the narrator is confined strictly to the discursive plane, to 
voicing either the events, or the character’s perceptions of the events: 
 One is the narrator’s use of a character as a primary medium … through 
which the events, other characters, and setting of the story are rendered, but 
rendered always in the words or ‘voice’ of the narrator.” (193) 
From a cognitivist view, Monika Fludernik (“New Wine in Old Bottles?”) 
completely denies the pertinence of the categories of voice and focalization. She 
argues that the communicational model implied in the genettian approach cannot be 
applied in the case of recent narratives. Genette based his definition of voice and 
focalization on a grammatical model (the verbal diathesis and mood) identifying an 
agent who speaks about an action and the attitude of his speaking. But, as Fludernik 
shows, he discusses matters of temporal order under the “voice” section, and, hence, 
as narrating instance, the “voice” category extends beyond matters related to the “who 
speaks?” question, namely to the time, but also place problem. Therefore, the “voice” 
category “cannot be simply reduced to the question ‘who speaks,’ or to the 
subcategory person” (Fludernik, “New Wine in Old Bottles?” 620). The presence of a 
personal narrator is taken for granted in the Genettian approach. Nonetheless, recent 
narratives that do not linguistically manifest a speaker undermine such assumptions 
that are in fact just reflections of the reading process, the reading effect of assuming 
                                                     
26 Following Brooks and Warren, he mentions the “focus of Interest” that captures the reader’s 
attention, “centrality” of a character, and perception (Chatman 192-193). 
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that someone has to tell the narrative one is reading; “to impute existence to a fact of 
diction” (622) is theoretically spurious. 
Genette’s concepts of voice and focalization cannot explain “non-natural” 
(624) narratives on which the reader projects real-life narrative schemes, or the 
conventionalization of non-natural narrative schemes that finally are not felt anymore 
as disruptions of natural schemes. For instance, in “quasi autobiographical fiction” 
(624), readers interpret the pretense to authentic first-hand experience and reliability 
of the telling addressed to a narratee in function of the real-life conversational schema. 
The “historical writing” (624) schema would follow the diachronic evolution and 
explanation of events. However, in omniscient narratives, a “historiographical” 
narrator can present both the historical facts, and inner life traits of the main 
protagonists. In modernist “reflectoral narratives” (624), the reading practice has 
formed a quasi “natural” expectation to get immediate access to the consciousness of 
characters through which the fictional world is perceived and known throughout the 
narrative text. We could say that this “VIEWING” schema, as Fludernik calls it (624), 
has been naturalized through the act of reading; it “has become a staple of narrative 
fiction, and it now feels quite ‘natural’ to readers who have come to expect direct 
access to characters’ minds” (625). Hence, the “neutral,” “objective” narrative in the 
third person and “first-person neutral narrative” disrupt the familiarized reading 
expectations. The same happens with second-person narratives; however, in the end 
its very functioning eliminates throughout the text its oddity. 
Fludernik’s analysis is centered on recent “nonnatural narration [on] the use of 
omniscient third-person narrative that is both consistently authorial and focalized 
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through the mind of the current protagonist” (626). The case combines an internal 
focalization from the inner consciousness of the protagonist, but without the 
immediacy trait that usually is attributed to internal focalization, and a “teller figure” 
(628) that normally would not focalize from the inner life of the character. For 
instance George Garrett’s narrative unfolds “the nonnatural schema of a ‘speaker’ 
who has the ability to describe the world through his characters’ consciousness” (627). 
However, no stylistic difference would allow distinguishing between the teller’s 
“narrative idiom” (629) that mediate the reader’s access to the character’s thoughts, 
and what would be the character’s own idiom if he was the speaker. Normally the 
distinction between the speaker’s and the character’s voice should be marked by 
stylistic differences. Hence, the category of “voice” is not relevant in this case. 
Moreover, the focalization, from an external focus on the character’s mind deviates 
towards a “consonant [one] sympathetic to his plight, not critical” (629). Thus, 
heterodiegetic narrative plunges from a global perspective and conflates with the 
limited subjective experience of the main character. 
The analysis proposed by Fludernik reveals the difficulties and the dead-end 
the application of the categories of voice and focalization reaches. The main problem 
lies in the derivation of both voice and focalization from the same linguistic markers 
(deictic or expressive). 
In an even more critical twist, Andrew Gibson (Towards a Postmodern Theory 
of Narrative; “And the Wind Wheezing”; “Commentary”) argues that, by putting 
forward “voice” as analytical tool, narratological studies cannot detach themselves 
from the humanistic project that roots the narrative in human presence. But the 
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ontological assumption of the narrative’s ability to convey spontaneously human 
experience is highly problematic. From a Derridean point of view Gibson contests the 
idealism of a coherent, meaningful, totality, “the theological privilege of the phōnē–
and, together with it, a particular valuation of reason, the conscious will, the self-
identity of consciousness, the certitude and unity of inner existence” (Gibson, “And 
the Wind Wheezing” 642). As voice can never be present to itself in its immediacy, 
Gibson argues, following Jacques Derrida, for a differential definition of voice in 
which writing becomes the very “differential principle” (Towards a Postmodern 
Theory of Narrative 169), “interior to voice” (“And the Wind Wheezing” 642), 
altering, disrupting voice. He calls for a “materialism of voice”: “narrative voice may 
be thought of precisely in terms of this play of the materiality of writing within it.” 
(“And the Wind Wheezing” 642). Drawing this time upon Jacques Rancière’s work, 
he shows that writing displaces the very source of enunciation, the reference to an 
original point, thus making incongruous any pretension to a legitimate authority. 
Hence narrative works in a paradoxical way: it never achieves completeness, because 
opened to further reading, and, at the same time, strives for totality. The paradox is 
expressed through the figurative/figural modes of narrative continuously transforming 
into one another. The figurative mode would correspond to the re-presentational order 
of narrative, the figural to the “prophetic mode” of writing, the baffling play of the 
text that calls for a future embodiment, and whose showing is the measure of secrecy 
and concealment:  
Narrative is both itself a mode of embodiment, and a call to a future which 
will give it body in determining its truth.… By the same token, in narrative, 
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writing finds a voice, but a voice that is ceaselessly traversed by writing and 
remains a parole muette.” (“And the Wind Wheezing” 646) 
However, as I shall discuss in the next chapter, “le Dire” opposed to “le dit” 
plays a capital role in Levinas’ questioning of established, totalizing knowledge and 
identities, in the ethics of dislocating the subject, the Same’s limits, by exposing it to 
the Other. Thus, can one evacuate the ethical significance of “le Dire” and displace it 
on the terrain of writing, as the voice of writing? Moreover, my literature review in 
chapter 1 and 2 pointed to the disrupted voice in pain and suffering, deeply rooted in 
an embodied, suffering dys-appearance. Far from being just a totalizing effect of self-
identity, voice witnesses its lack of coherence, ambiguity, hereby affirming itself as 
“voice” in its very ripping, and calling out for an ethical response to prolong or restore 
voice. It is because voice itself carries out its disruption, that writing can insert as a 
“differential principle” in the broken voice, in its interstices; but interstices that 
intertwine. 
Explaining the predominance of the oral linguistic structures (enunciation) 
over the logic syntax in Céline’s work, Julia Kristeva argues that intonation - the 
segmentation of the phrase, the projections or relegations at the level of the phrase 
structure between the determined term and the determining term with emphatic, 
emotive effects over the syntax–has profound psychological meanings (Pouvoirs de 
l’horreur). Intonation modulates the syntactic order through manifesting fundamental 
psychic dynamics: emphatic speech both affirms the autonomous subject, his/her 
identity with regard to the other, and confronts with the other. At the same time it 
asserts the subject following the pleasure principle through “emotive signal[s] close to 
the drives” (232) and is opposed to negativity, rejection, following the reality 
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principle. Thus, the subject explains, has to retell himself/herself in front of the other: 
“ ‘je dis en présupposant’ et ‘je dis ce qui m’importe’ et ‘je dis pour être clair,’ ou 
encore: je dis ce qui me plaît’ et ‘je dis pour toi, pour nous, pour qu’on s’entende’ ” 
(231-232). The discourse shifts from the I to the other as addressee of the message. 
Writing performs thus a memorial return upon itself up to an original point where 
voice and writing conflate in an “écriture parlée” (232). 
And yet, insofar as illness narratives about a significant other are concerned, I 
would rather argue that “l’écriture parlée” enacts a fundamental ethical situation of the 
self towards the suffering other. I would suggest a twofold answer to the question 
“what method for the ethics of illness narratives,” one that pays attention to the ethical 
stance of illness narratives and to the intersubjective dimension of life-narratives 
discussed in the former chapter. First, drawing on Levinas and Ricœur’s ethics I shall 
argue that the ethical stance modulates narrative voice. Second, I shall define voice in 
function of the life-narratives’ particular rules of social accountability. 
As I have already pointed to, for Levinas the only way one can relate to the 
Other without subsuming it under an interpretive grasp that would annihilate his/her 
difference, without reducing his/her absoluteness to a relative term, is to be exposed to 
his/her expression, to his/her discourse (Totalité et infini). It is only through verbal 
expressivity, through speech, that the Other coincides with his/her presentation and 
thus announces his/her manifestation, independently, and not through another term 
that would explain the Other and thus, reduce it to the terms of the explanation. 
Through discourse, the Other exposes his/her exteriority and is signifying 
himself/herself. The discourse produces meaning without having to refer to an 
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interpretive system that would translate and betray the Other’s difference. In the 
relation constituted by discursive expressivity both the Same and the Other are 
interpellated interlocutors, a plurality of differences. Hence language signifies insofar 
as it can be articulated in the vocative or accusative mode (the injunction to the 
responsibility towards the other). In this sense I understand voice as the very 
expressive address, relying fundamentally on the Same–Other discursive encounter. 
Voice addresses and responds to an ethical call in the emergency of immediacy. 
Against the primacy of the accusative injunction to an ethical stance towards 
the other, Ricœur argues that if one were to “listen to” and “receive” the call to 
responsibility, one should be able to offer in exchange an answer to the other’s call. 
Hence he equilibrates a primary asymmetrical, imperative relation in levinasian terms, 
with the capacity to offer, the initiative to respond, with solicitude rooted in goodness, 
“la qualité éthique des buts de l’action et de l’orientation de la personne vers autrui … 
par égard pour lui” (Soi-même comme un autre 222). The self acts with a “spontanéité 
bienveillante” (222) according to the acknowledgement of the superior authority of 
the just action, not following the obedience to a moral command. Hence, reversing the 
ethical command in Levinas’ view, solicitude is the sym-pathical initiative the self 
takes towards the suffering other, powerless, with reduced or even vanished capacities 
to act or affirm himself/herself as integral being, but at the same time it empowers the 
sufferer with the possibility of offering and hence playing a reciprocal role. In the 
“suffering-with” relation (223), the sufferer not only receives the ethical answer, but 
through his/her very fragility and vulnerability uncovers in the other his/her own 
power of affection, of being affected, the reminding of his/her own vulnerability: “Ce 
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que la souffrance de l’autre, autant que l’injonction morale issue de l’autre, descelle 
dans le soi, ce sont des sentiments spontanément dirigés vers autrui” (224). Finally, 
the suffering other teaches the self about his/her own mortality and irreplaceability.  
Voice covers thus the whole spectrum of ethical stances with respect to the 
relation to the suffering other and one has to consider it as a mode of assuming and 
performing ethical stances. It can take the modes of authoritative claim to 
responsibility recognized by the self (“l’assignation à responsabilité par la voix de 
l’autre” 223), solicitude, annihilated powers to act and at the same time re-
empowering through the very fragility of voice, “suffering-with” in the reciprocal 
murmurings, vulnerability of the self and the other: 
C’est peut-être là l’épreuve suprême de la sollicitude, que l’inégalité de 
puissance vienne à être compensée par une authentique réciprocité dans 
l’échange, laquelle, à l'heure de l'agonie, se réfugie dans le murmure partagé 
des voix ou l'étreinte débile de mains qui se serrent.” (223) 
In his studies, Lejeune has argued that the rules of self-narration establish the 
terms of a contract between narrator and reader (listener). For Paul John Eakin, they 
concern mainly the respect for referential truth, the respect for privacy, and the display 
of “normative models of personhood” (Living Autobiographically 32). Infringing 
these rules calls into question the validity of self-narratives and life-narratives in 
general. As already pointed out, misrepresentation of factual truth, and subsequently 
the questions concerning the subject (voice) telling the narrative and being told about, 
have been thorny issues in scholarly studies. The second target of my analysis is to 
define the modes of voice following the contractual rules considered by Eakin. To this 
end, I shall analyze the way the rules of telling the truth, of respecting one’s own and 
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others’ privacy and rendering personhood normalcy in self-narratives (life-narratives) 
inform, modulate voice in life-narratives, and what are their consequences for the self-
suffering other relations in illness narratives. Hence, the Genettian narrative instance 
is challenged as the modes of voice go beyond enunciative instances, and neither can 
voice be reduced to mere reading effects, as in Fludernik’s critique. One has to 
consider voice in its indissoluble relation to the truth it tells, to what it means to tell 
this truth, to the limits of privacy, personhood, and identity. Though telling the truth is 
the imperative for an ethical call to talk about oneself or another, for testimony, how 
much truth, and how can one tell this truth without transgressing the norms of what is 
acceptable following the two other rules? Wouldn’t it be, telling the truth, an 
ambiguous way of concealing another one, or of impermissible violation? In spite of 
post-humanist claims, voice could hardly be neutral or impersonal; to the contrary, it 
carries the gravity of initiative (the ethical solicitude as we saw in Ricœur’s analysis), 
it is intentional, manifest, or conveys ambivalent, surreptitious meanings through its 
very explicit stance, tendentious, coherent or abrupt, interrupted, undetermined. This 
renders the definition of narrative voice in terms of its effects of distance irrelevant 
(for instance, a minimum of the narrator’s narrative presence, hence a maximum of 
mimetism of the narrative discourse does not imply a maximum of truth as direct 
speech can be obliterated, cut, or deleted, neither does it imply respecting the other’s 
privacy). Fundamentally, the opposition between mimetic/diegetic orders is irrelevant. 
Lejeune acknowledged the ambiguities, ambivalences of autobiographical discourse, 
but he situates his analysis at the level of the narrative enunciation, approaching 
narrative “voice” in the Genettian framework (Je est un autre). In the end, he reaches 
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a dead end as he recognizes that the reader never has the immediate experience of an 
analytical unfolding of the autobiographical discourse, but is “situated in front of a 
constantly changing and ambiguous enunciation” (24; my translation). Would this 
mean, however, that the reader does not realize that he/she is reading an ambiguous or 
ironic text? To say so would discredit the reader’s ability to discern ambivalence, 
indeterminacy, or ethically dubious texts if he/she lacks such analytical tools. I would 
contend then that the effect of “ventriloquism” seized by the reader originates 
somewhere else, namely in the referential constitution of the life narrative text on 
which the intention and performance of enunciation depend. It is thus necessary to 
replace the discussion of voice in the specific context of life-narratives and examine it 
in the broader referential domain life-narratives imply. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
THE DISTENSION OF VOICE 
 
Frank Davey, How Linda Died 
 
 
 At a first glance, if taking the cues from the daily notations of dates at the 
beginning of each entry, one could say that How Linda Died is Frank Davey’s diary. 
The first chapter’s title announces the I as writer: “What I Began to Try Writing.” 
However, the diary’s thematic, proleptic title (Genette, Seuils) refers to Linda and her 
announced way towards death as the subject of the text. And subsequently, in the 
incipit of the diary the subject of the diary appears to be at least double. It is a 
disconcerting diary that anticipates from its title and incipit the Other, “Linda,” “she,” 
“their mom” as its subject. The narrator, which, if one were to respect the generic 
definition of diary, should be identical with the hero, appears to be the reflected and 
reflecting shadow of Linda: 
March 9, 1999. Linda’s reluctant to drive. She’s not eager to go out, even just 
to shop for groceries. I’ve been delaying writing this. She’s been asking me to 
make phone calls for her. To answer letters. Once she used to slap at my hand 
if I dared touch her phone while it was ringing. Now she’s not even eager to 
argue, one of our old pleasures. I remember a couple of weeks ago telling 
Mike and Sara that their mom is not just mellowing, she’s becoming less self-
confident.… A registered letter from the Law Society arrived today.… Over 
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the last few months there’ve been numerous letters from the society … but I 
don’t think she’s opened any.” (13) 
 In the first phrase, Linda appears as subject of the utterance, while the subject 
of the enunciation is “he,” Frank, the narrator; “she” is splitting thus the self-
narratives’ “myth of the full subject” (Lejeune, Je est un autre 7) and the 
corresponding self-sufficiency of its enunciation. Immediately after, the narrative I 
tells about his reluctance to write. Hence, the reader is faced with the ambiguity of 
determining who is in fact the subject of the diary. 
 However, the process of reading the text up to the end allows to suggest in a 
first stance that the subject as protagonist of the diary is Linda, Frank’s wife who 
suffers of brain cancer, and who will die at the end of the narrative; it also appears that 
Frank writes the narrative. One can affirm then that How Linda Died is a narrative 
type of “illness as narrative,” which follows the progression of Linda’s illness. But 
Linda suffers from brain cancer, which deteriorates her physical condition up to the 
point where she loses autonomy, and which progressively impedes her linguistic 
abilities, distorts and finally destroys her memory, her remembering capacity, 
ultimately her “narrational means.” Thus, one can say that the diary also belongs to 
the second narrative type: “narrative as illness.” Moreover, the daily entries scatter 
fragments of clinical conversations with physicians or nurses, accounts of looking for 
information on the Internet. Hence, the diary would also belong to the third type of 
“narrative about illness.” Frank Davey’s diary combines the three narrative types, but 
the dominant narrative structures belong to the first and second type. 
 Instead of the writing, “authorial” I, Linda is a problematic subject divided 
between the deictical “now” and the relative “once” (in Catherine Kerbrat-
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Orrechioni’s terms), though, as we shall see further, the divide is not clear. The 
writing I is confused now, himself problematic, trying to understand, to grasp 
(“watching,” “spying,” “making notes on her”) the Other’s difference; “exterior,” at 
an infinite distance from the Other, struggling with an impossibly totalizing writing, 
but at the same time writing to witness, responding to the authoritative presence of the 
Other’s dissemblance–a witnessing narrator. The I that refers to Linda, “she.” The 
“logical” focus of diary should be on the narrator who recounts the moments of his 
everyday life, and this is the case when the narrator recounts moments of his/her 
present life, choices or decisions. But How Linda Died disconcerts the reader with the 
incertitude of the narrating I before the Other: “I didn’t know what to make of this, I 
still don’t” (15-16); “I need a secluded place to continue thinking about her and to 
remember what I’ve been thinking” (23). Through the direct effect of questions, 
uncertainties, and ambiguities of the narrator, the indeterminacy of the narrating I 
functions as the signifier of the Other. 
 The fragment starts with recording puzzling facts about Linda that place her 
immediately as the subject–protagonist of a narrative where the narrator writes as an 
affected, hesitating I. Writing or not, narrating or not is itself a function of Linda: 
“I’ve been delaying writing this.… It feels bizarre to be watching her, to be almost 
spying, to be making these notes on her, but I don’t know what else to do” (13-14). 
The immediate present of the narrator’s account has here the reflexive function of 
mirroring Linda’s transformations, her changed behavior, to record what happens with 
Linda, the difference between the past, active Linda and a present, seemingly self-
indulging Linda, to record her story. At the same time it denounces the intrusive, 
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surreptitious, observing gaze of the I: 
Occasionally one of her old Toronto clients will phone. What I’ve overheard 
her say makes me think that she’s trying to deflect them, or that she doesn’t 
want to hear what they’re telling.… but she’s responding with platitudes, 
polite impatience. I don’t understand. (13); she is spending more and more 
time playing repetitive computer games–various solitaires, mah-jongg, jigsaw 
puzzles. Five or six hours a day. I wonder if she is depressed, but she doesn’t 
otherwise act depressed. (13-14); She’s supposed to be leaving for North 
Carolina tomorrow … But Linda’s being strange about it. Keeps saying she 
doesn’t want to go. That she’s getting too old for drives, that she’s been 
feeling tired.… I’m perplexed. Linda’s usually been an adventurous and 
resourceful driver. (16); Strong like Linda used to be. (17) 
 Nonetheless, progressively the blurred vision clears up, though still casting 
doubts upon any explanation; names, words, the place of things, directions, and 
addresses are forgotten: “I think I’ve started this because Linda’s memory seems even 
worse” (23). And Frank’s writing develops step by step as the struggle to make sense 
of the “obdurate reality” (Blumer) of Linda’s progressive loss of memory, of the 
obdurate incoherence: 
If that makes any sense.… today I wonder if maybe she’s having trouble 
remembering what food she has around.… Sometimes, when the tomatoes 
have begun to develop mould, I’ve joked to her that they appear to be ripe. 
She hasn’t seemed to get the joke.… Perhaps she’s just getting older and 
eccentric. Yesterday Mike asked me if I’d noticed that Linda’s been reading 
the same book for the past five weeks. I have.… But have I noticed that she’s 
been on the same page?… I didn’t know what to make of this, I still don’t. 
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Over the past twenty years she has read an average of three or four mostly 
inconsequential books a week… But maybe she’s bored with this one. Maybe 
she’s been interrupted many times. (14-16) 
 Doubts, uncertainties, questions (“maybe,” “perhaps,” “she hasn’t seemed…”) 
mark his writing as the echo of his own untold voice, a voice that resonates 
repetitively in his mind. As long as voice and thinking remain untold, unexplained, 
they haunt with an undetermined proliferation of words and memories, with excessive, 
obsessive proximity that would eventually turn into a limitless forgetting: 
I know I worry that I may forget something. And hope that things’ll look 
clearer, or make more sense, if I write them down–like they might if I could 
talk about them. (16) 
I need a secluded place to continue thinking about her and to remember what 
I’ve been thinking. To explain to myself what I’ve been thinking. (23) 
 Writing equates interrupting silence as the extreme of memory and word: 
“Écrire chaque jour, sous la garantie de ce jour et pour le rappeler à lui-même, est une 
manière commode d'échapper au silence, comme à ce qu'il y a d'extrême dans la 
parole” (Blanchot, Le livre à venir 254-255). It is through the landmarks of writing 
that voice emerges from a continuous metamorphosis, from a continuous transition of 
one word into another flowing as multiple, juxtaposed, repetitive sounds. Thus text 
becomes the rhythm and texture of voice, a “textured” voice that cannot be completely 
unraveled: faults, points of suture, suture line failures, and rips distort and render the 
texture uneven. Thus writing can collapse in its own disruption and fragmentation, a 
silenced voice that opens up the chasm of a wound: “il n’y a silence qu’écrit, réserve 
déchirée, entaille qui rend impossible le détail” (Blanchot, L'écriture du désastre 19). 
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Text displays both the grain of the texture and its scars and vulnerability, the syntax of 
an ordered voice, the voice that overflows, and the silenced voice. In the end, I would 
suggest to consider text as an interface of voice,27 a resonating interface that both 
modulates voice and is modulated by the rhythm of voice, its past, present and 
forward flow, or is torn up by the silences and disruptions of voice. Thus textual 
interface is polyphonic not only as a plurivocal (understood as multiple voiced) 
discourse in Bakthin’s terms, but as it echoes the distension of voice. Present voice 
can convey simultaneously what is said, what was said and what will be said; it 
resonates as the echoing effect and opens up the breach for further echoing through 
the interstices of voice. My argument is based on the Augustinian triple definition of 
time28 and on the relation between the uttering and reciting voice and the structure of 
time that he proposes and that I shall detail in my text analysis. Watson and Smith 
identify four modes of interfacing between the textual and visual: relational “through 
parallel or interrogatory juxtaposition of word and image”; contextual “through 
documentary or ethnographic juxtaposition of word and image”; spatial “through 
palimpsestic or paratextual juxtaposition of word and image”; and temporal “through 
telescoped or serial juxtaposition of word and image” (Introduction 21). At the level 
of the textual interface, I would suggest that text deploys the distension modes of 
voice. Voice interrogates itself, juxtaposing uncertainty, contradictions with its very 
expression. Voice is textured as palimpsest, as erased trace. However, its own echoing 
does not efface voice completely. Voice is relayed, delayed, repeated, interrupted, and 
suspended. And most of all, as I showed in the former chapter, in a specific way for 
                                                     
27 For the analysis of the textual/visual interface see Watson and Smith, Introduction. 
28 “There are three times, a present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things to 
come” (Saint Augustine 235). 
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life narratives, voice is referentially contextualized and documented, calling for social 
accountability. Voice affects and is affected by other voices, not only through a 
polyphonic genre construction, but as an ethical response to the Other’s suffering (see 
my discussion of Ricœur, Soi-même comme un autre at pp. 119-120). The life 
narrative texture (diary, autobiography or memoir) is not just a dialogue, intertext, 
between signifier and signified, an encounter of languages that “contradict and put 
into perspective each other” (Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel” 49), but a 
“performative interface” (Watson and Smith, Introduction 12) between a distended, 
echoing voice and text, between self, voice and text, between the self and the Other, 
between their voices through its referential, material and embodied specificity. 
 Davey’s writing is addressed by the Other’s call and addresses the Other: “I’m 
still not sure why I’m writing all this, or even who I’m writing it for. Maybe Linda? 
Maybe Mike, Sahra?” (16). Writing is not the effect of a decision, of a will to write; 
on the contrary, as stated by Blanchot, “écrire, c'est la déchéance du vouloir, comme 
la perte du pouvoir, la chute de la cadence, le désastre encore” (L'écriture du désastre 
24). It is incumbent upon us as responsibility, as address. The specter of a possible 
illness slowly looms in the discursive unfolding of days. Illness infiltrates the diary as 
an unavoidable immediacy to which writing is summoned to respond:  
She has confided to Judy that she was having trouble reading, having trouble 
focusing her eyes, and also having trouble with her balance–things she’s 
never confided to Mike or me. Judy wonders if Linda is ill–or perhaps 
severely depressed. She says I must persuade her to seek help. I don’t know 
what to think.… I wish I could figure out how to get Linda to discuss this 
with me. Part of my problem is that Linda has been such a strong person for 
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so long that I can’t believe these difficulties won’t go away. Or that she won’t 
be able to will them away.… I don’t want her difficulties to be real–don’t 
want her to confirm that they are real. Even though if I’m writing about them 
here I must know that they are.” (25-26) 
Directly reported words of Linda are markers of a disrupted language and 
Frank’s protective attitude pretending that nothing changed cannot pass them over: 
“She sometimes seems unable to remember the names for really common things, like 
oven mitts or French toast or broccoli: ‘Can you find that thing for me,’ she’s said to 
me, impatiently. You know that thing!’ ” (27). Hence, one could say, Frank’s writing 
follows the “grammar” of Linda’s loss of memory as the unnamable trace, her 
confused voice, her confused memory. Paradoxically, Linda’s confusion elicits and 
breaks, interrupts Frank’s own writing. A compensatory communication emerges 
eventually from the silenced voice and the diary evolves within thirteen days (between 
the 10th of April and the 23rd of April records) from Frank’s attempts to deny 
problems to the certitude that Linda herself is aware of them: “Just as abruptly as her 
language has begun faltering, an oddly tacit understanding has emerged between us. 
Hard to remember how quickly it happened. She knows that I know that she knows 
that she’s in trouble” (28). The use of the plural “us,” the mirroring effect between 
“she knows”–“I know” avoid thus the dispersal of writing. Linda’s disrupted voice 
prompts Frank’s remembering efforts towards retrieving and reconstructing fragments 
of past as a way of countering silence, not just Linda’s silence, but the threat of un-
voicing that affects Frank himself. The relation to the different, remote Other is 
reversed. Thus the same becomes the Other, is ousted from the privileged first person 
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status, threatened himself by an overwhelming proximity to the Other, by silence and 
identity loss (Blanchot, L'écriture du désastre): 
Instead of diminishing my need to remember things, these changes seem to be 
making me want to write down even more. It’s as if I fear that Linda’s 
increasingly uncompleted sentences are silencing me. As if the less she and I 
can speak the more I need to write. As if our talking was a part of how I made 
up and understood and kept my memories. I also wish I’d begun this journal 
earlier so I had a better record of her symptoms. I’ve started trying to 
reconstruct the last few months, going back over our dog-show calendar, 
through my e-mail records, trying to force them to bring back events and 
conversations. (28) 
 Ricœur talks about the “inénarrable” (“La souffrance n’est pas la douleur” 63) 
to describe how suffering disturbs temporality, the narrative order, and the narrative 
capacity to recount oneself. It impedes the “will to tell” (63) and addresses the 
interlocutor through cries and complaint. Moreover, as one’s own story is set in 
others’ stories (see also Arendt), suffering affects the “internarrative fabric” (Ricœur, 
“La souffrance n’est pas la douleur” 63; see also Soi-même comme un autre) that 
binds the teller and the listener, it affects thus the listener at the level of interpersonal 
relation. The Other’s silence, the Other as impossible narrator both calls for telling 
and risks condemning the addressee to silence. Writing intervenes then as a prosthetic 
interface between fragmented voices that supplies an “internarrative fabric” and 
sustains memory. It marks the rhythm of the memory of events, words, and 
conversations and at the same time it records the process through which memory gets 
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distorted: “ ‘I’ve been having problems remembering things. Remembering words,’ 
she said. ‘There’s something wrong with my head,’ she told them” (Davey 29). 
 Progressively, as Linda’s memory seems to worsen, the diary goes further into 
probing the past, whether into her common life with Frank or her life before meeting 
Frank. But writing does not perform a univocal telling. Frank’s telling and 
remembering reconstruct stories that were once told by Linda herself and in which she 
acted as the protagonist, stories that in the context of the diary both display this 
vulnerability, re-empower Linda against her vulnerability in front of illness, and 
witness her deeds: 
I start reminiscing, thinking about Linda and about how she started all this–
going to dog shows.… It’s a bit bizarre to be remembering this story. It used 
to be one of Linda’s stories–one she told people to demonstrate how much the 
dogs were hers and not mine.… I don’t think she could tell such a story right 
now.  (33-35) 
As the diary unfolds, we learn through Linda’s efforts to convey explicitly and 
directly her diagnosis that she suffers from brain cancer. She has an inoperable brain 
tumor that impairs her speech, sight, movement, and that would be fatal eventually: 
Today she says abruptly that she hasn’t yet told me everything about her visit 
to the neurologist. There was a diagnosis. ‘You need to know,’ she says.… ‘I 
have an inoperable brain tumor,’ she says. ‘I may have less than a year to 
live.’ She speaks all this very matter-of-factly, as if what she’s most aware of 
is the need to tell me as directly and precisely as possible.… All of this 
conversation seems both surreal and reasonable. Except that she and I are 
inside it. Exact speech is a struggle for her. It is all she can do to control 
denotation. (38) 
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From this stage illness becomes the landmark of writing, the keynote of the 
simultaneous desire to talk and at the same time what makes talk difficult as illness 
hinders the linguistic means and talking about illness would display vulnerability. 
Illness slots into everyday life affecting day-to-day actions, reorganizing life in 
function of a medical calendar, distorting taken-for-granted abilities of the self. 
Instead of a self-reflexive, repetitive daily record of the flowing time, the notes of the 
diary witness the departures from the usual, the interruptions of speech, and the 
infiltration of the clinical discourse into writing: 
It’s been a quiet day. Neither Mike nor I say much to Linda about her illness, 
and she doesn’t seem to want to talk. She got up, played mah-jongg, cooked 
supper, almost as usual. She’s spending quite a bit of time trying to write a 
speech she’s supposed to give at the annual Partners in Research banquet next 
Sunday night.… I can’t believe she’s planning to do it. And with her biopsy 
scheduled for Thursday. But she’s taking the speech seriously … And she’s 
passionate about the cause … But she’s having trouble with every sentence. 
I’ve helped her increase the font size so it’s easier for her to see the screen. I 
offer to type for her too, but she says, no, that she wants to do it. She seems 
annoyed that I’ve offered. She says that it’s going to be a popular speech–very 
short. The few sentences she’s completed are clichéd, terse, pedestrian. (40-
41) 
It is the moment in the diary, when Frank juxtaposes Linda’s diagnosis with 
the struggle of the wife of one of his best friends,’ Angela, who is treated for cervical 
cancer. Thus, Linda’s diagnosis transforms the way Frank looks at and understands 
the life world, orienting his attention towards a world whose structure and contour are 
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defined by illness and counterpointed with “before” illness episodes, with the “old 
Linda,” the Linda of shared stories and conversations. Illness takes its toll on Linda’s 
lived time which is reduced now to the present instant, to impenetrable passivity and 
lack of projects, of “life plans” to follow, to initiate actions (Ricœur, Soi-même comme 
un autre 186): 
I’m finding it really hard without the old Linda. Miss being able to talk about 
things with her, joke, reminisce, or plan. Or reminisce in order to plan. I wish 
she could help me understand what has happened to her. But all she wants to 
do is watch her television or her computer. If she talks it’s only about the 
present moment, her present moment.” (44) 
 Ricœur suggests that identity is constituted as a dialectical movement between 
the sameness dimension of an individual and “selfhood” (Soi-même comme un autre 
140), or ipse, the self maintenance: on the one hand the sameness of character, the 
settled sediments of the character’s identifications and acquired dispositions, the traits 
of character that constitute the portrait of an individual, retrievable throughout time, 
and on the other hand, the maintenance of a responsible and responding self in her 
relation to the Other, in what she recognizes and evaluates herself, and is evaluated by 
the Other, the respect of a promise. Narrative identity is the mediator between these 
poles. It involves the developing dynamic of the character, its temporal constitution, 
innovation and formative sedimentation, and the character’s actions and orientation 
towards a valuable “life plan” that make her recognizable and subject her to ethical 
judgment. Narrative identity evolves as an “internal dialectic” (175) between the 
temporal unity of the whole, unique life of the character, the concordant totality of a 
life, and the discordant events, accidents that disrupt this unity. The “concordant-
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discordant synthesis” (175) of the life narrative integrates the accidental as the 
necessary event, the destiny that constitutes the unique life unity, the character’s 
identity. Through “imaginative variations” the story can explore the identity 
possibilities that spread out on the continuum between the poles of sameness and ipse. 
Thus, at one end one can find the identifiable, same character, at the other end the 
character loses her sameness, the qualitative substratum of her identity, which 
questions the status of the character as such and affects the coherence of the narrative 
plot. In this last case, identity is maintained as variation “around” (178) one’s lived 
corporeal situation in the world, around embodiment which constitutes a dimension of 
the self as ipse.  
 At this stage of Linda’s illness, five months after the first troubling signs, the 
difficulty resides in discerning among the variations of Linda’s self that elude a 
“concordant-discordant synthesis.” Illness provokes questions about Linda’s identity 
as it absorbs her identity in its vertigo and at the same time displaces Frank’s own 
identity. It is impossible to understand her identity from the total perspective of a life 
unity as life plans are bracketed by illness and, in a retrospective glance illness partly 
reveals and confirms an already puzzling self that disconcerted a totalizing 
understanding even before the illness episode. The discordant self, continuously 
shifting between decisive actions, periods of enthusiasm and passivity or retreat, 
seems to be the very trait of Linda’s character as perceived by Frank, thus coinciding 
partly with the effects of illness on her identity. The “sameness” of her character 
appears to rely on its very discordance. At the same time, Linda’s selfhood is 
threatened with disintegration both at the narrative level, as Linda will soon not be 
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able to “voice” her own narrative, and at the level of the engagement to keep the 
promise of a moral stance in relation to another self. The question that Ricœur asks in 
order to save the ipse from its disappearance implies that ipse, through its very 
fracture and annihilation, is embedded in its relation to the Other, that ipse makes 
herself available for the Other that bursts into the closure of the self: “Qui suis-je moi, 
si versatile pour que, néanmoins, tu comptes pour moi?” (Soi-même comme un autre 
198). I would suggest to further reformulate this question from the perspective of the 
“internarrative” that binds the self to the Other: “Qui est-elle, si versatile pour que, 
néanmoins, elle compte pour moi?” and “Qui est-elle, si versatile, pour que, 
néanmoins, je compte pour elle?” I would argue that what governs the writing of the 
diary is the question about “Who is Linda, so changeable?” that Frank is yet 
compelled to write about her, “Who is Linda, so changeable?” that Frank is yet so 
bound to her through the confession of a fatal illness. Both these questions reverse the 
question that Ricœur asks. They articulate the double relation to the different Other as 
defined by Blanchot (L'écriture du désastre), from the self (same) to the Other and 
from the Other to the self (same), with debilitating consequences on everyone’s 
identities: 
Mike [the son] and I keep talking about what we could have done differently. 
Could Linda have had a quicker diagnosis? If not for us? We don’t seem to 
conclude too much. Maybe we were both too wrapped up in the drama of her 
identity to be sure it was changing. Too implicated in imagining and 
responding to who she was. I’m starting to think now that one huge problem 
we had in interpreting Linda’s behavior over the past five months was that it 
was both consistent and inconsistent with the person we thought we knew. 
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Neither Mike, Sara, nor I have ever been able to get enough of Linda, enough 
time with her–enough of her grace, kindness, intelligence, enthusiasm, her 
gourmet view of what the world has to offer. That enthusiastic Linda would 
be there and then suddenly switch off. Sometimes I thought it was the 
insatiability of my delight in her that caused her to switch off. At other times I 
wondered whether my delight was insatiable because she so often switched 
off. Hard to know. She would say she needed time for herself. Would pick up 
a book and look away. Or go to her room.… Who is Linda? How far back 
does one go in imagining her? The Linda we thought we knew had for the 
past thirty years displayed intense bursts of energy interspersed with equally 
intense periods of passivity, relative inactivity, seeming depression. The 
periods of energy could last for months, even years, as could the periods of 
inaction. During one period of energy she went to law school, graduated, 
completed the bar admission course, and began a law career. During another 
she … journeyed alone to the Mayan ruins of Uxmal, Chichén Izá, Palenque, 
Sayil, Labna, Tikal, and Altun Ha…. Yet her life has also had periods marked 
by numerous unfinished projects.… Yet … I hadn’t found these abrupt shifts 
in her interests extraordinarily strange. There had been numerous things she’d 
completed.… It was as if in each new enthusiasm she glimpsed some 
wonderful, utopian possibility, some amazing happiness. Perhaps even the 
mythic romance, I’ve sometimes thought, of her father’s ancestry. A 
happiness that would then prove illusory, ordinary, disappointing. She would 
retreat, regroup, and dream again.” (44-46) 
The difficulty to talk about illness surrounds Linda’s illness with silence. Read from 
the perspective of the recent diagnosis, the “normal,” ordinary course of the days are 
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shadowed by incertitude. But at the same time the illness narrative can lead to insight 
and growth. The portrayal of suffering evokes a dignified self who, in spite of the 
debilitating effects of illness inspires love. Moreover, going on with everyday tasks as 
long as possible becomes a means of maintaining the valued face (Goffman) and the 
daily actions that might support the integrity of Linda as she understood it; as if the 
only escape from nothingness would seem to be continuing the daily house chores, 
and accepting the very nothingness as part of everyday life. The minute actions and 
gestures might get the value of decomposing the very principle of destruction: “Linda 
goes about preparing supper cheerfully, as if she’s decided that this new development 
is all part of the expected course of things and not worth fretting about” (101). 
Hence, the diary becomes the witness to the “intrusive illness” (Charmaz, 
Good Days, Bad Days), to the struggle to counter the invasion of illness in the 
territory of everyday life, the territory of self-identity (Frank, The Wounded 
Storyteller), and the distortion of social relations. This interpretation of illness and its 
effects might be viewed as wholly negative. Though scholars defined illness as one of 
the epiphanic moments in one’s biographical story (Denzin), as the motor of personal 
transformation, growth, and redefinition of values, a turning point in one’s life 
charged with moral significance, one can ask whether the discourse advocating this 
definition can avoid the “in spite of difficulties” argument: in spite of the adversity of 
suffering, the sufferer has been able to cope with illness. From a contextual point of 
view, I would say that the coherence of any interpretation depends on the whole life-
story of the affected person: has illness been the congenital condition; is illness 
chronic; does it affect an adult or a child? Thus, it is important to note that both Linda, 
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and, as we shall see later, Iris Murdoch were adults, women who would have to 
depend on their husbands. They were both autonomous persons, deeply affected by 
illness. Especially in Iris’ case, a public case that shocked a wide international 
audience, illness meant the interruption of her career as a world-renowned writer. If 
one were to examine the role socially attributed to women as caregivers, one cannot 
observe that illness reverses it at the expense of their own definition of independency 
and autonomy. Moreover, illness affected the embodied autonomy of both Linda and 
Iris. Weakness and disability may be exploited as breaches that allow infringements of 
personal integrity, the use of power relations between the medical staff and Linda, or 
an engendered view upon her during clinical conversations: “[The physician] keeps 
lapsing into addressing me rather than speaking to Linda” (50). Yet the diary 
documents Linda’s efforts to voice her own personhood in spite of her vulnerable 
condition. In the context of the contemporary emphasis on individual autonomy as a 
normative dimension of personhood, displaying vulnerability and pain might be 
understood as a losing face as a lapse in autonomy. However, the record of voicing 
pain has the value of asserting a lived body that cannot be reduced to the medical 
body; it is a call for an ethical response addressed to the Other: 
Linda hates her neurosurgeon. She has said over and over how rough he was 
with her, brutally clamping the frame to her head that was to guide his 
surgery. She had asked him to tell her when it would hurt and he didn’t and, 
taken by surprise by the pain, she had broken into tears. (49) 
From this point of view, it is significant to note how the narrative opposes 
fragments pertaining to a biomedical vocabulary to a vocabulary of the personal realm 
(“biopsy”/“she’s passionate about the cause”). Frank nullifies the pretension at any 
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medical certitude and unveils, in a retrospective reading, the void of the medical 
rhetoric confronted with the lived experience of illness: “She also gives her a 
prescription for a steroid–dexamethesone, also known as decadron–that she assures us 
will … relieve some of her symptoms. Back home Linda looks at the pamphlets but 
can’t read them” (55-56). In order to distance himself from the bio-medical view, 
Frank uses the ironic commentary, “as if reciting a script,” the assertion of his own 
medical knowledge which confers him the authority to interrupt the physician’s 
discourse, to oppose its generalizing cast, “I keep interrupting him, making him speak 
more specifically about Linda’s case” (50), and lends his own voice to convey Linda’s 
feelings, her discontent with the prefabricated questions of the occupational therapist: 
“I can see Linda feeling she’s being talked down to, and becoming more and more 
contemptuous” (54). He takes an ironic distance from the language of ideologies–in 
this case the bio-medical ideology: “I wonder if I could make a poem about the 
woman’s checklists … Most of my poems these days are about language and the 
ideologies–such as those of this strange, well-meaning woman–that language habits 
convey” (54). To the medical rhetoric he opposes the power of creative language 
casting doubts on the medical authority. 
But Frank’s diary contests any kind of rhetoric, not just the medical one. It 
transgresses the daily rhetoric of self-reflection and the record of insignificance that 
avoids “le désespoir de n’avoir rien à dire” (Blanchot, Le livre à venir 255). He writes 
on the verge of Linda’s disruption of voice and memory as solicitude that responds to 
or translates the Other’s suffering: 
Linda’s language ability has deteriorated even more the past few days. She 
gropes for almost every noun, some of which I try to supply for her. 
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Sometimes she gets lost in sentences, seeming to forget what she has begun to 
say, and I attempt to translate for her.” (53-54) 
The progression of her memory loss and her disability corresponds with 
Frank’s remembering fragments of her past life, either as they were once remembered 
and told by Linda, and which he tries to restore along with the diary, or as his own 
memory of Linda, of their life together. 
The discovery of an old silver berry spoon in the kitchen, “engraved 
‘M’Cartney’–possibly the last remnant of Linda’s grandfather’s household” (56) 
triggers Linda’s family story in which her own story is entangled. In Frank’s retelling 
of her memory, Linda appears both as the empowered author and heroine of a quasi-
fictional story she enacted as a child, projecting herself on a utopian family past, or as 
a character in movies or ballets. From the perspective of Linda’s past story Frank 
reinterprets the present experience of her illness, a different story with its own 
characters (herself, the medical staff, and the close others), the plot of her diagnosis, 
its spatio-temporal references (the hospital wards, corridors, the waiting time), and 
counterpoints the ‘now’ of Linda, a silenced storyteller. Thus her life-narrative, and 
one could extend this assertion to life-narratives in general, does not unfold as a total 
story where accidents are reintegrated through a dialectical move. Linda’s life-
narrative is composed of multiple, interconnected stories: her own series of short 
stories, told and retold, that projected, expected a certain ending, whether fictional or 
real, and others’ stories that were and still “are” related with her own story at a 
variable distance. No story could be said to be independent of the others’ stories and 
as nobody could grasp the totality of others’ stories, none could be said to get to a 
definite closure. At best, one could say that closure is provisional: 
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I’ve often thought that Linda, the child, created herself by identifying not with 
her immediate world of shabby streets and quarreling parents but with those 
utopian McCartney family memories–with the sparkle of the movies and 
ballets she watched from a stool in her father’s projection booth, or with the 
shine of this single berry spoon.… She too became a ballerina, a child 
prodigy, and, like her sister Irene, she might have danced in Europe. And she 
learned contempt for bad taste and stupidity. For her indolent mother, who 
began calling her ‘the Duchess.’ Contempt such as she has now for her 
occupational therapist, for the chaos of Dr. Megyesi’s waiting room, for my 
confusion that day in guiding her to the Cancer Center. She’s quiet right now. 
Dozing in bed, half-watching the British Antiques Roadshow on her 
television.” (57) 
The provisional character of Linda’s life-narrative marks the temporal 
structure of the diary. In generic terms scholars defined the diary genre as a text with a 
tendency towards simultaneity between action and writing (Rimmon-Kenan, 
Narrative Fiction). However, seized by the immediacy of the temporal flux of his/her 
own existence and the aging body, the diarist is writing his/her own temporal passage 
in a paradoxical attempt at distancing himself from and at once immersing himself in 
the time where being and writing coincide (Braud; see also Simonet-Tenant). Diaries 
are then among the most prone to unfold as “body writing” given the performing 
character of the diaristic writing: “diary [is] the elaboration of a text, a text that seems 
to set free, much easier than others, its functioning, because it is not resolutive, but 
evolutive; it is not the finite text, but the text in the making” (Didier 46; emphasis 
added). But, as Jean Rousset points out, the attempt at seizing the immediacy of life in 
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a narrative simultaneity remains an exceptional accomplishment. Most frequently, the 
immediate past is conveyed through a discourse that comes in between actions and 
events. Here diaries contrast with a global autobiographical “retrospective and 
reconstructive” story (Simonet-Tenant 21). If references to past events and fragments 
of stories emerge in the text, they are interspersed with the present of the writing 
(Didier). Thus no preliminary plan orients the writing; basically, it follows the flow of 
days, thus giving the impression of immobility, repetitiveness, retellings, slow motion 
and gestation (Didier). Enumerations, brackets and digressions, nominal phrases or 
omissions of the subject punctuate the temporal sequencing (Didier; see also Gusdorf, 
Les écritures du moi; Couser, Recovering Bodies; Simonet-Tenant). Discontinuity, 
fragmentation, ruptures disturb the day-to-day rhythm of the diary record. They mark 
the pending uncertainty of the next moment, of the next day, of an indefinite future, 
but also the refusal of a definite end, either of writing or of existence: “The diarist 
evades the idea of death by that of succession” (Simonet-Tenant 112). 
One could say that How Linda Died follows the temporal characteristics of the 
diary if the temporal framing specific for memoirs and autobiographies did not take 
such a precedence over Frank’s daily record. But paradoxically, retelling Linda’s past 
stories, though an effort to re-identify Linda and restore her self’s integrity, deepens 
the provisional, indefinite character of her life-narrative (with destabilizing effects on 
Frank’s narrative too). 
Hence the diary becomes an echoing voice doubling a hypothetical 
remembrance, Linda’s differing in time voice and memory: “At eleven Linda became 
the only stable ‘woman’ in the house, doing the cooking, shopping, keeping an eye on 
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her baby sister. Or so she remembers” (60). The diary functions as a means of 
countering Linda’s suffering as loss of herself and identity, of reconstructing the 
identity figure from the puzzle of her life story as once told by Linda or by her sister 
Susie. Yet any definitive assertion that might conclude about Linda’s identity remains 
questionable, translates into an obsessive incertitude about “who is Linda?” that 
pervades the whole writing and resonates as a multiple voice. In the end, recognizing 
the limits of one’s discourse about the Other amounts to an ethical stance towards the 
Other, to sustaining her integrity. 
Linda’s autobiographical stories and memories, once told in the past are retold 
in the present of the writing as the diarist’s own memory in the first person: what 
Frank remembers of Linda’s remembering and telling. As suggested by James Olney, 
the autobiographical narrator “tells the story of himself telling the story of himself 
telling the story of his life” (Memory and Narrative 8). In Frank Davey’s writing, 
there is a multiple distension of telling, voices and memories where the voice of the I 
tells at least a double story, of the I and the Other. One could be inclined to consider 
that Frank’s voice telling what he remembers of Linda’s stories, settles his own 
memory. However, his voice neither annihilates Linda’s voice and memory, nor 
pretends to subsume them under its own narrating. Reformulating the Augustinian 
stance, I argue that Frank’s voice conveys both his own voice and Linda’s, as the 
present voice of voice past, as the present voice of voice present, as the present 
memory of memory past, where the voice and memory of the I and the Other meet up 
in a textured palimpsest: 
Linda several times told me that the McCartneys believed they had come to 
Scotland from Ireland to help ‘the Bruce.’ That when she was a child she 
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puzzled over who ‘the Bruce’ was.… I remember thinking then of her 
grandfather McCartney, his birth in the Bahamas, his death in Vancouver 
some thirty years before Linda was born. Remember thinking that she’d never 
seen his photograph or known the house or address where he lived. Linda was 
the first child of her father’s second marriage.… she can remember sitting in 
the projection booth with him, watching Gone with the Wind; or sitting in the 
lighting booth while Margot Fonteyn or Violet Elvin helped him light a 
performance of the Royal Ballet.… Special moments, although her little 
sister, Susie, has often told me the family house was a pigsty even then. Their 
chronically unhappy mother didn’t like cooking or housework.… Susie’s said 
… After their dad’s retirement came poverty, which their mother couldn’t or 
wouldn’t attempt to manage. Linda’s mother, Jackie, had grown up in 1920s 
Vancouver as a kind of street kid–or so Linda’s accounts make her seem.… A 
plausible narrative.… Says her mother couldn’t budget … Linda thought her 
mother did this so she’d run out of money and people would feel sorry for her. 
Maybe that’s why Gone with the Wind became Linda’s favorite movie. She 
told me she identified intensely with Scarlett, especially when Scarlett came 
back to Tara, found the house in ruins, her family passive and despairing, and 
took charge, like little Linda, of everyone.… But past grandeur might be 
restored. A young girl could imagine that. You dream, you die a little, but you 
can dream again. As her mom became more needy, Linda became more 
contemptuous. When she was twelve, her mother told her she and her dad 
were separating.… When Linda was fourteen she earned her certificate to 
teach ballet.… And there’s the second big reason Linda wants secrecy. She 
doesn’t want people’s pity. For Linda, pity is in bad taste. She doesn’t want 
people feeling sorry for her, or people like her mother having the power to 
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withhold affection. Doesn’t want her mom to know and be able to pretend to 
be motherly.” (60-61) 
Following closer the narrative of retelling and remembering the Other’s 
autobiographical narrative and memory, one can identify a particular mode of 
remembering that could be well understood if one situates it in the perspective of the 
Augustinian interpretation of time and voice, of memory and recounting memory. For 
my purpose, the Augustinian analysis is particularly significant as it equates terms that 
are fundamental for my own analysis: time, voice, memory, and life-narrative. 
In his understanding of time, Saint Augustine strives to overtake the aporias of 
the definition of time under the common notions of “present,” “past” and “future.” 
The main aporias over which Augustine stumbles concern the “being and non-being 
of time” (Ricœur, Temps et récit 24) and the problem of measuring time. The first 
aporia confronts the ontological difficulty to define the status of “past,” “future,” and 
“present” since “past” would imply that it does not exist anymore, “future” that it does 
not exist yet, and “present” that it cannot be seized since it is reduced to an instant that 
has no extension. From this difficulty the second aporia ensues: how can one measure 
time, if one cannot seize its ontological status? However, as an answer to the first 
aporia and seemingly contradicting his observation about the ontological impossibility 
of present, Augustine situates time in the present: in order to exist, past and future 
have to be present. But as emphasized by Ricœur, Augustine refers to a present “prêt à 
accueillir une multiplicité interne” (Temps et récit 31). It is the present of the soul29 
                                                     
29 Though in the English translation I refer to Henry Chadwick translates anima, -ae with “mind” 
instead of “soul,” I shall use Ricœur’s (Temps et récit) translation of “soul”; see for instance the context 
where Augustine discusses the images imprinted on the soul: “ex memoria proferuntur non res ipsae, 
quae praeterierunt, sed verba concepta ex imaginibus earum, quae in animo velut vestigia per sensus 
praetereundo fixerunt” (Augustini Confessiones). Ricoeur refers to “mind” too when he translates 
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that Augustine considers now, the soul that stores the images that actual events had 
imprinted on the soul–and Augustine reformulates thus his earlier discussion of 
memory as the “storehouse” of the images of perceptions (Augustine 185-186; X, 
viii). In the present of the soul are also located the “premeditations” and expectations 
of future actions that will come to existence only when the effective actions will take 
place: 
… I know that wherever they are, they are not there as future or past, but as 
present. For if there also they are future, they will not yet be there. If there 
also they are past, they are no longer there. Therefore, wherever they are, 
whatever they are, they do not exist except in the present. When a true 
narrative of the past is related, the memory produces not the actual events 
which have passed away, but words conceived from images of them, which 
they fixed in the mind like imprints as they passed through the senses. Thus 
my boyhood, which is no longer, lies in past time which is no longer. But 
when I am recollecting and telling my story, I am looking on its image in 
present time, since it is still in my memory. Whether a similar cause is 
operative in predictions of the future, in the sense that images of realities 
which do not yet exist are presented as already in existence, I confess, my 
God, I do not know. At least I know this much: we frequently think out in 
advance our future actions, and that premeditation is in the present; but the 
action which we premeditate is not yet in being because it lies in the future.” 
(Augustine 233-234; XI, xviii) 
                                                                                                                                                        
“anima” with “esprit,” which, I think, is however partly equivalent with “mind.” My preference for 
“soul” is also motivated by the meaning of “breathing,” “breath” that “anima” signifies, which is closer 
to the equation time-word-voice suggested by Augustine. 
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The three temporal modes appear in his well-known formula of the triple 
modes of the present: 
there are three times, a present of things past, a present of things present, a 
present of things to come.… The present considering the past is memory, the 
present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present 
considering the future is expectation." (Augustine 235; XI, xx) 
For my analysis it is important to note that the present mode is defined as 
“immediate awareness” and further as “attention.” I consider them not just as a one 
dimension of the “triple present” (Ricœur, Temps et récit 34), but, following Levinas’ 
discussion of time, as the breach through which the Other addresses the Same. Here, I 
would suggest, Augustine meets Levinas who defines time in terms of the relation to 
the Other (see my former discussion of Levinas on p. 46). As we shall further see in 
the Augustinian discussion of measuring time, this might appear discordant with the 
intentional activity of attentiveness, the orientation towards future, and of memory. 
However, it is worth noting that Augustine’s comment on the aporias of measuring 
time is mainly based on the example of reciting a known psalm, and he acknowledges 
this at the end of the XIth Book of his Confessions. My reflection will explore the 
consequences of this limit in Augustine’s interpretation, considering both their 
implications at the level of the relation to the Other, and at the level of life-narratives. 
The second aporia Augustine confronts derives from the first one: given the 
ontological status of time what one can measure is only the present. However, we 
have seen that the present has no extension to be measured; one can measure the 
present only as it passes: “how do we measure present time when it has no extension? 
It is measured when it passes, but not when it has passed, because then there will be 
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nothing there to measure” (Augustine 236; XI, xxi). But in this case, to measure time 
means to measure its passage that originates in the future, goes through the present 
and terminates in the past. In the end, Augustin stumbles on a circular aporia: the 
passage of time signifies an extension, “a space of time” (Augustine 240; XI, xxiii) 
that cannot be seized in the present: “I am not measuring the future which does not yet 
exist, nor the present which has no extension, nor the past which is no longer in being. 
What then am I measuring? Time as it passes but not time past?” (240; XI, xxiii). 
Searching a way out of the difficulty, Augustine appeals to the comparison between 
the sounds of two voices: one that starts and ends at a certain point, and the other one 
that flows uninterruptedly. He realizes that one can measure only the voice that came 
to an end, not a continuous sound. Still, once the voice ended, how is it possible to 
measure a voice that does not exist anymore? He concludes: “So the times we 
measure are not future nor past nor present nor those in process of passing away” 
(241; XI, xxvii). The problem becomes more complicated, but at the same time will 
turn into its solution, when he compares the lengths between a short syllable and a 
long one that sound one after another. How could one grasp their lengths since they 
will end, become non-existent, the moment one tries to compare them–and one can 
compare them only as they ended? Augustine argues now that in order to compare 
them, one has to be able to “fix” them in one’s memory, in one’s mind, thus time can 
be measured in mind as “the impression which passing events make upon [mind].… 
present consciousness is what I am measuring, the stream of past events which have 
caused it” (242; XI, xxvii). It is consciousness which orients towards a certain 
duration of the sounds to be uttered, which plans the interval of their duration and 
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keeps this “plan” in memory. The following question Augustine has to answer now 
concerns the way mind realizes the passage from the future, through the present, into 
the past. He argues that the passage of time depends on the active, “present attention” 
of mind which “transfers the future” (243; XI, xxvii-xviii), through the present, into 
the past. It is the notion of distentio animi that defines the three processes of the 
present mind which de-multiplies the present into the present of things future, the 
present of things present and the present of things past, and realizes the transfer, 
extension from one time to the other. Namely, mind is the “active agent” (243; XI, 
xviii) that is tensed between the expectation of future, the attention towards the 
present and the storing memory and thus accomplishes the passage, extension of time, 
and at the same time maintains the passage “present”: 
For the mind expects and attends and remembers, so that what it expects 
passes through what has its attention to what it remembers. Who therefore can 
deny that the future does not yet exist? Yet already on the mind there is an 
expectation of the future. Who can deny that the past does not now exist? Yet 
there is still in the mind a memory of the past. None can deny that present 
time lacks any extension because it passes in a flash. Yet attention is 
continuous, and it is through this that what will be present progresses towards 
being absent. So the future, which does not exist, is not a long period of time. 
A long future is a long expectation of the future. And the past, which has no 
existence, is not a long period of time. A long past is a long memory of the 
past!” (243; XI, xxviii) 
As emphasized by Ricœur, there is a continuous play between passivity, 
affectio, understood as “impressions”–“images” of the past and “signs” of the future–
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imprinted on the soul, and the active aspect of attention through which the “present 
intention” effectively accomplishes the transfer from the future into the past (Temps et 
récit). The contrast appears with acuity in the present which conflates the present 
instant lacking extension and the continuous attention-intention. The most expressive 
example that Augustine uses to illustrate his reflection is the reciting of a psalm. Here, 
Ricœur interprets, the passive-active play is founded on the definition of expectation, 
attention, and memory as a triple intentional act (not limited to the “present attention”) 
that “interact” (Temps et récit 47). They are “tensed” towards seizing the verses and 
make them pass into memory, and thus distend the passage (cessation) of time as the 
counterbalance between the shrinking of expectation and the extension of memory 
through the present flow.30 As Ricœur observes, “quelque chose demeure (manet) 
dans la mesure même où nous ‘traversons (peragimus) en pensée poème,  vers et 
discours’ ” (47; italics in the original). The passive aspect of affectio as impression on 
the soul constitutes the reverse side of the three discordant intentions: 
Suppose I am about to recite a psalm which I know. Before I begin, my 
expectation is directed towards the whole. But when I have begun, the verses 
from it which I take into the past become the object of my memory. The life 
of this act of mine is stretched two ways into my memory because of the 
words I have already said and into my expectation because of those which I 
am about to say. But my attention is on what is present: by that the future is 
transferred to become the past. As the action advances further and further, the 
shorter the expectation and the longer the memory, until all expectation is 
consumed, the entire action is finished, and it has passed into the memory. 
                                                     
30 “La théorie du triple présent, reformulée en termes de triple intention, fait jaillir la distentio  de 
l’intentio éclatée” (Ricœur, Temps et récit 46).  
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What occurs in the psalm as a whole occurs in is particular pieces and its 
individual syllables. The same is true of a longer action in which perhaps that 
psalm is a part. It is also valid of the entire life of an individual person, where 
all actions are parts of a whole, and of the total history of ‘the sons of men’ 
(Ps. 30: 20) where all human lives are but parts.” (Augustine, 243; XI, xviii) 
In this context the distentio has the meaning of a “breach, non-coincidence of 
the three modalities of action” (Ricœur, Temps et récit 47) that, read from the 
perspective of the whole psalm to be recited, or less, the words, the syllables, or more, 
the whole life of a person, even the human history, is finally integrated into a 
concordant totality.31 
However, as I have already pointed to, Augustine’s main discussion develops 
around what allows him “to plan” expectation, attention and memory and this 
culminates in the example of reciting “a psalm which I know.” He also “selects” 
sequential voices or sounds (one long syllable after a short one, a continuous voice, 
whether terminated or not). And yet, his attention to specify that he refers to a known 
psalm is not gratuitous. Thus, at the end of the XXIth book of the Confessions, one 
encounters with little surprise the lament, and one could say passion, over the disorder 
of the multiple distensions of his life, over the disruption of the times he lives in that 
definitely do not cohere in any worldly concordance: 
my life is a distension in several directions. (243; XI, xxix) 
us the many, who live in a multiplicity of distractions by many things… (244; 
XI, xxix) 
                                                     
31 See also Olney for the ordered circularity in Augustine’s reciting (Memory and Narrative). 
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I am scattered in times whose order I do not understand. The storms of 
incoherent events tear to pieces my thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul, 
until that day when purified and molten by the fire of your love, I flow 
together to merge into you. (244; XI, xxix) 
Augustine cannot escape from the torment of his own soul which eludes any 
comprehensive perspective. In spite of its proximity to itself, the soul cannot grasp its 
own totality. At the end of the book on time he returns to the dilemma on the self’s 
memory to which Augustine pointed in the XXth book on memory: 
I myself cannot grasp the totality of what I am. Is the mind, then, too 
restricted to compass itself, so that we have to ask what is that element of 
itself which it fails to grasp? Surely that cannot be external to itself; it must be 
within the mind. How then can it fail to grasp it? … Amazement grips me.” 
(187; X, viii). 
And how could the self be seized in its totality since it is affected by the 
multiple “distractions,” displacements that it cannot subsume through any intentional 
act? It is important to note here that the self’s dilemma is discussed in the context 
where time–voice–memory–telling the self’s story are the main terms of the equation 
where time is understood on the basis of the voice’s sequence, reciting, the 
storytelling of one’s life-narrative, and attentive consciousness (expectation, attention, 
memory). Turning back to the storytelling subject in Arendt, to the subject as the actor 
and sufferer of a story and to my earlier discussion of one’s life-narrative as an 
indefinite interconnected story with the others’ stories, I would rather suggest that the 
self’s temporal distension, the self’s story is exposed to Others’ temporality and 
stories, to Others’ voice and memory. I would argue that the fundamental discordance 
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that realizes the temporal distension is not the one between intention and distension, 
neither between the modalities of intention, but the breach between the Same and the 
Other, the breach of the Other’s voice in one’s own, which does not allow retrieving a 
temporal concordance.32 At best, it would be a provisional concordance that indeed, 
relies on an intentional act. As I have already shown with Levinas, it is the Other’s 
proximity that instantiates time (see p. 46), the Other with his/her indefinite story, 
with his/her indefinite voice or silences. In front of the Other, attention and 
“immediate awareness” cannot plan the circular retrieval of the future from the past 
(memory); “immediate awareness” is “spontanéité bienveillante,” solicitude the Other 
calls upon. Fundamentally, attention is the response to a call, attention to something 
because already attention to someone exterior to the self and that provokes the tension 
of the self (Levinas, Totalité et infini). Though Ricœur re-equilibrates the Levinasian 
imperative through an act of acknowledgement that recognizes the ethical value of 
taking the initiative to respond to the Other, the answer already implies the Other’s 
proximity, being exposed and vulnerable to his/her otherness (Levinas, Autrement 
qu’être). The Other’s proximity displaces the Same through the immediacy of its 
contact: “l’immédiateté de l’autre, plus immédiate que l’immédiate identité dans sa 
quiétude de nature, l’immédiateté de la proximité” (Levinas, Autrement qu’être 134). 
 “Immediate awareness” situates the self in the immediacy of the Other, creates 
a breach of identity, “disjonction de l’identité” (88), and disrupts the Same’s 
                                                     
32 This claim has no pretence of generalizing the interpretation to the whole domain of illness narratives 
which, in the end, would mean to claim that it is specific to illness narratives. In fact, the present 
argument is based on the autobiographical, first-person text of Confessions. My interest in drawing on 
Saint Augustine and Levinas resides in the relation between time, memory, voice, and intersubjectivity 
that their discussions can display. I consider it is significant to address these relations in the context of a 
disrupted, suffering voice. I understand my analysis not as a reduction to illness narratives, but as a 
possible opening towards the study of other texts focused on the experience of suffering (see trauma 
narratives). 
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synchronicity; it scatters the soul in Augustinian words. Thus, the temporal break-up 
Ricœur mentions when interpreting Augustine, is the effect of the dia-chronic 
difference between the Same and the Other that cannot be subsumed into a common 
present. The immediacy of being exposed to the Other shatters time as dia-chrony 
between the Same and the Other (Levinas, Autrement qu’être). The temporal 
distension signifies dia-chrony. The Augustinian definition of time as the “present of 
things past, [the] present of things present, [the] present of things to come” expresses 
the difficulty to grasp the serial passage of time through the present. The present splits 
itself into a triple modality,33 “passes” as disruption. 
But then, if the temporal distension means the disjunction between the 
temporal modalities, how could voice tell the story of a shattered time if it were not 
itself a shattered voice, distended through its own disruption? How could voice tell the 
story of a “distracted,” displaced self if it were not voicing its own multiplicity? It is 
in this sense that I mentioned the distension modes of voice at the beginning of this 
chapter: the present voice of voice past, the present voice of voice present. Levinas 
defines “Dire” as the “pré-originel” (17) language that bears the responsibility towards 
the Other: “dire, c’est répondre d’autrui” (80). It signifies the response to the Other 
which is incumbent on the self and constitutes subjectivity as the self cannot evade 
responsibility. The self is accountable for the Other in spite of himself/herself and 
significance itself is constituted as the self’s accountability for another. “Dire” is 
opposed to “le dit”: language as a system of signs, as phrasing that thematizes the 
Other. My understanding of voice as distention is predicated on its capacity to express 
                                                     
33 One could say that Augustine announces the derridean impossibility to conceive the “presence of the 
present” (Derrida, Marges de la philosophie 24). 
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“le Dire,” the breached voice that expresses suffering and displaces the Same, the 
voice that conveys the shattering and distention of time through its utterance. In 
uttering an utterance, the voice is doubled by the voicing of its own disruptions which 
paradoxically articulate the distention of voice. Voice conveys thus the discordance 
between its own past and memory, present, and future. At this point I depart from a 
levinasian interpretation. For Levinas, recollecting the past, the remembering effort 
means the attempt to retrieve in a re-presentational, historical order, or diachrony. 
Memory is reconstructed by an intentional act through “le Dit” which summarizes, 
synchronizes the passage of time. In the same way, imagination can anticipate the 
future and render time present, simultaneous. But the in-spite-of-itself responsibility 
that is incumbent on the self does not depend on a free, deliberate act or engagement, 
thus does not situate itself as a tstarting point in an “actual or represented present” 
(87). It is bared as passivity, exceeds representation and has no original, emerging 
point in time that one could recollect. The temporal passivity concerns the self as 
ageing, the lost time that could not be recollected through the synthesis of 
representation. It signifies “la disjonction de l’identité où le même ne rejoint pas le 
même: non-synthèse, lassitude” (88). The irretrievable passage of time is independent 
of any initiative or finality. 
And yet, as we have seen with Frank Davey’s diary, memory, through an 
effort to restore the passage of time, a past present, conveys its own disruptions, or, in 
a more appropriate formula, is conveyed by its own disruptions. Linda’s memory loss 
compels Frank to a remembering act. The breach of memory, of the Other’s memory, 
traces the path for remembering forgetfulness as in Augustine’s puzzle: how can one 
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realize that one is forgetting if one did not recognize, remember forgetting? It is Linda 
and Frank’s drama to realize, and thus remember “the effects of forgetfulness.” 
(Davey 69), the impossibility of “Dire”: 
Most of what Linda has in her life these days is television. When she is 
groping for a word to designate an electrical device, like our kettle or 
microwave or toaster, the only one she can reliably find is ‘VCR.’ For the past 
five years she has been taping programs on the downstairs VCR and taking 
them up to her own VCR in her bedroom to watch at her leisure, fast-
forwarding past commercials.… Now she watches TV through her VCR 
twenty-four hours a day. (76)  
From a Levinasian perspective, designating things would belong to the 
linguistic domain of “le dit,” coded and decoded communication of signs, and 
exchange of information. And yet, I would rather suggest that the effort to remember 
designation, the failure of designation, the remembering of the failure becomes a 
mode of “le Dire,” helplessness, a shattered voice that calls forth the self’s response. 
The voice as “Dire” and memory are indissociable–an obsessive, repetitive memory of 
forgetfulness that pervades the days, and Frank’s writing. The impossibility of 
remembering and remembering this impossibility signifies the “fall” of memory from 
the status of an intentional act–retrieving in a sequential backward movement the 
passage of time–to unfolding silence, the indefinite, extreme overflow of words. As 
Felman suggests, the wound probes deep in the “darkness that language had to go 
through and traverse … that the language had precisely to pass through…” (34; italics 
in the original). Frank’s writing distends the wounded voice and memory, Linda’s and 
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his own, following the passage of language through forgetting, measuring the passing 
time of forgetting: 
Increasingly, she is having difficulty completing sentences again, or 
remembering what she had been going to say when she began the sentence. 
This morning, for instance, she began asking ‘What time…’ and then stopped 
… In some ways it seems like I am losing part of my own memory–she used 
to remember so many things for me. I once joked to George that she was a 
kind of McLuhanesque extension of my nervous system–helping me sort out 
books I was writing, reminding me of my mother’s birthday, remembering 
that I was planning to propose a paper to a conference in Paris.… Now I am 
pleased if she remembers her own pills.” (107-108) 
As Linda’s voice fractures and memory gets obscure, the diary turns into the 
extension of forgetting, unravelling simultaneously in a double temporal sense the 
memorial past and future–the uncertain certitude. Voicing the present illness, the 
incompleteness of words and sentences means at the same time the distension of the 
present into the past and the future: the gulf of memory in which both Linda and 
Frank are entangled and lost, and the consumption of future, as an effect of the 
passing voicing itself and of reading the diary towards its end. If one were to consider 
the role women played in tracking the family story, and women’s memory work for 
the husband, Linda’s loss also signifies the vanishing of the couple’s memory, an 
abyss that eventually absorbs Frank’s individual memory. Moreover, from the title, 
the diary already imposes a double reading. As the writing progresses, it unfolds in the 
future, approaching the announced death of Linda that orients the reading through a 
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perfect future perspective.34 But at the same time, the diary was written quasi-
simultaneously with the illness development, thus it displays the temporal disruption 
of futurity that the very illness experience imposes. Time is conjectured from the 
anterior future of the progress of illness; it is “subjunctivized” under the constraint of 
the day-to-day indeterminacy. 
At the textual interface of the diary language is seized in its whole capacity to 
relate to otherness, where the conceptual content, “le dit” in Levinas’ terms, is 
transcended, and transfigured into an expressive address that elicits the ethical 
response, le “dire,” “talked” beyond the limits of a comprehensive understanding: 
“Maybe the word for her now is ‘chtonic,’ or ‘enigmatic.’ Maybe she’s become more 
muselike, more inscrutable, more Delphic, as in oracular. Maybe her condition only 
illustrates how painful it would be to be an oracle” (276). Voice does not unveil itself 
at a textual surface; the text does not “territorialize” Linda’s voice. Voice expresses its 
difference, incompleteness, uncertainty through interfering with other voices. The 
textual interface is produced through the voices’ interference, otherness and 
occultation. The very effort to restore voice and memory emerges in the breaches of 
voice. The text is not the space of adjustments between the Same and the Other, but 
the displaced moment of their tension and attention, “déphasage,” “immediate 
awareness” of an embodied shattered voice. Here, the expressivity of voice signifies 
the exposing of embodied discourse where the suffering voice coincides with the 
painful mode of the body: “Today at breakfast Linda is very weak and shaky. Her 
right hand trembles as she sips her coffee, as she counts out eight milk of magnesia 
                                                     
34 Couser discussed the similar case of the reading experience of a diary where the reader knows about 
the death of the author (Recovering Bodies). 
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pills” (107). Voice does not represent the painful body, but exposes it. The body talks; 
not through “word-presentations … residues of memory” that might be retrieved at the 
level of a conscious “surface” (Freud 20, 19), but through carving out its own 
vulnerability–the talk of vulnerability. 
Thus, insofar as life-narratives are concerned, one could not consider text as an 
autonomous production. It emerges as the “in-between” face, face between the self 
and the Other, between voices, interface between the temporal distensions of voice. 
Text inflects through the tension of voice, and it cannot be dissociated from voice. It 
does not re-present voice because it is riveted to voice and its disruptions. If voice 
rushes into the abyss of remembering forgetting, text follows this movement as the 
present of voice present, the present of voice past, the present of voice future. 
There are two main observations that one could make at this point. First, How 
Linda Died blurs the genre definition of diary. From an ethical perspective it de-
centers a soliloquial I–oriented discourse. The diary is sprinkled with biographical 
notes about Linda. If they are Linda’s “as told to” autobiographical fragments, one 
could say that the diary becomes the medium of a second-degree autobiography. 
However, Frank’s writing runs across narrative levels, or better, voicing the suffering 
memory, voicing the disruptions of voice runs across the narrative through expressive 
embodied talk that irrupts writing, that constitutes the tension of writing. Thus, it is 
difficult to maintain narrative levels, “planes” or degrees. On the contrary, interpreting 
voice through narrative levels would hinder reading the dynamics of the text, the 
intonation of its tension points. 
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Second, the very ethical stance that governs the writing of the diary articulates 
the memorial work of Frank Davey, the restoration of a memory and the expressivity 
of a presence, of a menaced life and self, the testimony to its fragility and mystery. As 
put by Shoshana Felman, “A ‘life-testimony’ is not simply a testimony to a private 
life, but a point of conflation between text and life, a textual testimony which can 
penetrate us like an actual life (14); “speech as such is unwittingly testimonial; and … 
the speaking subject constantly bears witness to a truth that nonetheless continues to 
escape him, a truth that is essentially, not available to its own speaker” (Felman 24). 
The narrator is called to speak, voluntarily or involuntarily, consciously or 
unwittingly, not only for himself, for his own experience, but “for others and to 
others” (Felman 15). Thus Frank is compelled to write for Linda, to witness her 
illness, an overwhelming event for both Frank and Linda that cannot be grasped, 
assimilated through a cohesive, conclusive account. 
 Davey’s writing, through its very restitutional character, does not pretend to a 
re-configuring power, which would be equivalent to assuming from his own 
perspective Linda’s life–something that would be a countersense to his narrative 
position. The truth of his narrative witnessing consists in manifesting the latent 
narrative essence of an embodied suffering proximity, not in the stated, truth assertion. 
The testimonial narrative has to be understood as “truth’s realization” (Felman 24). 
And truth is realized in Frank Davey’s diary as the voice’s distension that responds to 
the Other’s call.  
CHAPTER 6 
 
REMEMBERING FORGETTING 
 
John Bayley, Iris: A Memoir of Iris Murdoch and  
Iris and her Friends: A Memoir of Memory and Desire 
 
 
1. Memoir as genre 
 
In the field of life-narratives scholars have usually distinguished between first-
person illness narratives and illness memoirs, “third-person illness accounts” written 
by close others that take care of the suffering person, though they have also 
recognized their intersection with confessional first-person modes (Wiltshire, 
“Biography, Pathography”; Diaz). In studies that specifically approached memoirs, 
one included them in the category of “écrits consacrés à l’effectif” (Jeannelle, Écrire 
ses Mémoires 280), writings with a referential trait. As their authors strongly claim 
responsibility for their writing, Jean-Louis Jeannelle suggested that the category of 
“narrator” be reserved exclusively to the domain of fictional texts (“L’acheminement 
vers le reel”). He considered that the “uttering instance” (“instance énonciatrice,” 
“L’acheminement vers le reel” 289) was more pertinent for memoirs as they are 
anchored in the “interdiscursivity” of multiple social discourses (292) and in the 
historical condition of their authors (see also Jeannelle, Écrire ses Mémoires). 
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Nevertheless, John Bayley’s texts, Iris: A Memoir of Iris Murdoch and Iris and 
her Friends: A Memoir of Memory and Desire, announce from the beginning the 
intention of crossing genre boundaries. The title, “A Memoir of Iris Murdoch” already 
suggests multiple meanings: the significance of memoir as genre, of memory and the 
remembering process. At the same time, the possessive “of Iris Murdoch” displaces 
the usual emphasis in memoirs on the author’s memories, although the one who 
remembers is the author. Bayley remembers “of” Iris and for Iris. The text bears 
biographical marks, and John Wiltshire regards it as such (“Biography, 
Pathography”). Nonetheless, though biographical notes are dispersed throughout the 
memoir (accounts, landmarks of their relationship and life together), one could not 
define Bayley’s work as a biography. A Memoir of Iris Murdoch is fraught with 
perplexities and assumed limitations of knowledge of important parts in Iris’ life. For 
this same reason, I prefer to maintain the “narrator” category throughout the analysis 
in order to discuss different effects of voicing with respect to the Alzheimer’s disease 
sufferer. Despite the effort to put together, in a coherent whole, the narrative of 
remembrance as a mode of retrieving Iris’ lost remembering self, the inscription of the 
narratorial voice in the present and the presence of Iris’ illness bears the traces of 
forgetting in the form of uncertainties, ambiguities, gaps. 
In the same vein, the second memoir written by John Bayley follows the final 
stage of Iris’ illness, until her death. Illness seems to enter a new phase, which 
corresponds with a “de-facement” (de Man) of Iris. As illness progresses Iris seems to 
lose any communicational means, becomes more and more restless, anxious, refusing 
to be fed, departing suddenly from home, piling up clothes, disappearing, wandering 
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like a ghost around the house and uttering meaningless words. Writing this memoir is 
thus both a witnessing of Iris’ slow, though sometimes aggressive, stubborn de-
facement, and an escape for John as the memoir alternates records of Iris’ disturbance 
with his own large autobiographical recalls that no longer refer to the common past of 
Iris and John, as in the first memoir. 
 
2. The traces of memory and forgetting 
 
Wiltshire reads Bayley’s texts as a blurring, transgressing, and transmuting the 
distinctions between the self and the other (“Biography, Pathography”). He pays 
attention especially to Bayley’s second work about Iris’s illness, Iris and Her Friends: 
A Memoir of Memory and Desire emphasizing the author’s psychology as caregiver 
and the expansion of his own autobiographical memory while Iris’s illness entered the 
last, most destructive phase. Wiltshire interprets the affective response and coping 
modes of the narrator (writing, remembering his own past, fantasizing), as the 
introjection of Iris’ pain, anxiety and their remodelling, conversion into a coherent 
content that can be communicated to the sufferer and rendered bearable: “The 
pathography takes up the disturbing and meaning-denying aspects of illness 
experience and attempts to make them into something that can be thought” 
(“Biography, Pathography” 418). He follows the model of infant-mother and 
analysand-analyst relation in psychoanalysis. 
However, I suggest that this interpretation is problematic since the 
communication of a coherent, interpretable content is blocked for an Alzheimer’s 
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disease sufferer. As recognized in fact by Wiltshire himself when he discusses the 
compensatory strategies developed by the narrator: “his self-fuelling activity is not 
replenished by any hope of amendment in the patient” (421). At the same time, he is 
still caught in a dual mode of thinking when he distinguishes between pain and 
suffering not only in a radical way, but also in an unethical one: “Iris feels the pain but 
does not suffer it; Bayley discovers it, for Iris” (422). His affirmation is questionable 
if we consider that in the first stages of illness, one of the most disturbing lived 
experiences of the Alzheimer’s sufferer is the loss of self: “the loss of self happens 
before the very eyes of the person whose self is vanishing.” (Ronch 24). To claim that 
an Alzheimer’s patient does not suffer pain would mean to reduce pain to its physical 
aspects and limit the experience of suffering to its conscious contents.35 
Thus, in so far as Bayley’s first memoir is concerned, intersubjectivity lies 
somewhere else, maybe in the very asymmetry between Iris and John, which, at least 
in the economy of the text, was, since John has met Iris, the very paradigm of their 
relation. He calls it “sympathy in apartness” (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 39), “apartness” 
meaning separateness, solitude, distance, difference, inability to grasp the Other, the 
remains of incomprehensibility that cannot be elucidated. 
This sympathy for what was or might be going on in Iris’s mind, together 
with my inability to understand or enter into it, must have developed quite 
early on.… Already we were beginning that strange and beneficent process in 
marriage by which a couple can, in the words of A.D. Hope the Australian 
poet, ‘move closer and closer apart.’ The apartness is a part of the closeness, 
                                                     
35 Wiltshire’s affirmation is not a far cry from the common sense discourse which states that infants do 
not suffer physical pain, as if physical pain would have no effect on the later psychological 
development of the child. 
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perhaps a recognition of it: a pledge of complete understanding.… The more I 
got to ‘know’ Iris, in the normal sense, during the early days of our 
relationship, the less I understood her. Indeed I soon began not to want to 
understand her. (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 38-39) 
Hence, against Wiltshire’s understanding of intersubjectivity as the taming of 
incomprehensibility, of anxiety, of pain in a meaningful totality that “can be thought” 
and re-assumed by the sufferer, the oxymoron “sympathy in apartness” discloses the 
faults of one’s interpretation of the Other as the very basis of relating to the Other. 
Bayley’s writing is not an attempt at solving the puzzle of the Other. It sets free both 
her distinction, the unique Iris, as “Iris was Iris” (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 42), and her 
indeterminable past, present and future traits that threaten and are threatened by 
disappearance. 
I consider “sympathy in apartness” as one of the emblematic metaphors of the 
memoir as it allows the journey between “then” and “now” announced in the division 
of chapters but that pervades the entire text. It condensates, and beautifully expresses 
both the condition for the ethical relation to the Other in Levinas’ terms (Totalité et 
infini), namely the separateness, the difference of interiorities, and the transcendent 
movement towards the infinite Other. One could say that the outbreak of Iris’ illness, 
her suffering and vulnerability, radicalizes the difference and at the same time deepens 
the closeness. 
From the first chapters of the memoir, Iris takes the faces of a protean, elusive, 
“escapist” (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 40) hero: the loved maiden in fairytales who can 
disappear any time into an unknown place, comes back, but will definitively vanish 
after a fatal mistake of her lover. Past uncertainties about Iris’ “sameness” and 
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“reality,” about her “visits” to her friends, ambiguities about her feelings fuel a 
dubitative discourse that opens onto alternative possibilities that, however, are never 
named, only hinted at. In this context, narrating ambiguity and uncertainties signifies 
letting free, skirting the Other’s alternative being, as it appears in the parallel between 
the fairy-tale maiden and the present memory (“I can now feel that I was giving 
Iris….”) of their relation: 
The happy child-like girl or woman she had now turned into when she was 
with me was delightful, but also … fundamentally unreal, like the girl in the 
fairy story. This could not be the real Iris. But with the hindsight that also saw 
a parallel with the fairy story I can now feel that I was giving Iris without 
knowing it the alternative being that she required: the irresponsible, even 
escapist persona … which she had no idea that she wanted or needed. Neither 
did I have any idea that I was supplying it. I felt I was in love. Indeed I was 
sure of it; and I was innocently sure, too, that it must be the most important 
thing for both of us, although Iris never gave any indication that she thought 
so too. The Iris with whom I talked nonsense and gambolled about … was 
delightful; and yet I could not but feel that she was not the same woman I had 
first seen and marked out; nor was she the ‘real’ Iris Murdoch, the serious 
hard-working responsible being observed and admired by other people. 
(Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 40) 
 Iris’s “present” illness carves even further the narrative of indeterminacy: “I 
never asked Iris how I had come to be included in that party … Now, of course, it is 
too late” (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 41). It is in the very faults of the broken voice of 
forgetting, Iris’ stumbled, repetitive voice that the narrator’s own voice of 
remembering arises, hypothesizing about the existence of a possible principle of 
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identification that survives Alzheimer’s devastation: “And yet I think she would 
recognize Maurice Charlton or other friends.… Memory may have wholly lost its 
mind function, but it retains some hidden principle of identification, even after the 
Alzheimer’s has long taken hold” (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 41). The narrator seems to 
look for Iris’ affective memory traces that, as suggested by Ricœur’s essay (La 
Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli), are not to be confounded with the cortical traces. From 
this point of view recognition is the fundamental link between a first psychic 
impression and its retrieval from its oblivious persistence, latency in our spirit. 
Recognition thus renders present an absence, a disappearance that however remains 
anchored in the past that has been. Bayley’s text emerges in the very process of Iris’ 
forgetting as the textual interface between Iris’ forgetting and his remembering, 
echoing a tacit question that one feels compelled to ask in front of the loss provoked 
by Alzheimer’s disease: is identity, “is a ‘self” possible when the ability to construct 
narrative is broken?” (Basting 88), when loss of memory seems to equate “loss of 
self.” As demonstrated by Gunnthórunn Gudmundsdottir in the case of 
autobiographies, writing one’s memories might reside to a certain extent in the very 
loss of memory: “Not only can forgetting influence the whole structure of the text, it 
can also be the very reason for starting to write, as an attempt to retrieve what has 
been lost” (35). Even more, I would argue that memory retraces the process of 
forgetting, that memory is a distension of forgetting. Ricœur talks about the 
fundamental form of forgetting, the unconscious, latent state where the traces of 
virtual memories of already-happened affective impressions remain available for 
recognition: “le noyau de la mémoire profonde consiste en une masse de marques 
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désignant ce que d’une manière ou d’une autre nous avons vu, entendu, senti, appris, 
acquis” (La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli 571). Thus forgetting is not only what memory 
strives to counter–if one considers it under its “erasing,” destructive trait–, but also 
what preserves traces throughout time (“duration” in Henri Bergson’s terms and used 
by Ricœur) so that one can perform the retrieving effort of remembering. 
Still, between the two poles of fundamental forgetting and forgetting as 
erasing, Bayley’s notes another mode of forgetting, particular to Iris. Forgetting as 
effacement seems to characterize Alzheimer’s sufferers, and it affects Iris too. Thus, 
the narrator, even if reluctantly, compares Iris with other patients. Though refusing to 
see Iris through the lenses of a common social metaphor for Alzheimer’s patients 
(“the corpse”), and refusing to see himself as “chained” to that corpse, he is haunted 
by this image. He also acknowledges the effects of the disease upon Iris as a patient 
among others:  
We had known our partners as equals over many years, told and listened and 
communed together, until communication had dwindled and faltered and all 
but ceased. No more letters, no more words. An Alzheimer’s sufferer begins 
many sentences, usually with an anxious repetitive query, but they remain 
unfinished, the want unexpressed, usually it is predictable and easily 
satisfied…. (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 43)  
 However, immediately, the narrator evokes a peculiar trait of Iris that, I would 
suggest, points to a different forgetting: 
 …usually it is predictable and easily satisfied, but Iris produces every day 
many such queries, involving ‘you know, that person,’ or simply ‘that,’ which 
take time and effort to unravel. Often they remain totally enigmatic, related to 
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some unidentifiable man or woman in the past who has swum up to the 
surface of her mind as if encountered yesterday. At such times I feel my own 
mind and memory faltering, as if required to perform a function too far 
outside their own beet and practice. (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 43) 
Wouldn’t the persistent, repetitive query, the undetermined, enigmatic 
questions voice the trace of forgetting? The trace not of effaced memory, but of 
blocked remembering, of the displaced or derailed memory; not a complete 
disappearance or erasing, but the agent of displacement. The trace of forgetting carves 
hence different paths, different imprints in the past to be unravelled in the future, and, 
if one were to take Plato’s metaphor in Theaitetos, to which no sensation would 
correspond.36 Still, the trace of forgetting is as demanding as the effort of 
remembering memory’s traces, the work of anamnēsis as defined by Aristotle (qtd. in 
Ricœur, La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli), the active quest for memories: “la capacité de 
parcourir, de remonter le temps” (116). The forgetting voice, “take[s] time and effort 
to unravel.” And both memory and forgetting unfold in a double orientation towards 
past and future (see Ricœur’s analysis of Augustinian memory: Temps et récit; La 
Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli).  
The Augustinian paradox of forgetfulness will support my argument for the 
definition of forgetting as an “agent of displacement.” At the same time, Augustine’s 
interpretation of time through its correlation to voice (see my former analysis in 
chapter 5) and my own discussion of the distension of voice will sustain my view on 
voice as the trace of forgetting. 
                                                     
36 Interpreting Plato’s metaphor, Ricœur equates forgetting and the memory’s mistakes as either an 
effacement or a non-correspondence between the marks left by the initial act of imprinting onto the wax 
block contained by the soul and the present sensation (La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli). 
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In Book X of his Confessions, after having developed the problem of memory 
as recognition, Augustine stumbles across the problem of forgetfulness. Since, when 
talking about forgetfulness one has to recognize the significance of the word as 
forgetfulness, and since recognition means to remember, Augustine is confronted with 
the aporia of remembering forgetfulness, and thus remembering loss of memory: “But 
when I remember forgetfulness, both memory and forgetfulness are present–memory 
by means of which I could remember, forgetfulness which I did remember. But what 
is forgetfulness other than loss of memory?” (193; X, xvi). The paradox of 
forgetfulness announces in a certain way the later difficulties in Book XI where 
Augustine has to solve the problem of time, of the present which does not have any 
extension. Thus, he asks, how can forgetfulness be present since its presence would 
mean precisely not to remember? Nonetheless, forgetting is not considered as an 
absence, as a void, but a qualitative lack of a power, which disturbs consciousness and 
puzzles with the necessary recall of this lack: 
How then is it present for me to remember when, if it is present, I have no 
power of remembering. What we remember, we retain by memory. But unless 
we could recall forgetfulness, we could never hear the word and recognize the 
thing, which the word signifies. Therefore memory retains forgetfulness. So, 
it is there lest we forget what, when present, makes us forget.” (193; X, xvi) 
To solve the difficulty Augustine suggests in a first moment that, since it is the 
I who remembers, recalling forgetfulness would not be situated in the I’s memory or 
that the sense of forgetfulness is to counter forgetting (not to forget), solutions that he 
rejects as absurd. He points towards the solution of remembering the images of 
forgetting imprinted on the memory, instead of the presence of forgetfulness. But the 
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argument fails since, in order to inscribe its images on memory, forgetfulness should 
have been present and the argument is lost in a u-turn to the impossibility of retaining 
forgetfulness since “by its very presence, forgetfulness deletes whatever it finds 
already there ... and ... forgetfulness destroys what we remember” (194; X, xvi). The 
only solution Augustine can offer is finally the distinction between the complete 
forgetfulness, which does not allow one to remember, and the partial forgetfulness 
that leaves one the possibility to remember at least the meaning of forgetfulness. 
And yet, following the idea of forgetfulness as a qualitative lack of power, I 
would argue that it would be possible to understand the paradox of remembering 
forgetfulness. For this, I suggest that forgetfulness parallels the passivity of suffering 
as defined by Levinas (“Une éthique de la souffrance”) and that what one remembers 
is the suffering of forgetfulness. I understand forgetfulness as suffering, which 
through its very passivity tears apart consciousness as an “agent of displacement.” 
Forgetfulness carves in the present the recognizable traces of its displacements, not to 
be found where one thinks they are. 
In Levinas’s interpretation, suffering is a qualitative, adversative mode of 
disrupting and opposing consciousness and cannot be assimilated through knowledge 
and interpretation: 
c’est un malgré-la-conscience.… apparaît comme un trou permanent dans le 
vécu; elle se refuse au vécu; la douleur est en quelque sorte la modalité de ce 
refus. Ce vécu est vécu comme adverbe, comme un comment du vécu, c’est 
en quelque sorte une interrogation permanente et sans réponse posée sur le 
vécu. (Levinas, “Une éthique de la souffrance” 127) 
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Suffering expresses itself as negativity through its very refusal to be contained 
by the acts of consciousness. It is the suffered unbearable that consciousness cannot 
bear, cannot comprehend, the disordering, dismantling passivity. Nonetheless, I would 
argue that it is through its very negative passivity and refusal that suffering turns into 
the agent of disruption and displacement; it becomes trial, ordeal, enduring as Levinas 
himself comments: “Ce mal qu’est la souffrance est manifestement une épreuve” 
(“Une éthique de la souffrance”132). In the same way, forgetfulness refuses itself to 
be contained by remembering. Through its very effort, remembering is subjected to 
forgetfulness that transforms itself into refusal, adversity–an unbearable passivity that 
displaces, rips memory. It is in this sense that one can understand the Augustinian 
paradox. Forgetting is remembered as the suffered dismantling of memory that traces 
labyrinthine lost paths and discordances. 
This is Iris’ suffering, Iris’ repetitive query about the time of forgetfulness that 
has to be unravelled following displaced paths, a wandering quest, questions without 
answers: “What is left is the terrible expectancy. ‘When?’ and ‘I want...’ is she still 
saying inside herself, like the blind man in Faulkner’s novel, ‘When are they going to 
let me out?’ Escape. The word hovers, though she never utters it” (Bayley, Iris: A 
Memoir 172). “Iris’s ‘Well’ relapses into something about ‘when he comes’ and ‘Must 
for other person do it now.’ ‘Dropping good to borrow when…’ ” (175). Iris’ voice 
expresses the suffering of forgetfulness, the dissonance, the distension between a 
present query, the indefinite waiting for an answer and the refusal of the answer. It 
conveys at the same time forgetting and the memory of its suffering. The 
indeterminate “expectancy” does not “plan” the time to be unfolded. “Expectancy”–in 
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Augustinian terms it signifies the orientation toward the future–means here being 
exposed to the lack of any project, being suspended between a continuously elusive 
past and the impossibility of its reframing through the present telling. Eventually, 
voicing pronounces its own silences, “the extreme of words” that can multiply 
indefinitely and thus annihilate each other, beginning phrases and abandoning them: 
being staggered, mute before the words without borders, before one word.… To tell 
the word … which one? In Iris’ own words, the metaphor for forgetfulness is a “ 
‘sailing into the darkness’ ” (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 179), and John understands it as 
the “terrible lucidity about what is going on” (179) that disconcerts one with the 
abrupt fracture of its very consciousness: “But can one be lucid in such a way without 
possessing the consciousness that can produce such language? And if consciousness 
can go on producing such words, why not many more, equally lucid?” (179). The 
paradox of remembering forgetfulness is doubled thus by the paradox of tracing 
indiscernible paths of suffering, “the terrible lucidity” that one does not know where 
one is going and which imposes itself on the consciousness as its own pathos–the 
impossibility to escape navigating into nowhere. In Augustine’s terms, “memory is 
present to itself through itself” (192; X, xv), and forgetfulness puzzles with its 
“pretense” to being present. Iris’ suffering points to very paradox of forgetfulness 
since her consciousness is subjected to the distension of memory that is present 
through its forgetting. 
With Augustine, memory, and time have become the fundamental dimensions 
of interiority. However, as argued in the chapter that formulated the problem of the 
research, the Levinasian interpretation of our relation to the future transgresses the 
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limits of interiority towards intersubjectivity. Thus, memory, doubly oriented towards 
past and future, already comprises an orientation towards otherness; not only towards 
otherness as absence (as in Aristotle’s definition of the design as both copy, eikōn, 
referring to an absent model of the design, and the design as object, support itself), but 
to the Other as a different interiority–with her own absences... In the same chapter 
(pp. 32-33) I have also pointed towards the social and cultural construction of 
memory; Ricœur uses the term mondaneité (La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli 44) to open 
the meaning of memory towards the horizon of the world where one had experienced 
the initial psychic impressions of our memories. Founding the idea of the traces 
retrieved in the future by remembering on Levinas’ perspective, on the transcending 
towards otherness as the other, offers however the basis for understanding 
intersubjectivity in the context of caring for the Alzheimer’s sufferer. Namely, the 
traces of forgetting, their differing, deviating paths affect not only the sufferer, but the 
care-giver too. One could say that Bayley’s own discourse, “… at such times I feel my 
own mind and memory faltering, as if required to perform a function too far outside 
their own beet and practice” (Iris: A Memoir 43), at the same time voices Iris’ 
forgetting traces, and performs the insertion of his own remembering effort in the 
forgetting traces voiced by Iris’ unfinished discourse: as a continuing remembering 
effort in an undetermined future, as the un-correspondent quest to an unrecognized 
image? … Both alternatives point to the “closer apart” oxymoron, to its implied 
asymmetry. 
Retrieving the traces of the Other’s forgetting and memory, means in the case 
of Alzheimer’s, retrieving suffering, vulnerability, remembering in any case 
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forgetfulness–as in the Augustinian paradox of acknowledging–, remembering that 
one is forgetting, remembering the fatal “closer apart.” I would suggest that the whole 
memoir performs the paradox of remembering Iris’ forgetting, of retracing forgetting, 
a paradox that is experienced in a painful way by John: he “sees,” as in front of his 
eyes that Iris is losing her memory (a very common experience for many Alzheimer’s 
sufferers themselves who forget and realize that they are forgetting). The structure of 
memory and forgetting that I identified following Augustine and Levinas’ ethics also 
allows understanding the bounds of vulnerability between the sufferer and the caring 
other, the caregiver’s traces of suffering in his effort to respond to a broken voice: “no 
tears, none of those broken sentences whose only meaning is the dread in her voice 
and the demand for reassurance” (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 189). 
As shown by medical scholars, one of the main side effects in Alzheimer’s 
disease is the deterioration of the defence system individuals normally use to reduce 
anxiety (Ronch). But “unmeaningness,” chaos, incoherence, are conditions faced 
(though with differences) both by the caregiver and by the sufferer (Wiltshire, 
“Biography, Pathography”): 
Once, if there had been little river traffic about, we would have swum at once 
the hundred yards or so across the river and back. Now it is too much trouble, 
and a possible producer of that endless omnipresent anxiety of Alzheimer’s, 
which spreads to the one who looks after the sufferer. Not that it would be 
dangerous; Iris still swims as naturally as a fish.… It was being in the water 
she loved. Twice she came quite close to drowning. I thought of that, with the 
anxiety that had now invaded both our lives, as we approached the bank 
again, to scramble out.… I pulled myself out first and turned to help Iris. As 
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she took my hands her face contracted into that look of child-like dread which 
so often came over it now, filling me too with worry and fear.” (Bayley, Iris: 
A Memoir 34-35) 
Facing the decline of the short-term memory, Alzheimer’s disease sufferers 
tend to compensate the impossible remembering with past memories, which become 
“the reference point for orientation to time, place and person. The past, in essence, is 
where the person with AD finds him or herself” (Ronch 26). If one refers to the 
struggle to retrieve long-term memory, the text rarely records in a direct speech Iris’ 
own remembering discourse. It is constituted more as the reported repository, the 
lasting hindsight of the narrator that can perceive the difference between “once” and 
the forgetting “now,” retrieving the past as the confirmation of who one was, and 
hence confirming who one is (Basting). Nonetheless, through the very act of 
remembering, it traces forgetting. John’s efforts lie in identifying landmarks of the 
common past between Iris and him, like bathing in the river. But the former common 
pleasure (“once”) and its remembering is interrupted by the “now” incapacities. In the 
case of the Alzheimer’s disease, one of the most baffling effects on the sufferer’s 
embodiment is the gap between an apparently normal physical state of the affected 
person, and the distorted meaning-making activity that contradicts the self’s portrait 
(Wilthsire, “Biography, Pathography”). Personal style, behavioral patterns, language 
vanish with the vanishing memory and with cognitive impairment (Ronch). Hence, the 
disruption of embodiment does not lie in a diseased body, in its abjection, and 
pollutedness, as in the case of cancer sufferers (Waskul and van der Riet), but in its 
incomprehensive, disturbed intentionality as “being in the world” in the terms of M. 
Merleau-Ponty (Phénoménologie de la perception). It is the whole embodied 
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condition of the individual that is affected by memory loss, as the domain of memory 
comprises the entire spectrum of “savoir faire” (see Ricœur’s analysis of Bergson’s 
habitual memory in La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli): 
… once we would have got our clothes off as soon as possible and slid 
silently into the water, as we had done on that first occasion. Now I had quite 
a struggle getting Iris’s clothes off.… Her instinct nowadays seems to be to 
take her clothes off as little as possible.… She protested, gently though 
vigorously, as I levered off the outer layers. In her shabby old one-piece 
swimsuit … she was an awkward and anxious figure, her socks trailing round 
her ankles. She was obstinate about not taking these off, and I gave up the 
struggle.” (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 33-34) 
Loss of the remembering of “that first occasion,” a landmark of the relation 
between Iris and John, loss of self means loss of significance and translates in 
disoriented, grotesque gestures that, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, do not inhabit the 
world anymore. However, in spite of its grotesqueness, the demented body-self is able 
to preserve its negotiating power and hence, its dignity, which cannot be understood 
as meaning-making, but as expressiveness: “she protested, gently, though vigorously.” 
Recording suffering allows hence recording and witnessing Iris’ uniqueness, 
her preserved, continuous dignity and character, her self, beyond the lost 
remembering, and hence beyond her impossibility to constitute her own self-narrative: 
Alzheimer sufferers are not always gentle: I know that. But Iris remains her 
old self in many ways. The power of concentration has gone, along with the 
ability to form coherent sentences, and to remember where she is, or has been. 
She does not know she has written twenty-seven remarkable novels, as well as 
her books on philosophy; received honorary doctorates from  major 
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universities; become a Dame of the British Empire … She is always anxious 
to oblige. And the old gentleness remains.” (34) 
But it is a risky play to hover between dignifying the memory of things 
disappeared and recording the trace of their disappearance. The difference between 
the “once” reader of ancient Greek and the “now” demented Iris performs the 
effective reminder of suffering loss. The effort of recognition, supposed by the 
remembering process becomes a painful going back following partial or interrupted 
traces as the temporal duration of latent memory has been severely affected. In his 
own efforts to restore the figure of Iris as passionate reader or as author, Bayley takes 
the role of her reader, reading aloud from her favourite books, but he realizes the 
irrelevance of the mere struggle to record clusters of words instead of reconstructing 
fictional worlds: “But the relation of such recognition to true memory is clearly a 
painful one. Tolkien and Lady Murasaki had been inhabitants of her mind … to meet 
them again in this way and awkwardly to recognize them, was an embarrassment” 
(50). Reading aloud is transformed eventually into a reminder of the loss of identity, 
of Iris’ authoring powers. Iris cannot construct fictional worlds and thus cannot author 
herself anymore. Apparently, this would imply that Bayley’s memoir is the medium 
through which he becomes the author of Iris’ life, the fulfillment of an unconscious 
wish that empowers the marginal academic husband at the expense of the world-
renowned writer. However, Iris’ affliction though affecting her recognizing capacities, 
still kept the capacity of intimation into a fictional world that she could create together 
with John (like the insertion of their own jokes in the margins of a text that John was 
reading). The fragment counterpoints the remembered moment when Iris and John 
enacted the author–reader–author play of roles. After reading a part of her novel The 
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Bell, John was caught in its character’s intimation and expressed his desire to find out 
more about the character. Iris asked him to write a fragment about the character. As 
long as the remembering recognition is not implied, performed communication 
through jokes seems to find a way between Iris and John: 
A burst of laughter, snatches of doggerel, song, teasing nonsense rituals one 
lovingly exchanged, awake an abruptly happy response, and a sudden 
beaming smile that must resemble those moments in the past between 
explorers and savages, when some sort of clowning pantomime on the part of 
the former seems often to have evoked instant comprehension and 
amusement. (43) 
But even so, though momentarily rendering possible a simultaneous 
communication, even if a ridiculous one, they deepen the gap between Iris and John, 
their apartness, and also between the “once” and “now” Iris. And such “success” 
moments are rare in the present of the illness, when communication seems to be 
deflected or filtered, obliging to a chasing race after its tracks: 
Our mode of communication seems like underwater sonar, each bouncing 
pulsations off the other, and listening for an echo. The baffling moments at 
which I cannot understand what Iris is saying, or about whom or what–
moments which can produce tears and anxieties, though never … the raging 
frustration typical of many Alzheimer sufferers … Both of us at a loss of 
words. (44) 
The “echo” metaphor is highly suggestive for my understanding of the trace of 
forgetting, as it epitomizes the effort to retrieve the trace of the very disappearing of 
Iris’ remembering. It disconcerts through its significance as vanishing trace, but also 
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as vanishing voicing origin, hence aggravating the meaning of loss of memory. The 
echo does not temporally preserve, as memory does, available memories following the 
initial psychic impressions. Hence no retrieval, no way back towards the past is 
possible. Echo is a one-way ticket towards losing words. In a paradoxical way, only 
the memory of the echo could be retrieved. 
But “echo” also suggests the frailty of the voice threatened with effacement. 
What effacement precisely? One would be tempted to suggest it is the loss of the 
presence to itself that renders vulnerable the voice, given the fact that, as recorded by 
John, Iris did not seem to be conscious of her state. Still, Iris did not appear to be 
affected by the lack of meaning of her utterances, as long as John received the voice 
as a familiar, recognizable voice, and thus recreating and conveying back to Iris, if not 
the sense of a meaning, at least the sense of a certain familiarity to her own voice. 
Apparently, this loved familiarity became the only remaining landmark that Iris could 
perceive, or, maybe, in which she would have essentially been interested in. As 
accounted by Bayley, in fact, the problem of identity puzzled her just because she 
never felt she “possessed” an identity. Hence, one could suggest, Iris’ identity already 
had the consistency of a vanishing trace, of the echo. 
As already mentioned, Iris’ own voice rarely “sounds” in an immediate direct 
discourse. And if it does so, it only reproduces in the present tense her repetitive 
interruptions that are echoing the trace of her despair and suffering in front of an 
oblivious void with no temporal or spatial landmarks. The whole memoir as “memoir” 
is thus mostly tributary to Bayley’s remembering voice, though his own voice and 
memory risk being absorbed by Iris’ sailing into the darkness: 
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…most days are in fact for her a sort of despair, although despair suggests a 
conscious and positive state and this is a vacancy which frightens her by its 
lack of dimension. She mutters ‘I’m a fool’ or ‘Why didn’t I’ or ‘I must…’ 
and I try to seem to explain the trouble while rapidly suggesting we must post 
a letter, walk round the block, go shopping in the car. Something urgent, 
practical, giving the illusion of sense and routine. (44) 
I cannot now imagine Iris any different. Her loss of memory becomes, in a 
sense, my own. (189)  
One of Iris’ constant questions is “ ‘When are we leaving?’ ” (51) and it 
appears repetitively in the second memoir too. Even if the answer to it hardly meant 
anything, the query expresses the desire for journey, one of the most significant 
narrative elements (the heroine’s journey), and also one of the fundamental embodied 
metaphors (“life is a journey”). The question implies Iris’ eagerness to leave for a 
journey. Nobody could assert anything certain about the meaning of the anxious query 
for Iris. However, although unstructured as a configured narrative it expresses a 
spontaneous, uncontrollable desire to enact a journey, an unknown, risky journey, 
hence, to perform a narrative. One can only suggest that, in a certain form Iris, 
preserved what Cavarerro called “the narratable self”; the spontaneous act of telling 
one’s story corresponds to the experience of the journey of life, unpredictable, fraught 
with danger. But I argue that in Iris’ case, “the narratable self” does not depend on its 
temporal constitution, but on the time it constitutes: the disappearing time of her 
forgetting in the story of her memory, translated in the text of the diary as her anxiety 
to leave. As I showed following Arendt, Mattingly (“The Concept”), and Jackson 
(“The Rashomon Approach”), narratives are rooted in the experience of suffering. 
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Initiating an action means a self-presentation through speech as the actor and sufferer 
of one’s own story in the nexus of social relationships and life obstacles. The telling 
actor-subject tells his/her story through interlacing it with the others’ stories. The 
narrative identity of Iris, her “narratable self” resides precisely in her identity as 
illness sufferer, as subject confronting obstacles in the life’s journey. She expresses 
the sufferer’s voice, the broken or impossible voice that contrasts with “the voice of 
the healthy” (Hydén 62).  
 From a formal point of view, the memoirs pertain to the three types of illness 
narratives formulated by Hydén (see my presentation in chapter 4): “illness as 
narrative, narrative about illness and narrative as illness.” For the present analysis the 
interplay between “illness as narrative” and “narrative about illness” is significant. 
 John Bayley’s memoirs voice Iris’s suffering and his own suffering. They 
constitute the textual interface where voices, through disclosing their vulnerability and 
failure (both Iris’ and John’s), at the same time display and displace time and a 
narrative disrupted by illness episodes, and propose a narrative where voice strives to 
restore personal integrity. As illness progresses, the memoirs turn into a clash of 
voices, exorbitant truth of incoherence, rage and exhaustion, and it is into the breaches 
opened by the fractures of voice that the restoration effort emerges. Thus, the question 
one has to ask in the context of a referential narrative is whether John Bayley’s 
memoirs respect the rules of referential writing proposed by Eakin (Living 
Autobiographically; see my discussion in chapter 4) and what would be the 
consequences of infringing these rules in Iris’ case? The question is even more 
relevant in the case of the second memoir, Iris and Her Friends…where Iris’ 
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aggravated illness seems to decompose her self and renders her even more vulnerable. 
 I would argue that the memoirs expose both the truth of an impossible 
narrator, Iris, her mysterious, obsessive queries, unfinished words, crippled 
intelligence, and the risky expression of an author losing his own face, John, his rage, 
his own anxiety which, in the second memoir, he struggles to counter through 
recomposing his autobiography. 
 Nonetheless, as Roy Henry suggests, “His escape into his memories and 
desires only underscores the depth of his attachment to Iris Murdoch” (604). We have 
seen that the first volume ended with the “closer and closer” metaphor of their 
relation. Iris and her Friends… explores further the “closeness of closeness” where 
the self, as he becomes more and more dependant on the suffering Other, on her 
overwhelming illness, battles for imaginary separation, through evading into his own 
memory; John’s memory is taken hostage by Iris’ dementia, it depends on it: 
Poor darling. No rest for that head. And I need its agitations now. If there 
were peace and silence, if she were not here beside me, my fantasy about the 
Perfect Woman and Gerrards Cross, together with memories of Littlestone 
and the golf course and the Mixed Room and my ruined cottage–they would 
all vanish away together. Like that puff of smoke. (Bayley, Iris and her 
Friends 221) 
 As announced in the title, the memoir is about “Iris and her friends” and 
through the reading of the memoir one finds out that the figures and characters of 
John’s own autobiographical memory are Iris’s friends, interlaced with fictional 
characters that once were residents of Iris’ own imagination and memory. 
 What disconcerts the reader of the memoir is the double movement of 
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Bayley’s memory: recounting a separate, independent autobiography that does not 
refer to his life with Iris, and the sense of being possessed by, dependant on the 
demented Iris in the “closer and closer” relation. Bayley’s very dependency on the 
Other, on Iris, distends his own memory and reinstates his interiority: 
This feast of memory seems never to have existed for me before these days 
when Iris has lost her own memory.… Might she herself be soothed at these 
times of the day by some obscure knowledge of the compensatory pleasure 
which memory, let loose now like a horse in a meadow, is bringing me?… 
Remembering for love of doing it–comfort food–is bound to be selfish. But 
selfishness can itself help the very person who might seem cut off by it. The 
comfort I give Iris depends on my ability to lead this inner private life, whose 
vividness ironically depends on Iris not being present in it. It is all pre-Iris; all 
done and gone long before our own life together.” (Bayley, Iris and her 
Friends 59-60) 
What would I do without her? Impossible to imagine any other routine. I 
certainly cannot imagine enjoying my solitary drink unless Iris were safely in 
bed and asleep upstairs.… After nearly fifty years, I feel closer to Iris in a way 
that is different from a parent’s for a child. Every day the knowledge that iris 
and I are one flesh grows more overwhelming. The further the illness takes 
her away in the spirit, the more she is with me in the flesh.… At the moment 
she keeps me sane. The final egoism, is it?” (187-188) 
 In Levinas’s view, one cannot take an ethical stance to the different, 
transcendent Other unless the I is separated and constitutes an independent, free 
interiority, unless the I resides in himself. There is a radical difference between what 
one can say and how one can talk about oneself, and what and how one can talk about 
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the Other that both imposes separation and establishes the unavoidable intersubjective 
relation. Separation is produced as inner “psychism” (Levinas, Totalité et infini 23), as 
personal, discontinuous time that cannot be assimilated into historical time, egoism, 
sensibility and pleasure, a mode of “autohospitality” (Montandon 7). Through 
memory, “psychism” assumes, receives as subject the original birth whose 
significance does not depend on a totalizing history which erases particular existences 
and subsumes them in documentary chronology:  “La mémoire comme inversion du 
temps historique est l’essence de l’intériorité” (26). Memory thus reverses the 
passivity of the past, its mere passage, historicity, and the already happened that 
would mean death.37 
 And yet, the memoir announces explicitly both John’s detachment from Iris 
and his merging with her, the inseparableness from her, the impossibility of distancing 
himself from the radically different, lost, hated Other. John’s interior movement 
seems to depend on a connective tissue (Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible) with 
“She,” the externalized, ridiculed Iris, relegated at an infinite distance, but faceless, 
expressing no discourse: 
Shamelessness comes upon me now that Iris herself has gone, or is going. I 
don’t care what I do write or say about her or about anything else.… I find 
myself proclaiming to others, and to myself, as well, ‘She seems to want to go 
to bed about seven,’ or ‘In this new phase, she’s very restless in the night.’ 
Who is She who has made an appearance, and with whom others and myself 
are so familiar?… She has indeed become a She.… Did I write about Iris last 
year to stop her becoming such a She?” (Bayley, Iris and her Friends 242) 
                                                     
37 “Memory recaptures and reverses and suspends what is already accomplished in birth-in nature. 
Fecundity escapes the punctual instant of death” (Levinas, “La Souffrance Inutile” 56). 
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 How can one understand the memory that saves itself, and at the same time, 
attached to the voiceless companion, recounts the double story of memory itself and 
of the dissolution of memory? I would argue that in Bayley’s second memoir, Iris’ 
loss of memory, forgetting, becomes itself a grotesque agent of disorder, a 
hyperbolized incomprehensibility that threatens with its ghostly voices, with being 
absorbed in its abyss, and at the same time expresses helplessness, asks for help, for 
the self’s answer. 
 Scholars have studied the grotesque with reference to the body. Ambivalence 
is one of the main traits of the corporeal grotesque, where the subject goes beyond its 
frontiers, the individual body forces, protrudes its limits, intermingles with and 
prolongs external objects and bodies (Bakhtine, L’œuvre de François Rabelais). The 
grotesque body is in a permanent movement of construction and also recreates other 
bodies, annihilates the distinction between the internal / external territories. 
 I would rather suggest that one could interpret the loss of memory, the 
hypertrophy of silence through the grotesque image. In Bayley’s second memoir 
forgetfulness cannot be dissociated from voice, and body. The grotesque loss of 
memory is expressed through the grotesque voice and prolongs into a grotesque body. 
But a grotesque forgetfulness is suffering, anxious loss through the absence of its own 
limits and its indeterminacy, an eerie darkness with no landmarks, a hypertrophy of 
void and it provokes both its rejection, separateness from it, the struggle to contain 
one’s own memory in a coherent whole through the narrative of the self, and, thus, the 
ability to respond to the Other’s call. 
 Voices, the sound of indeterminate voices, lost query constitute the very incipit 
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of the memoir that will haunt John’s proliferation of memories and fantasies: 
One night some months ago … I had woken up suddenly with the feeling that 
something was wrong … For there was a subdued noise somewhere in the 
house. The sound of voices. Was it burglars? But why should burglars be 
talking? Did they think the house was empty? I reached over the other side of 
the bed. There was nothing there. Iris had gone.… And to whom was she 
talking? Surprising how eerie her voice sounded, in the silence of the night, 
coming up muffled from somewhere downstairs. No words to recognize. 
There wouldn’t, in any case, be intelligible words. No doubt that’s why it 
sounded like two or three people conversing together, voices merging. Who 
are these new friends of Iris ?… My heart sank inside me as I realized that the 
disease must have entered another phase.… for a moment, I thought I heard 
the voice of Macbeth, the most terrifyingly intimate of all Shakespeare’s 
tragic characters. ‘Methought I heard a voice cry Sleep no more!’ ” (Bayley, 
Iris and her Friends 242) 
 The memoir unfolds as a distention of Iris’ fracture of wandering voices, 
countered by John’s own multiplying self-memories. Iris’ voices become the double, 
the shadow of John’s own memory, which seems to be caught in the paradox of Iris’ 
obsessive desire to leave home, to wander, and her wish to remain in the presence of 
John: “I marveled yet again … at the contradiction between her instinct to be away– 
anywhere, anywhere out of our world–and her wish to be my shadow. My water 
buffalo, interposing her bulk so that I can’t vanish away” (Bayley, Iris and her 
Friends 195). As illness progresses, one can observe a gradually de-facing of Iris 
which translates the grotesque of the proliferation of forgetfulness. Thus Iris 
metamorphoses into a “water buffalo” which allows John’s own abjection of Iris: 
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Nowadays, I can deliver a volley of obscenities at her and she smiles and 
nuzzles me as if they constitute the deepest, most loving reassurance. “Damn 
your eyes. Blast your guts. Bugger off, can’t you!” I shout it with a beaming 
smile, giving her a not-too-gentle push or a whack on the behind. (195) 
 Conflicting voices compete through Bayley’s discourse. The memoirs play 
thus on the verge of ambivalent feelings: love and hate in the prospect of a living 
death and indefinite mourning. They follow the ambivalent movement of idealizing 
Iris, the writer, and ironically abjecting her decay, as if Iris’ diminished intellectual 
capacities were swallowing her entire person in a grotesque mixture of retardation and 
childish naughtiness. Mental decay becomes the metaphor for a debased reversal of 
the traditional social feminine role, from caregiver to an infantile care recepient. 
However, the metaphor resonates at the same time with the socially constructed image 
of elderly women as dependant persons (Chivers). The terrible mother is reduced to a 
three-year-old toddler with the de-faced figure of a water buffalo, even if she liked 
their pictures before illness:  
…my rage over the indoor plants.… Unfortunately they had also entered the 
orbit of Iris’ obsession with her small objects, things that she has picked up in 
the street and brought into the house. She began to water them compulsively. 
I was continually finding her with a jug in her hand, and the window-sill and 
the floor below it slopping over with stagnant water, I urged her repeatedly 
not to do it … that day I went suddenly berserk. Astonishing how rage 
produces another person, who repels one, from whom one turns away in 
incredulous disgust, at the very moment one has become him and is speaking 
with his voice. The rage was instant and total, seeming to come out of 
nowhere. ‘I told you not to! I told you not to!’ in those moments of savagery 
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neither of us has the slightest idea to what I am referring. But the person who 
is speaking soon becomes more coherent. Cold too, and deadly. ‘You are 
mad. You’re dotty. You don’t know anything, remember anything, care about 
anything.’ This accompanied by furious aggressive gestures. Iris trembling 
violently. ‘Well–’ she says, that banal prelude to an apparently reasoned 
comment.” (Bayley, Iris and her Friends 174-175) 
 Telling truth equates in this case with exposing loss of voice, loss of face and 
thus loss of self. It dissolves privacy and “normative models of personhood.” But 
recounting the story of an Alzheimer’s sufferer, through narrating the narrative as 
illness, imposes itself a recounting of “illness as narrative” in which illness affects the 
capacity to recount, to tell one’s “narratable self.” Thus, as a result of the illness’ 
progress, the discourse of illness as narrative and the narrative as illness seem to 
collapse in the metaphor of a “closeness of closeness” (Bayley, Iris: A Memoir 92), 
“closer and closer together” (183) movement that seems to leave no choice except of 
being absorbed by the presence of illness. Discourse is inseparable from illness in 
Bayley’s memoir, the “narrative as illness” is indistinguishable from the “illness as 
narrative” and it cannot evade truth as exposure of a decentred (whether it would 
concern Iris or John), forgetful self and displaced memory. From this perspective, the 
rules of life-narratives necessitate a review. Telling the story of an Alzheimer’s 
sufferer without telling the story of his/her suffering as disintegration of the self or 
covering one’s ambivalence would make no sense. The fundamental trait of an 
Alzheimer’s sufferer resides in his/her loss of self and narrative means. As I suggested 
in the analysis of Frank Davey’s writing, the ethical value of his diary resides in the 
very disclosing of vulnerability, in the call upon one’s own exposure to the Other’s 
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vulnerability. In Bayley’s memoirs Iris is the suffering subject who compels one to 
write her story. If she cannot use narrative means, she is situated in the ethical position 
to call upon them in the Other, through the Other’s voice. The memoirs emerge in the 
process of forgetting, inserted in its traces.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 I started the reflection of my doctoral dissertation with questioning the paradox 
of the experience of suffering: its subjective foundation and its intersubjective 
dimension. In the social sciences scholars approached illness narratives as operators of 
the intersubjective relation to the suffering Other. Though lived time is one of the 
existential dimensions of the experience of suffering, they emphasized the embodied 
condition of the sufferer. If the temporal structure of illness narratives has been 
studied, the tendency was to study it from a configurative perspective: suffering “the 
disturbance of ‘memory’ ” that affects the construction of the self’s understanding and 
coherence. My main concern has been with the disruption of memory as lived 
remembering capacity that affects the self’s ability to articulate memory through 
linguistic and narrative means, in the context of the last stages of brain cancer and 
Alzheimer’s disease. 
 Thus, I focused my research on the telling, voice disruptions in sufferers who 
experience themselves as “impossible storytellers,” who live on the verge of losing 
their “narratable self.” As a consequence, I showed that one has to understand illness 
narratives as embodied discourses that articulate the intersubjective relation to the 
suffering Other who is losing his/her remembering capacity. The main question to 
answer concentrated on the narrative mechanisms that could render possible this 
relation. 
 This question opened onto the discussion of the relation between suffering and 
198 
pain that I addressed through a phenomenological approach and the frame of the 
embodied paradigm. I concluded that the subjective experience of suffering cannot be 
dissociated from physical pain. 
 In the second chapter I reviewed the scholarly literature on the experience of 
suffering with respect to the problem of intersubjectivity. I proposed an 
interdisciplinary perspective based mainly on phenomenological studies, the paradigm 
of embodiment, medical anthropology and sociology. In a first moment, following 
Kahn and Steeves (“The Significance of Suffering”) I identified the “existential 
domains” of suffering and pain: “the experience of time, lived human relations, and 
lived space” and pointed to the necessity to discuss the embodied condition of the 
sufferer. From a phenomenological point of view, embodiment is understood as an 
already significant, preobjective and prereflective situation in the world. It is in this 
context that one has to discuss the problem of intersubjectivity. I was able to trace two 
main positions with respect to the limits in which intersubjectivity can be integrated or 
not in the experience of suffering: immanentist positions that deny any possibility of 
an intersubjective relation to the suffering Other; and anthropological and sociological 
positions that suggest that suffering and pain are intersubjectively, socially and 
culturally constructed. Even these, however, do not effectively discuss how 
intersubjectivity is realized; they explain the embodied lived experience with social 
and cultural constructivism. At the same time, following studies on suffering and pain, 
I confronted the aporia of the objectification of pain (the estrangement, thematization 
of one’s own painful body) and its preobjective status. As a way out of the aporia, I 
suggested to take up the body’s thematization as a moment of the very subjective 
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experience which opens up the possibility of interpretation, of the discursive reference 
to pain and suffering, eventually of the intersubjective relation without leaving the 
ground of embodiment. Consequently, I had to readdress the problem of 
intersubjectivity while considering the dialectics between the subjectivity and 
objectivity of the suffering experience, the disruptive, negative mode of the painful 
subjectivity that seem to annihilate intersubjectivity. 
 I found the appropriate solution in an ethical approach drawing mainly on E. 
Levinas’ philosophy and on anthropological and phenomenological studies that took 
up the problem of the language and narratives of pain and suffering. 
 In the analyses of Frank Davey’s diary, and John Bayley’s memoirs, I 
considered text as an interface between voices, between self and the suffering Other, a 
permeable interface that displays wounds, interruptions, and ambivalences. 
 The original contribution of my research resides in the exploration of the 
intersubjective dimension of suffering through narrative means. I analyzed voice as 
the narrative mechanism that relates one to the suffering Other. I detected both the 
limits of sociological and anthropological studies in grasping the narrative 
mechanisms of intersubjectivity, and the limits of narratological studies of voice. I 
suggested that, in the context of life-narratives, an ethical definition of voice would 
allow us to overtake the ambiguities of narratological studies and to explain how one 
can relate to the suffering Other. Drawing upon Saint Augustine interpretation of time, 
memory and forgetfulness, and on Levinas’ view on the intersubjective foundation of 
time, I proposed a new definition of narrative voice as distended between the present 
voice of voice present, the present voice of voice past and the present voice of voice 
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future. I demonstrated how the textual interface allows grasping interferences: how 
one voice prolongs the Other’s voice without annulling the Other’s voice, how the 
Other’s voice breaches the self’s voice and thus distends it into a memorial work by 
obsessively remembering forgetting, the Other’s forgetting, and retracing memory 
through forgetting – whether the Other’s memory, the memory of a life in common or 
the self’s personal memory. 
 As any interdisciplinary research, this study faced the danger of following 
multiple paths simultaneously. My ambition was to explore the problem of suffering 
and pain in different fields ranging from ethics and phenomenology to medical 
anthropology and sociology, narratological and life-narratives studies, and to detect 
through the narrative analysis of voice, the ethics of the intersubjective relation. In the 
end it results that the analytical means correspond, overlap with what I identified as 
the object of this study: the intersubjective dimension of the experience of suffering; 
namely, through the distension of voice, the Other has breached one’s own discourse. 
Thus, a second epistemological difficulty ensues: the circularity of my argument, with 
a subsequent concern about ethics’ own capacity to effectively engage in an anti-
totalizing approach of the Other, of his/her voice. The question is relevant especially 
in the context of referential life-narratives, where I hoped to identify what escapes 
from the representation of the Other, and consequently, from the danger of his/her 
misrepresentation. Fundamentally, the Other, his suffering cannot be represented, but 
voiced, and through one’s own voicing one conveys one’s vulnerability too, loss of 
face (as in John Bayley’s case). Voicing equates with being exposed: crying, shouting, 
insulting, ordering, conveying at the same time ambivalence and what exposes 
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ambivalence. Voice itself is multiple, distended, before being multiplied. Thus, I see 
this research as a starting point for further investigation deviating from a 
narratological approach that could not grasp the effects of voice at the interference 
between text and the Other, between the self and the Other. 
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